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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis contains five papers. Two belong to the field of industrial or-
ganization. Both are on innovation and the investment in it. The paper
“Persistence of Monopoly and Research Specialization” takes a new look
at monopoly persistence and explores which effects determine it. In “En-
try and Incumbent Innovation”, we investigate how the threat of entry
influences the innovation activity of an incumbent. Two papers belong
to the field of contract theory. They are on principal-agent relationships
with moral hazard. In “Ambiguity in a Principal-Agent Model”, we as-
sume that the agent’s knowledge about the statistical properties of the
performance measure is ambiguous and that the agent is averse to ambi-
guity. We investigate how ambiguity and ambiguity aversion change the
use of information and the power of the incentives which are optimally set.
In “The Optimality of Simple Contracts: Moral Hazard and Loss Aver-
sion”, Fabian Herweg, Daniel Mu¨ller, and I explore how an agent’s loss
aversion changes the complexity of the optimal contract. The last paper
is on the economics of education and human capital formation. In “The
Technology of Skill Formation and Hidden Information”, we consider a
model of child development, where the formation of human capital occurs
in multiple stages via investments. We explore how hidden information
about how to treat a young child best changes the optimal investment
plan. In the remainder of the introduction, we will explain the papers
and their results in more detail.
In Chapter II, we investigate the persistence of monopolies in markets
with innovations. The extensive literature on the subject has discussed
this issue in terms of the efficiency effect and the replacement effect.
Since competition destroys profits, the efficiency effect predicts that the
2incumbent’s incentive to remain a monopolist through innovating is at
least as great as the entrant’s incentive to become a duopolist. The re-
placement effect predicts the opposite: the entrant’s incentive to innovate
is higher than the incumbent’s because only the incumbent takes into ac-
count that innovating replaces its existing technology. According to the
classical work of Gilbert and Newbery (1982), the efficiency effect deter-
mines the outcome, whereas in a seminal paper by Reinganum (1983) it
is the replacement effect.
We build a unifying model in which both effects are present. In our
model, the first-moving incumbent may be able to discourage the poten-
tial entrant from investing in research by investing itself. The outcomes
of research activities are uncertain. Therefore, preemption is less than
perfect. For high success probabilities, we obtain a result in the spirit
of Gilbert and Newbery (1982): preemption is almost perfect and so the
efficiency effect is the driving force. For low success probabilities the
incumbent can hardly preempt and so the replacement effect predomi-
nates. This result is in the spirit of Reinganum (1983). A rough intuition
is that research is a powerful preemption device if and only if it is likely
to succeed.
The former results imply that research with a high success probability
is more likely done by the incumbent than by the potential entrant, and
it is vice versa for research with a low success probability. In this sense,
incumbents specialize in “safe” research, and potential entrants in “risky”
research. We also show that research undertaken by potential entrants
is, on average, “riskier” than that of incumbent firms. Moreover, the
probability of entry has an inverted U-shape in the success probability
of research. Since even at the peak the probability of entry is only a
quarter, the persistence of monopoly is high. We also explore the norma-
tive aspects of our model and show that, apart from one exception, firms
never overinvest and may underinvest. When the incumbent preempts
the potential entrant and the innovation is non-drastic, overinvestment
may occur.
In Chapter III, we explore how the threat of entry influences an in-
cumbent’s investments in R&D. This question is important since innova-
3tions are central to growth. The literature has found two counteracting
effects. First, the Schumpeterian effect. A larger entry threat reduces
the incumbent’s expected profit and therefore also its investment. Sec-
ond, the entry deterrence effect. To deter entry, or to make entry un-
likely, a greater threat requires a larger investment. Combining both
effects yields that the incumbent’s investment is hump-shaped in the en-
try threat. When the entry threat is small and increases, the incumbent
invests more to deter entry or to make entry unlikely. This is due to the
entry deterrence effect. However, when the threat becomes huge, entry
can no longer profitably be deterred or made unlikely and the investment
becomes small. Then the Schumpeterian effect dominates. We show that
these results are robust to different timings. In one time structure, the in-
cumbent does not know the rivals’ production costs when deciding about
investment. In the alternative timing, the costs are known.
Chapter IV is motivated by the following empirical findings: wage
schemes sometimes do not depend on performance or the dependence
is rather weak. Additionally, the Informativeness Principle, according
to which the principal uses all information in a compensation contract
which is correlated with performance, is often violated. These findings
are in contrast to the theoretical literature. We show that considering
ambiguity and ambiguity aversion can bring theory in line with empirics.
There is also a conceptual justification to consider ambiguity. In
standard models of principal-agent relationships, it is implicitly assumed
that the agent knows precisely the statistical properties of the perfor-
mance measure. However, we think that this is a rather strong—and in
real life often unrealistic—assumption. We relax it by assuming that the
agent faces ambiguity with respect to the performance measure. Due to
ambiguity, the agent’s beliefs about the distribution of the shock on the
performance measure are not represented by a single probability function,
but instead by a set of probability functions. Since Ellsberg (1961), at the
very latest, we know that subjects are averse to ambiguity. Therefore we
assume that the agent is not only risk-averse, but also ambiguity-averse.
We show that with ambiguity the agent is pessimistic about the distri-
bution of the shock on the performance measure. As a consequence, the
4compensation demanded by the agent is relatively high, compared to the
standard model (which neither considers ambiguity nor ambiguity aver-
sion). Because the principal has to ensure participation of the agent, this
implies that the principal’s cost of providing incentives is relatively high.
As a result, the principal sets relatively weak incentives which yield a
relatively low expected payoff. It may even be the case that the optimal
contract is a fixed wage.
When there are two performance measures, it can be optimal for
the principal to ignore one of them (and potentially both), even though
both measures are informative. The reason is that with ambiguity, the
inclusion of a measure into a wage scheme causes costs which are not
negligible even when the wage depends on the measure only to a small
extent. Hence, the Informativeness Principle does not hold in our model.
In Chapter V, Fabian Herweg, Daniel Mu¨ller, and I consider a prin-
cipal-agent relationship with moral hazard. Empirically, wage schemes
sometimes consist of remarkably few different levels. Sometimes there are
even only two levels: a base wage and a lump-sum bonus. The observed
simplicity of contracts, however, is at odds with predictions made by
economic theory. We show that considering loss aversion can solve this
puzzle.
Our model is standard but for one twist: the agent is assumed to
be loss-averse in the sense of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). With
the tradeoff between incentive provision and risk-sharing being at the
heart of moral hazard, allowing for a richer description of the agent’s
risk preferences that goes beyond standard risk aversion seems a natural
starting point to gain deeper insights into contract design. Our main
finding is that a simple lump-sum bonus scheme is optimal when loss
aversion is the driving force of the agent’s risk preferences. This is in stark
contrast to the findings for a standard risk-averse agent. The intuition is
as follows: an agent who is risk- but not loss-averse exhibits local risk-
neutrality. This implies that paying slightly different wages for different
signals improves incentives at negligible cost. Therefore simple contracts
cannot be optimal. With a loss-averse agent, this is no longer true. With
the reference point being multidimensional under the concept of Ko˝szegi
5and Rabin, the agent is first-order risk-averse at all possible wage levels.
In consequence, paying even slightly different wages reduces the agent’s
expected utility, for which in turn he demands to be compensated. Thus,
by offering a simple contract that specifies only few different wage levels,
the principal can lower the expected payment necessary to compensate
the agent.
In Chapter VI, we contribute to the literature on the formation of
human capital. Cunha and Heckman (2007) consider an economic model
of child development, where the formation of human capital occurs in
multiple stages via investments. They solve for the optimal intertemporal
investment plan, which is important to derive policy implications. We
extend their framework by assuming that children are differentiated in
the sense that a child’s type determines what type of investment is most
productive for him/her, and that this information is not available when
a child is young. When a child is old, the type is revealed.
How does the optimal investment plan change as a result of hidden
information? There are two intuitive guesses. (i) It is optimal to invest
less in the first and a more in the second phase of childhood, because in
the second one can tailor the investments to a child’s type and therefore
yield a high return of investment. (ii) It is optimal to invest more in the
first and less in the second phase to make sure that, despite low returns
in the first phase, the effective investment in the first phase is not “too
bad”. We show that the answer crucially depends on the substitutability
of investment between phases: when investments are easily substitutable
(easier than Cobb-Douglas), intuition (i) is right; when substitution is
difficult (more difficult than Cobb-Douglas), (ii) is right. More specif-
ically, hidden information weakens the importance of early investments
in children when inter-phase investments are easily substitutable, but
strengthen them when substitution is difficult.
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II. PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY AND
RESEARCH SPECIALIZATION
We examine the persistence of monopolies in markets with
innovations when the outcome of research is uncertain. We
show that for low success probabilities of research, the incum-
bent can seldom preempt the potential entrant. Then the effi-
ciency effect outweighs the replacement effect. It is vice versa
for high probabilities. Moreover, the incumbent specializes in
“safe” research and the potential entrant in “risky” research.
We also show that the probability of entry has an inverted
U-shape in the success probability. Since even at the peak
entry is rather unlikely, the persistence of the monopoly is
high.
II.1. INTRODUCTION
This paper takes a new look at monopoly persistence in markets with
innovations. The extensive literature on the subject has discussed this
issue in terms of the efficiency effect and the replacement effect. Since
competition destroys profits, the efficiency effect predicts that the incum-
bent’s incentive to remain a monopolist through innovating is at least as
great as the entrant’s incentive to become a duopolist. The replacement
effect (Arrow, 1962) predicts the opposite: The entrant’s incentive to in-
novate is higher than the incumbent’s because only the incumbent takes
into account that innovating replaces its existing technology. According
to the classical work of Gilbert and Newbery (1982; henceforth GN) the
efficiency effect determines the outcome, whereas in a seminal paper by
8Reinganum (1983; henceforth RE) it is the replacement effect.1 We build
a unifying model in which both effects are present. We allow for un-
certainty with respect to the outcomes of innovative activities and show
that the success probability of research determines the relative strength
of both effects.
We consider a monopolized market, where the first-moving incum-
bent may be able to discourage the potential entrant from investing in
research by investing itself.2 The outcomes of research activities are un-
certain. Therefore, preemption is less than perfect. For high success
probabilities we obtain a result in the spirit of GN: preemption is almost
perfect so the efficiency effect is the driving force. Intuitively, since the
success probability is high the potential entrant’s expected profit from
research greatly depends on the incumbent’s research decision. Hence,
it is very likely that the incumbent can and does preempt the potential
entrant. For low success probabilities the same argument applies in re-
verse, i.e., the incumbent can hardly preempt and so the replacement
effect predominates. This result is in the spirit of RE.
These results imply that research with a high success probability is
more likely done by the incumbent than by the potential entrant, and it
is vice versa for research with a low success probability. In this sense,
incumbents specialize in “safe” research, and potential entrants in “risky”
research. We also show that research undertaken by potential entrants
is, on average, “riskier” than that of incumbent firms. Moreover, the
probability of entry has—at least roughly—an inverted U-shape in the
success probability of research. Since even at the peak the probability of
entry is only a quarter, the persistence of monopoly is high.
We also explore the normative aspects of our model. We consider the
second best world in which pricing cannot be regulated and show that,
apart from one exception, firms never overinvest and may underinvest.
1See also the debate in Reinganum (1984) and Gilbert and Newbery (1984).
2The idea that a dominant firm might use its investment decision as a strategic
device to persuade a potential entrant not to enter stems from Spence (1977) and
Dixit (1980). They consider capacity investments.
9When the incumbent preempts the potential entrant and the innovation
is non-drastic, overinvestment may occur.3 Intuitively, this holds when
in case that incumbent’s research is successful (i) the monopoly price is
almost the same as when the incumbent would have the old technology (so
that the consumer surplus is hardly increased) and (ii) the incumbent’s
profit only slightly improves relative to the investment costs.
The research process considered by GN is commonly interpreted as an
auction. As an extension, we integrate such an auction process into our
model. This changes our results: regardless of the success probability,
the incumbent will always outbid the entrant if the innovation is non-
drastic. So entry will never occur. This replicates GN’s result in a more
general framework which allows for uncertainty of the research process.
Our paper is related to the literature on the persistence of monopoly
in markets with innovations, which is surveyed by Gilbert (2006). The
relation of our model to GN and RE is discussed later. Denicolo (2001)
and Etro (2004) consider a research process of the RE type where the
replacement effect disappears, since the aggregate R&D effort is inde-
pendent of the incumbent’s decision. Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) show
that in RE’s model, when the innovation is non-drastic, the efficiency ef-
fect may outweigh the replacement effect. With different outcomes being
possible, there is, however, no clear-cut result.4 Our model delivers clear
and intuitive results without any assumption on whether the innovation
is drastic or not.
We offer a novel explanation to the question why entrants do riskier
research than incumbents. Existing literature on this question empha-
sizes other explanations. While Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) look at
differences in the risk-attitudes of firms, De Meza and Southey (1996)
3An innovation is called drastic if it is so large that the innovative entrant is
effectively unconstrained by incumbent’s competition. It can charge monopoly prices
and yield monopoly profits.
4See Fudenberg and Tirole (1986, Ch. 3) and Tirole (1988, pp. 397-398). Also
Beath, Katsoulacos, and Ulph (1989a, 1989b) show that both effects can play a role
in a model similar to RE’s. But again, no clear and simple results can be yielded
(1989a, p. 167).
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consider excessive optimism of entrepreneurs. Scherer and Ross (1990,
Ch. 17) blame the bureaucracy in large companies. Baumol (2004) high-
lights educational differences between researchers in incumbent firms and
entrepreneurs that engage in research. In Rosen (1991) the ex ante high-
cost firm must spend more than the ex ante low-cost firm to yield the
same cost level. Through this asymmetry, the former chooses a riskier
research project than the latter.
We present, analyze, and discuss the model in Sections II.2, II.3, and
II.4, respectively. A welfare analysis is in Section II.5. After considering
an auction setting in Section II.6, we conclude in Section II.7. Proofs are
in the Appendix.
II.2. MODEL
There are two firms, an incumbent 퐼, and a potential entrant 퐸. At
stage 1 the incumbent decides whether or not to invest in a firm specific
research project. Investing causes expected costs of 푘 > 0 and yields an
innovation with probability 푝 ∈ (0, 1]. At stage 2 firm 퐸 faces the same
decision. In order to focus on the replacement and the efficiency effect we
set both firms on equal footing and assume that both firms’ projects have
the same costs and success probabilities. At stage 3 nature independently
determines whether each firm’s project is successful or not. A successful
firm gets a process innovation that enables production at per-unit costs
of 푐. If 퐼 does not invest or its project fails, it can produce at per-unit
costs of 푐¯ by using its old technology, where 푐¯ > 푐 > 0. In contrast, if
퐸 does not invest or its project fails, it cannot produce at all. Finally,
at stage 4, firms compete a` la Bertrand. For reasons that will become
clear later, we assume that there is also a stage 0 where first the success
probability 푝 is drawn from density 푔, and then the cost 푘 is drawn from
conditional density ℎ.5
Firms are risk neutral and cannot collude. There is perfect informa-
tion. The solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Con-
5When 푘 is drawn before or simultaneously to 푝, we can ignore the 푘 value until 푝
is drawn, and so preserve the vision that 푝 is drawn first.
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sumer demand is given by the function 퐷(휙), where 휙 is the consumer
price. We assume that 퐷(휙) is falling in 휙, positive for 휙 = 푐¯+휖 (where 휖
is small and positive), and 퐷(푐) is finite. These assumptions allow us to
borrow Tirole’s (1988) analysis of Bertrand profits; see below. To yield
clear-cut normative results we have to assume that monopolist’s optimal
price is unique.6
II.3. ANALYSIS
We solve the model by backward induction. In this section we first de-
scribe the Bertrand profits of firms. Then we determine their research
decisions. Finally we present the results.
II.3.1. BERTRAND PROFITS
Bertrand profits are uniquely determined by the firms’ production costs
and therefore can be expressed as 휋퐽(푐퐼 , 푐퐸), where 퐽 ∈ {퐼, 퐸}, 푐퐼 ∈
{푐¯, 푐}, and 푐퐸 ∈ {푐,−}. The symbol “–” indicates that 퐸 cannot produce
at all. We normalize the maximal profit 휋퐼(푐,−) to 1. The following
lemma on the structure of firms’ profits is due to Tirole (1988).7
L e m m a 1:
(i) 휋퐸(푐¯,−) = 휋퐸(푐,−) = 휋퐸(푐, 푐) = 휋퐼(푐, 푐) = 휋퐼(푐¯, 푐) = 0,
(ii) 1 > 휋퐼(푐¯,−) > 0,
(iii) 1 ≥ 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐) > 1− 휋퐼(푐¯,−).
Part (i) describes the well-known result that when a firm cannot pro-
duce or has the same or even higher per-unit costs than its competitor its
Bertrand profit is zero. Part (ii) states that a monopolist is strictly bet-
ter off with low than with high per-unit costs; nonetheless, a monopolist
with high per-unit costs makes a positive profit. The first inequality of
6Hermalin (2009) offers some weak assumptions on 퐷(⋅) that guarantee inter alia
uniqueness; see his Proposition 3. The key assumption is that 퐷(⋅) is log-concave.
7Tirole partially summarizes existing literature. He does not consider the Nash
equilibria found by Blume (2003) where one firm plays a weakly dominated strategy;
see Tirole (1988, p. 234, footnote 37).
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part (iii) contains the efficiency effect : since competition destroys indus-
try profits, 퐼’s incentive to remain a monopolist through innovating [and
yield a Bertrand profit of 1] is at least as great as 퐸’s incentive to become
a duopolist [which yields a Bertrand profit of 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)]. However, when 퐼
takes into account that its old technology is replaced when it innovates
[the net-effect of innovating on its Bertrand profit is just 1−휋퐼(푐¯,−)] 퐸’s
incentive to innovate is higher than 퐼’s. This is the replacement effect
which is captured by the last inequality. When the first weak inequal-
ity of (iii) is strict we say that the innovation is non-drastic; in case of
equality the innovation is called drastic.
II.3.2. RESEARCH DECISIONS
Firm 퐽 ’s research decision, 퐽 ∈ {퐼, 퐸}, is denoted by 푎퐽 ∈ {0, 1}, where
0 denotes no investment and 1 investment. We assume that in case of
indifference a firm does not invest.8
Potential Entrant’s Research Decision.— Since 푎퐼 is either 0 or 1,
there are two subgames. Letting 푏퐸(푎퐼) denote 퐸’s best responses to 푎퐼 ,
we have
푏퐸 [0] = 1 ⇐⇒ 푘 < 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)푝 =: 푘¯(푝); (II.1)
푏퐸 [1] = 1 ⇐⇒ 푘 < 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)(1− 푝)푝 =: 푘(푝). (II.2)
Thus, 퐸 invests if and only if the costs 푘 are sufficiently low. More
specifically, if 푘 < 푘(푝), then 푎퐸 = 1 is 퐸’s dominant strategy and when
푘 ≥ 푘¯(푝) the dominant strategy is 푎퐸 = 0. For 푘 ∈ [푘(푝), 푘¯(푝)) we have
푏퐸(0) = 1 and 푏퐸(1) = 0.
Incumbent’s Research Decision.— 퐼 chooses the optimal action
foreseeing 퐸’s later responses. If 푘 ≥ 푘¯(푝), then
푎퐼 = 1 ⇐⇒ 푘 < (1− 휋퐼(푐¯,−))푝 =: 푘ˆ(푝); (II.3)
if 푘 < 푘(푝), then
푎퐼 = 1 ⇐⇒ 푘 < (1− 휋퐼(푐¯,−))(1− 푝)푝 =: 푘˜(푝); (II.4)
8To rule out that cases of indifference drive our results we will later introduce an
assumption that guarantees that cases of indifference have a measure of zero.
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and if 푘 ∈ [푘(푝), 푘¯(푝)), then
푎퐼 = 1 ⇐⇒ 푘 < 푝. (II.5)
Equilibrium.— Using the previous formulas the construction of the
equilibria is straightforward. Figure II.1 shows the equilibrium research
decisions, which we denote by 푎∗ = (푎퐼∗, 푎퐸∗). The following lemma
summarizes formally.
휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)
1− 휋퐼(푐¯,−)
푘 = 푝
푘(푝)
푘˜(푝)
1
1 푝
푘
푎∗ = (1, 0)
푘¯(푝)
푘ˆ(푝)
푎∗ = (0, 1)
푎∗ = (1, 1)
푎∗ = (0, 0)
Figure II.1: Research decisions in equilibrium.
L e m m a 2: The firms’ research decision in equilibrium are
∙ 푎∗ = (1, 1) for 푘 ∈ [0, 푘˜(푝));
∙ 푎∗ = (0, 1) for 푘 ∈ [푘˜(푝), 푘(푝));
∙ 푎∗ = (1, 0) for 푘 ∈ [푘(푝), 푘¯(푝));
∙ 푎∗ = (0, 0) for 푘 ≥ 푘¯(푝).
Intuition.— Investments are strategic substitutes. In the parameter
area where 푘 ∈ [푘(푝), 푘¯(푝)) 퐸 invests if and only if 퐼 has not invested.
Hence, 퐼 can preempt 퐸. But is it profitable for 퐼 to preempt? Yes it
is, due to the efficiency effect: in this parameter area 푘 < 푝, i.e., (II.5)
holds. Roughly speaking, 퐼 prefers the risk to replace its old technology
itself to the risk of being replaced by 퐸. Hence in this parameter set the
equilibrium is 푎∗ = (1, 0). Note, in this parameter set regardless whether
퐼 invests or not, exactly one firm will invest and so eventually make 퐼’s
old technology obsolete. Consequently, 퐼 does not take into account that
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its existing technology may be replaced by its own investment and the
replacement effect plays no role.
For low 푝 values preemption is possible only for a relatively small
range of costs, compared to the range of costs where at least one firm
invests. The line of arguments is as follows. Observe that the probability
that only 퐸 receives the innovation when it invests—and thus receives a
positive Bertrand profit—hardly changes through 퐼’s decision. Therefore,
퐸’s expected profit from research hardly depends on 퐼’s decision. Hence,
preemption is seldom possible. In contrast, for high 푝 values, preemption
is mostly possible; the arguments stated before apply in reverse. So
research is a powerful preemption device if and only if it is likely to
succeed.
Due to the replacement effect, there is a set of parameters where 퐸
is willing to invest, irrespective of what 퐼 has done, but where 퐼 is no
longer motivated to invest, given that 퐸 will invest. Hence in this set
푎∗ = (0, 1). As explained before, when the success probability 푝 is high,
퐸’s expected profit from research—and so its willingness to invest—is
very sensitive upon 퐼’s investment decision. Hence the replacement effect
loses its power when 푝 becomes large. In the extreme case of 푝 = 1, it
has no power at all: 퐸 never invests when 퐼 has invested.
When the costs are very low both firms are always willing to invest
and hence 푎∗ = (1, 1). In the remaining parameter set, costs are so high
that 푎∗ = (0, 0).
II.3.3. RESULTS
From Figure II.1 or the arguments made before it is intuitive that when
the success probability 푝 is low the replacement effect is“more important”
than the efficiency effect, whereas for high 푝 values it is vice versa. To
formalize this intuition, we assume that prior to the firms’ investment
decisions the costs 푘 and the success probability 푝 are drawn. This is
kind of a comparative statics analysis which allows us to determine how
“important” the different equilibria and effects are.
In order to obtain concrete results we make the following assumption
which says that 푘 is uniformly distributed in the “relevant” set.
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A s s u m p t i o n A1: The conditional density of 푘, ℎ(푘∣푝), is uni-
form in 푘 for (푝, 푘) ∈ 풮 :=
{
(푝, 푘)∣0 < 푝 ≤ 1, 0 < 푘 ≤ 푘¯(푝)
}
.
With this assumption we can establish our main result which is about
the probability of investments, conditional on 푝. Note, we take the per-
spective that 푘 is not yet drawn.
P r o p o s i t i o n 1 : Suppose A1 holds. If 푝 is sufficiently high, 퐼 is
more likely to invest in research than 퐸. It is vice versa if 푝 is sufficiently
low.
Intuitively, given that a high 푝 value was drawn, it is much less likely
that a 푘 will be drawn which lies in the small interval where 푎∗ = (0, 1)
rather than in the large interval where 푎∗ = (1, 0); see Figure II.1. For a
low 푝 value it is vice versa. Put differently, when the success probability is
high it is likely that the incumbent preempts the potential entrant and so
that the efficiency effect determines the outcome. This is not true when
the success probability is low. Then the replacement effect predominates.
So both effects are important in our model, and the success probability
determines their relative power.
Taking another view by looking at a large number of 퐼-퐸-pairs, Propo-
sition 1 predicts that most of the “risky” research is done by potential
entrants but not by incumbents. Incumbents on the other hand specialize
in “safe” research, which is undertaken rarely by potential entrants.9
Perhaps not surprising—albeit nontrivial to prove—is that potential
entrants’ research is“riskier”than that of the incumbent. We measure the
likelihood of failure when neither 푝 nor 푘 is yet drawn. Additionally to
A1 we assume that 푝 is distributed with positive and non-atomic density.
P r o p o s i t i o n 2 : Suppose A1 holds and that 푔(푝) has full support
and is finite ∀푝 ∈ (0, 1]. Then 퐸’s research is more likely to fail than 퐼’s.
The sketch of the proof is as follows: First we show that the likelihood
that 퐼 invests relative to the likelihood that 퐸 invests is increasing in 푝.
9We say that research is“risky” (“safe”) when 푝 is low (high). This denomination is
cheeky because when 푝 is low the outcome of the research process can be less uncertain
than when 푝 is high.
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Then we show that this implies that the distribution of 푝, conditional
that 퐼 invests, first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of 푝,
conditional that 퐸 invests. This enables us to finally prove that 퐸’s
research is more likely to fail than 퐼’s.
What remains to determine is the persistence of monopoly. When 퐸
has invested and is successful, it competes with 퐼 on the market. Then
the monopoly does not persist. Otherwise the monopoly persists. We
can deliver the following result about the probability of entry (i.e., non-
persistence of the monopoly), conditional on 푝.
P r o p o s i t i o n 3 : Suppose A1 holds. Then the probability of en-
try is at most 푝(1− 푝).
The intuition is simple: When 푝 is low, research is seldom successful
and entry rarely occurs. When 푝 is high, on the other hand, 퐼 pre-
empts 퐸 except for a small interval of cost realizations; see Proposition
1. Therefore entry is unlikely, too. For intermediate values of 푝, how-
ever, it is likely that 퐸 invests and is successful. Hence, the probability
of entry has roughly an inverted U-shape in 푝.10 By Proposition 3, the
probability of entry is at most 1/4, which implies that the probability
for the monopoly to persist is at least 3/4.11 Hence we conclude that the
persistence of the monopoly is high.
II.4. DISCUSSION
II.4.1. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Baumol (2004) finds that “risky” research is most often done by en-
trepreneurs and not by incumbents, and that it is vice versa for “safe”
research.12 This fits Proposition 1. Also Vinod Koshla notes that “[r]isk
10Ignoring the probability mass outside 풮 (this is possible when one redefines the
densities 푔 and ℎ accordingly) yields an exact inverted U-shape.
11The reason why the persistence is not lower in our model when the replacement
effect is powerful is that the replacement effect is only strong when research often
fails—and failure of potential entrant’s research is another reason for persistence.
12See also Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 653).
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and acceptance of failure are central to innovation, [...] but the dinosaurs
typically avoid both” (Statement in The Economist, 2007, p. 3). For in-
dustries in which failures are common, our model predicts that most of
the research is done by potential entrants and not by incumbents. This
seems to be the case, for example, in the IT sector.
Proposition 2, which states that 퐸’s research is more likely to fail
than 퐼’s, is supported by Astebo’s (2003, p. 227) finding that
“the average probability that an independent inventor suc-
ceeds in commercialising his/her invention is estimated to
about 0.07. In comparison, the probability of commercial suc-
cess of conducting R&D in established firms is approximately
0.27,”
where the later value is from Mansfield et al. (1977). Further evidence is
provided by Baumol (2004) and Bianchi and Henrekson (2005, p. 367).
Empirically, the persistence of monopolies seems to be high (Geroski,
1995), as Proposition 3 predicts.
II.4.2. THE ROLE OF ASSUMPTION A1
Scherer and Ross (1990) elucidate how the costs of R&D are distributed.
However, since we use expected costs and normalize them we cannot use
their insights. To us, A1 seems a natural starting point. This assumption
is not as restrictive as it may seem for several reasons. First, A1 assumes
that ℎ(⋅) is uniform in 푘 for parameters of the set 풮, but ℎ(⋅) may still
depend upon 푝. Second, when the average density of 푘 conditional on 푝
in the different equilibrium sets of 풮 is the same, the proofs, and so also
our results, stay unchanged.13 Third, A1 is sufficient, but not necessary,
for our results.
To see the last point, suppose that A1 does not hold. Proposition 1
also holds under the alternative, weak assumption: the average density
13More technically this means that for all 푝 ∈ (0, 1], ℎ¯(푘 ∈ 푎∗ = (1, 0)∣푝) = ℎ¯(푘 ∈
푎∗ = (0, 1)∣푝) = ℎ¯(푘 ∈ 푎∗ = (1, 1)∣푝), where ℎ¯(푘 ∈ 푎∗ = 푖∣푝) is the average conditional
density of 푘 when 푘 is in equilibrium set 푖.
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of 푘, conditional on 푝 and that either only 퐼 or 퐸 invests, is bounded
between two positive constants.14 Additionally observe that then the
probability of entry approaches 0, as 푝 approaches 0 or 1. So at least
roughly the probability of entry has an inverted U-shape in the success
probability of research; cf. Proposition 3.
A1 is important for Proposition 2. When A1 does not hold, the
likelihood that 퐼 invests relative to the likelihood that 퐸 invests can
be locally decreasing in 푝. Hence, the result stated in Proposition 2
can reverse. From Figure II.1 it is, however, intuitive that for “many
distributions” of 푘 and 푝 the result holds.15
II.4.3. COMPARISON TO THE LITERATURE
In our model each firm possess one idea, which can be interpreted as
a box. Each box contains either nothing or the innovation.16 To open
its box a firm has to invest.17 This conception implies that the success
probability of research is exogenous, and if a box turns out empty there
14Formally, ℎ¯(푘 ∈ 푎∗ = 푖∣푝) has an infimum and a supremum which are in ℝ++
for all 푖 ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)} and for all 푝 ∈ (0, 1]. To understand why this condition
is sufficient consider the following example. The supremum is twice as large as the
infimum. Look at Figure II.1 and determine the 푝 value for which the interval of 푘
values with equilibrium 푎∗ = (1, 0) is twice as large as the interval with 푎∗ = (0, 1).
When a 푝 is drawn which lies above this critical value we can be sure that it is more
likely that the costs 푘 will lie in the interval with 푎∗ = (1, 0) than in the interval with
푎∗ = (0, 1). So it is more likely that 퐼 invests in research than that 퐸 does. One can
also easily construct a lower critical value of 푝 and show that it is vice versa when 푝
is low enough.
15Think of a joint probability distribution lying over Figure II.1. Ignore the density
when 퐼 does not invest. Then calculate 퐼’s center of mass. Make the same steps for
퐸. For “many distributions”, 퐼’s center is further to the right than 퐸’s.
16With this interpretation nature determines success or failure already at Stage 1.
Since firms do not know the realization until Stage 3 this modification of the timing
does not change the model in any way.
17This description is in line with Scotchmer’s (2004) statements that “[a]n innova-
tion requires both an idea and an investment in it” (p. 39) and that “some research
efforts do not pay off with certainty ... [and] failures obviously cannot be identified
in advance” (p. 40).
19
is no way for that firm to get the innovation. Since each box can be
opened at most once, the game is not repeated.18
The models differ greatly with respect to uncertainty. GN consider
no uncertainty in the research process. In RE the uncertainty effectively
concerns only the arrival date of the innovation, because the game is
repeated unless one firm is successful. In our model, on the other hand,
it is uncertain whether a firm’s idea is realizable; see above. This type
of uncertainty is extremely important in reality, see Freeman and Soete
(1997, Ch. 8), Scotchmer (2004, pp. 40, 55), or DiMasi (2001).
In our model research is a powerful preemption device if and only if
it is likely to succeed. In contrast, in GN preemption is always possible,
in RE never. When preemption is possible, it is worthwhile due to the
efficiency effect. Consequently, the efficiency effect is the driving force in
GN, in our model when the success probability is high, and does not play
a role in RE. When preemption is not possible, the efficiency effect is not
important, and the replacement effect steps in. Hence it predominates in
RE, in our model when the success probability is low, and not at all in
GN. Moreover, the probability that a monopoly persists is below one-half
in RE, equal to one in GN, and between three-quarters and one in our
model. Hence, regarding the importance of the relevant effects and the
persistence of monopoly, we take a position between RE and GN.
II.4.4. TIMING AND ROBUSTNESS
We assumed that firms decide sequentially about investing in research.
When instead they decide simultaneously, preemption is not possible, and
our results are no longer valid. While arbitrary from a theoretical point
of view, the assumption of a sequential investment game is not unusual
in the literature and also has an intuitive appeal: First, in contrast to
18An interesting extension would be that firms have several boxes. However, even
when one assumes that each firm can open at most one box the analysis gets cumber-
some because the number of cases multiplies. Another interesting extension would be
that firms can manipulate the type of their box, or that they can influence upfront
what type they likely will receive.
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the incumbent, the potential entrant might need some time to gather
information about the market or to obtain funding. Second, Freeman and
Soete (1997, p. 202) argue that “a firm which is closely in touch with the
requirements of its customers may recognize potential markets”. So the
incumbent but not the potential entrant, may be quicker in developing
new ideas. Third, with the incumbent being already prominent among
market participants, its activity may be visible for everyone, while the
entrepreneur’s may not. Hence, only the incumbent may be able to
credibly preannounce its investment decision.
In an earlier version of the paper we considered a different timing,
where the potential entrant observes incumbent’s success or failure be-
fore it decides about its investment. This does not change our results
substantially. The same is true for the following extensions: (i) heteroge-
nous research costs or success probabilities, (ii) patents,19 (iii) Cournot
competition, (iv) product innovations, and (v) correlated success proba-
bilities.
II.5. WELFARE ANALYSIS
In Section II.3 we analyzed the positive aspects of our model. Now we
explore the normative implications. In the second best world where prices
cannot be regulated we seek to answer the question whether there is
too much or too little investment from a welfare point of view. The
literature (see Tirole 1988, p. 399) has found two counteracting effects.
First, there is the nonappropriability of social surplus effect: firms may
underinvest because the innovator typically does not receive the whole
19Our non-extended model can be interpreted in two ways: (i) There are no patents
and each firm keeps details of its innovation secret so that an outsider cannot imitate.
This interpretation is empirically justified because“patents are regarded as a necessary
incentive for innovation in only a few industries” (Cohen 1995, p. 227). See also
Scotchmer (2004, Ch. 9). (ii) There are patents but both firms innovations are
different in the sense that each firm can get a patent on its technology. Additionally
note, that there are patents in RE and GN is not crucial for their results: Without
patents and with Bertrand competition a firm no longer wants to engage in research
when its competitor was already successful.
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social surplus created by its innovation. Second, firms may overinvest due
to the business stealing effect: the innovator may not take into account
that it steals the rival’s business.
P r o p o s i t i o n 4 : When the innovation is non-drastic and the in-
cumbent preempts the potential entrant then firms may overinvest. In
all other cases firms do not overinvest and may underinvest.
We first give the intuition for the case where the innovation is non-
drastic and the incumbent preempts the potential entrant. When incum-
bent’s research is successful it may set a price which is almost the same as
when it would have the old technology. So the consumer surplus is hardly
affected through the innovation. That is, the nonappropriability of social
surplus effect is weak. Observe that through the threat of entry, the in-
cumbent is “forced” to steal its own business. Hence the business stealing
effect is powerful and may dominate. Put differently, no investment of
both firms may be socially desirable.
In contrast, when the innovation is drastic, the successful incumbent
sets a much lower price than it would set without the innovation. So the
expected consumer surplus increases greatly and the nonappropriability
effect dominates. Similar arguments apply for the case where only the
potential invests.
One may presume that when both firms invest this may not be socially
desirable: research effort is duplicated and so both firms may yield the
innovation. This suspicion is false. When both firms are successful the
consumer price is only 푐, which results in a dominant nonappropriability
effect.
Subsidies.— Suppose that the only policy instrument of a gov-
ernment is a research subsidy. Through subsidies the government can
change firms’ investment decisions, since firms determine their invest-
ments on the basis of the net costs. Proposition 4 shows that subsidies
are especially relevant to support drastic innovations because for these
innovations firms sometimes underinvest but never overinvest.
Targeting subsidies to potential entrants and not to incumbents has
two potential advantages. First, the equilibrium 푎∗ = (0, 1) is socially
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weakly preferred to 푎∗ = (1, 0).20 Second, promising a subsidy to 퐸 in
case that it invests can push 퐼 to preempt 퐸. Hence, the subsidy is not
paid. Nonetheless a previously unexplored research project may now be
investigated.
II.6. EXTENSION: AUCTION SETTING
GN’s research process is commonly interpreted as a first-price auction
with complete and perfect information (Reinganum, 1984). Next, we
integrate such an auction setting and show that our results change sub-
stantially.
Suppose 퐼 and 퐸 bid for the service of a firm which implements a
research project for the winner.21 The auction is held before it is clear
whether the research project will be successful.22 A firm’s valuation is
its willingness to pay for victory, i.e., the difference in its expected profit
between winning and losing.
P r o p o s i t i o n 5 : The incumbent always wins if the innovation is
non-drastic.
So with an auction setting and a non-drastic innovation there never
is entry. This result coincides completely with GN.23 Intuitively, since
퐼 can always outbid 퐸, preemption is always possible. Given that the
20When the innovation is non-drastic the preference is strict: total welfare is higher
when there is a duopoly in which 퐸 has the innovation than in a monopoly where 퐼
has it.
21This need not be taken literally. GN’s interpretation is that the firms are in a
race, and the firm which invests most wins. Another is that firms compete for scarce
and essential resources, and so only the firm which invests the most gets them.
22The alternative timing is that the auction is held afterwards. Then either a project
with a success probability of one or zero is auctioned. In the latter case holding an
auction is superfluous. The former case is a just special case in the setting of the
original timing. Hence, the alternative timing needs no separate investigation.
23We allow for an uncertain research process. GN consider uncertainty only verbally,
but it is not clear to us what type of uncertainty they mean. Yi (1995) couples an
auction with RE’s model, and his result is that the entrant will never do research.
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innovation is non-drastic, then, by virtue of the efficiency effect, 퐼’s val-
uation is strictly higher than 퐸’s, and preemption is indeed worthwhile.
In contrast, when the innovation is drastic firms’ valuations are the same
and one has to specify a tie-breaking rule. However, if there is only a
bit of uncertainty whether an innovation is indeed drastic, 퐼’s valuation
is higher than 퐸’s, and so 퐼 will win the auction. Hence generically, 퐸
never does research, and entry never occurs. This insight is new.
II.7. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a simple model in which both, the replacement and the
efficiency effect are present. We showed that research is a powerful pre-
emption device if and only if it is likely to succeed. This results in the
predominance of the efficiency effect when the success probability of re-
search is high and the predominance of the replacement effect when it is
low.
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III. ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION
We explore how the threat of entry influences the innovation
activity of an incumbent. We find that the incumbent’s in-
vestment is hump-shaped in the entry threat. When the entry
threat is small and increases, the incumbent invests more to
deter entry, or to make it unlikely. This is due to the entry
deterrence effect. However, when the threat becomes huge,
entry can no longer profitably be deterred or made unlikely
and the investment becomes small. Then the Schumpeterian
effect dominates.
III.1. INTRODUCTION
Even though innovations are central to growth, the question whether
more competition leads to greater R&D investments is not settled. While
we do not try to answer this general question, we seek to explore the more
specific question how the threat of entry influences an incumbent’s in-
vestments in R&D. We build a simple model that captures two important
but counteracting effects. First, a Schumpeterian effect. A larger entry
threat reduces the incumbent’s expected profit and therefore also its in-
vestment. Second, an entry deterrence effect.1 To deter entry, or to make
entry unlikely, a greater threat requires a larger investment.
Combining the effects, we find that the incumbent’s investment is
1For the importance of entry in the United States, see Aghion and Howitt (2006,
p. 279). Entry deterrence is empirically relevant: “Most R&D investments made by
private firms are aimed at securing market advantage” (Scotchmer 2004, p. 1). See
also the empirical study of Goolsbee and Syverson (2008).
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hump-shaped in the entry threat. When the entry threat is small and
increases, the incumbent invests more to deter entry or to make entry
unlikely. Then the entry deterrence effect dominates the Schumpeterian
effect. However, when the threat becomes huge, entry can no longer prof-
itably be deterred or made unlikely and the investment becomes small.
Then the Schumpeterian effect dominates.
We show that the hump-shaped relationship between incumbent’s
R&D investment and the entry threat is robust to different timings. In
one time structure, the incumbent does not know the rivals’ production
costs when deciding about investment. In the alternative timing the costs
are known.
Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2009) also explore
how the R&D investment of an incumbent depends on the strength of
the entry threat.2 A difference is that they measure the entry threat by
entry costs, whereas we measure it by the number and quality of poten-
tial entrants. Additionally, in their model, the leading incumbent is not
only threatened by a potential entrant, but also by another incumbent.
They show that a higher entry threat increases the leading incumbent’s
investment when the firm is initially close to the technological frontier;
this is due to the escape-entry effect. It is the other way round if the
leading incumbent is further behind the frontier; this is due to the dis-
couragement effect. So in contrast to our model, for a certain type of
firm, only one effect is present and the influence of a higher threat on
the investment is monotone. The model has some problems. First, in
a dynamic model it is not appealing that firms only consider the profit
of the next period, but not at all profits of later periods. Second, why
should there be a technological frontier which moves exogenously? Is it
not more plausible that firms themselves determine how the technological
frontier moves? Indeed, regarding the former two points, Aghion, Bloom,
Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) take the completely opposite route.
Third, it is assumed that innovations occur step-by-step and that entry
can only take place at the new technological frontier. This has the un-
2For a similar model, see Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2005).
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plausible consequences that an incumbent which is close to the frontier
and innovates must not fear entry at all. In contrast, an incumbent which
is further below the frontier cannot prevent entry, no matter how much
it invests.
In Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) the interplay
between an escape-competition effect and the Schumpeterian effect gen-
erates an inverted-U relationship between R&D investment and product
market competition. In their model, the leader (of a duopoly) does not
want to innovate because this does not change its profit. This is in con-
trast to our model where we only consider the incentives of the leader
(which is in our case a monopolist). Moreover, they do not consider entry.
There is a discussion in competition policy about the optimal patent
breadth, how costly imitation should be, and when competition law
should require a firm with market power to share its property.3 In our
model, stronger patent protection, higher costs of imitation, or stricter
property rights can be interpreted as a weakening of the entry threat.
Empirically, there is no clear evidence that patents provide strong posi-
tive incentives to invest in innovation. The picture is rather mixed.4 This
is a puzzling result (Lerner 2009, p. 347). Our model delivers a simple
and intuitive solution. We predict that the incumbent’s investment is
hump-shaped in the entry threat.5
Our model can also be interpreted as one in which the incumbent is
a home firm that is threated by foreign firms. The empirical results are
mixed but point to a positive relationship between foreign competition
3See, for example, Gallini (1992), Scotchmer (2004), Segal and Whinston (2007),
and Vickers (2009).
4See the survey of Bessen and Meurer (2008), the study on the role of the patent
system in the British Industrial Revolution of Mokyr (2009), or Lerner’s (2009) study
on the impacts of shifts in patent policy across 60 countries.
5Also Segal and Whinston (2007) show that in some cases “policies that protect
entrants necessarily raise the rate of innovation” (p. 1703); they concentrate on inno-
vations made by potential entrants. In Boldrin and Levine’s (2009) model investments
in R&D are higher in a competitive equilibrium than in a monopolistic equilibrium.
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and innovation in the home market.6
The relationship between the intensity of competition and R&D in-
vestment is generally regarded as ambiguous in theoretical models. This
is due to the large variety of relevant effects and of the definition of
competitiveness.7
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the
model. In Section III.3, we analyze it. The alternative timing is consid-
ered in Section III.4. Section III.5 explores the question how important
the incumbent’s initial production costs are for the relationship between
incumbent’s R&D investments and the entry threat. Section III.6 con-
cludes.
III.2. MODEL
There is an incumbent, firm 0, and 푁 rivals, firms 1, ..., 푁 . Rivals can
enter at cost 푡 > 0. They threat the monopoly position of the incumbent.
By investing in R&D the incumbent can lower its production costs which
makes entry less likely. We will explore how the incumbent’s optimal
investment varies with the quality and the number of rivals.
At Stage 1, the incumbent chooses its R&D investment 푘 ≥ 0. The
incumbent’s per-unit production costs are
푐0(푘) = 퐶 − ℎ(푘),
where 퐶 > 0. We assume that the function ℎ is twice differentiable and
satisfies the following mild assumptions.
6See Gilbert and Sunshine (1995), Lelarge and Nefussi (2008), MacDonald (1994),
Pavcnik (2002), Javorcik (2004), and Aitken and Harrison (1999). Aghion, Blundell,
Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2009) find mixed results, in accordance with their the-
oretical predictions: whether there is a positive or negative effect depends on the
distance of the incumbent to the technological frontier.
7See, for example, Lee and Wild (1980) vs. Delbono and Denicolo (1991), Gilbert
and Sunshine (1995), Belleflamme and Vergari (2006), Sacco and Schmutzler (2007),
Schmutzler (2007), Denicolo and Zanchettin (2008), and Vives (2008). For a survey,
see Aghion and Griffith (2005) or Gilbert (2006).
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A s s u m p t i o n A2: (i) ℎ′(푘) > 0, (ii) ℎ′′(푘) < 0, (iii) ℎ(0) = 0,
(iv) lim푘→∞퐶 − ℎ(푘) > 푡, (v) ℎ
′(0) > 1.
In words, (i) says that a higher investment lowers production costs; (ii)
that there are decreasing returns to scale; (iii) that no investment yields
no cost reduction; (iv) that it is not possible to yield production costs that
make entry impossible; (v) that when there is no entry threat, investing
at least a tiny amount is optimal, see below. Parts (i) and (iv) imply
퐶 > 푡.
At Stage 2 the rivals’ per-unit production costs (푐1, ..., 푐푁 ) are drawn.
8
We will later make concrete assumptions on the distributions.
At Stage 3, the rivals decide upon entry in an arbitrary order, poten-
tially simultaneous. We assume that in case of indifference a rival does
not enter.
At Stage 4 all rivals that entered and the incumbent compete a` la
Bertrand. All firms produce a homogenous good. Figure III.1 summa-
rizes the timing.
1 Incumbent 2 (푐1, ..., 푐푁 ) 3 Entry 4 Bertrand
invests are drawn decisions competition
Figure III.1: Timing
Consumers have unit demand and a willingness to pay of one.9 If
there are two or more cheapest firms, they buy from the firm with the
lower production costs. This assumption is solely made to avoid open set
problems. So that the market is always served, we assume that 퐶 < 1.
There is perfect information, and each firm maximizes its expected
profit. Our solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We
consider only pure strategy Nash equilibria.
8Also Hopenhayn (1992) considers productivity shocks. But he does not consider
innovations.
9That is, the incumbent’s revenue is at most 1. So any investment 푘 > 1 is
dominated by 푘 = 0. So one could relax Assumption A2(iv) to 퐶 − ℎ(1) > 푡.
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III.3. ANALYSIS
III.3.1. BERTRAND COMPETITION AND ENTRY
Standard analysis of the Bertrand game yields that rival 푗’s total profit
when it entered the market is
휋entry푗
∣∣
ℳ
= max{0,min{푐푖}푖∈ℳ∖푗 − 푐푗} − 푡,
where 푗 ∈ {1, ..., 푁} and ℳ ⊆ {0, ..., 푁} is the set of all firms which
are in the market, that is, the incumbent plus the rivals that entered.
The first term of the formula is the Bertrand profit. If firm 푗 does not
have the lowest production costs among all firms in a market, it makes
a Bertrand profit of zero. Otherwise its Bertrand profit is the minimum
per-unit cost of all other firms in the market minus its own production
costs. The second term is cost of entry.
When a rival does not enter it makes zero profits. Hence, no rival
wants to enter in equilibrium, if and only if
휋entry푗
∣∣
ℳ={0}
≤ 0 ∀푗 ∈ {1, ..., 푁}. (III.1)
This can be rewritten as
푐0(푘) ≤ 푐푗 + 푡 ∀푗 ∈ {1, ..., 푁}.
When this condition does not hold, the equilibrium is such that some
rival 푗 enters. Then 푐푗 < 푐0(푘) and the incumbent will make a Bertrand
profit of zero. Hence,
휋0(푘) =
{
휋no entry0 (푘) = 1− 푐0(푘)− 푘 for 푐0(푘) ≤ 푐+ 푡,
휋entry0 (푘) = −푘 otherwise,
(III.2)
where we defined 푐 := min푗∈{1,...,푁}{푐푗} as the minimum production costs
of rivals.
III.3.2. INVESTMENT
The incumbent’s expected profit when it invests 푘 is
피[휋0(푘)] = 휋
no entry
0 (푘)Prob
no entry(푘) + 휋entry0 (푘)Prob
entry(푘).
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Using (III.2) we can rewrite this as
피[휋0(푘, 퐹 )] = (1− 퐶 + ℎ(푘))(1− 퐹 (퐶 − ℎ(푘)− 푡))− 푘,
where 퐹 is the distribution function from which 푐 is drawn. The in-
cumbent’s incentives to invest are determined by the marginal effect of
investment on its expected profit.
Consider first the benchmark case where entry never occurs:
푑피[휋0(푘, 퐹 )]
푑푘
= ℎ′(푘)− 1. (III.3)
The first term on the right hand sight captures the marginal effect of
investment on production costs, the second describes the marginal cost
of investment.
Next, consider the more interesting case where entry may occur:
푑피[휋0(푘, 퐹 )]
푑푘
= ℎ′(푘)(1− 퐹 (퐶 − ℎ(푘)− 푡)) (III.4)
+(1− 퐶 + ℎ(푘))푓(퐶 − ℎ(푘)− 푡))ℎ′(푘)− 1,
where 푓 is the density function which belongs to 퐹 . What has changed
through the entry threat? On the one hand, the return of investment
is lower: it becomes less likely that the investment is actually used in
production; see the first term. Put differently, it is less likely that the
investment “pays off”. This is called the Schumpeterian effect.10 On the
other hand, the return of investment is higher: investing more makes
entry less likely; see the second term. We call this the entry deterrence
effect of investment.11 Since both effects run in different directions it
may well be the case that the incumbent’s incentive to invest is higher
with an entry threat than without one.
10See also Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001) and Aghion, Bloom, Blun-
dell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005). The Schumpeterian effect is closely related to the
discouragement effect in Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2009).
11Aghion and Griffith (2005) call this the Darwinian effect of competition. Our
entry deterrence effect is similar to the escape-entry effect considered by Aghion,
Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2009) and the escape-competition effect de-
veloped in Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001) and Aghion, Bloom, Blundell,
Griffith, and Howitt (2005).
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For concreteness, we assume that the production costs (푐1, ..., 푐푁 ) of
the rivals are independently drawn from exponential density functions.
Rival 푗’s costs are drawn from density
푓푗(푐푗) = 휆푗푒
−휆푗푐푗 (III.5)
with 휆푗 > 0 and corresponding distribution function
퐹푗(푐푗) = 1− 푒
−휆푗푐푗 . (III.6)
The nice feature when all 푐푗’s are independently and exponentially dis-
tributed is that 푐 is exponentially distributed, too:12
퐹 (푐) = 1− 푒−휆푐, with 휆 :=
푁∑
푗=1
휆푗.
Hence we can allow for heterogeneity of the rivals through different
휆푗s without complicating the analysis. The parameter 휆 captures the
strength of the entry threat. It increases with the number 푁 and quality
휆푗 of rivals. When 휆 = 0 there is no entry threat.
Under the exponential distribution of the rivals’ per-unit costs, we
get
피 [휋0(푘, 휆)] = (1− 푐0(푘)) 푒
−휆(푐0(푘)−푡) − 푘. (III.7)
Let the optimal investment be given by the function 푘∗(휆).
P r o p o s i t i o n 6 : When there is no entry threat the incumbent
invests a positive amount: 푘∗(0) = ℎ′−1(1) > 0. When the entry threat is
huge (휆→∞) the incumbent does not invest. An investment of at least
푘ˆ, where 푘ˆ is an arbitrary positive investment level, cannot be optimal
when 휆 is sufficiently high.
Proof: See Appendix.
12Technically we need the distribution of the first-order statistics. This distribu-
tion can also be derived when each rival’s costs are not drawn from an exponential
distribution. Then the distribution of the first-order statistics is in general more
complicated.
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That is, the incumbent invests some positive amount when there is no
entry threat. In contrast, when the threat is overwhelming, entry occurs
for sure. Then the incumbent does not invest at all. The Schumpeterian
effect dominates the entry deterrence effect. The intuition for the last
point is as follows. When the entry threat is large, entry is very likely,
even when the incumbent invests 푘ˆ or more. So the incumbent invests
an amount less than 푘ˆ to save investment costs.
Next we explore whether it is possible that a higher entry threat
increases the optimal investment. The next proposition offers a sufficient
condition such that this is true.
P r o p o s i t i o n 7 : Suppose that 퐶 < 1+푡
2
. The optimal investment
푘∗(휆) is increasing in 휆 for 휆→ 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Since we assumed that 퐶 ∈ (0, 1) and 푡 > 0, this sufficient condition
can easily be met. When the initial production costs 퐶 are low, the
incumbent’s monopoly profit is high. Then the incumbent invests more
when there is a small entry threat than when there is no threat, because
it wants to defend its monopoly. That is, for low entry threats the entry
deterrence effect dominates the Schumpeterian effect. In contrast, when
퐶 is high, the monopoly profit is low and so the incumbent may have
few incentives to defend its monopoly position. Then the Schumpeterian
effect dominates the entry deterrence effect even for small entry threats.
The next Proposition follows directly from Propositions 6 and 7.
P r o p o s i t i o n 8 : Suppose that 퐶 < 1+푡
2
. The optimal investment
푘∗(휆) is hump-shaped in 휆.
To sum up, when the entry threat is small and increases, the in-
cumbent invests more to make entry unlikely. This is due to the entry
deterrence effect. However, when the threat becomes huge, entry can no
longer profitably be made unlikely and the investment becomes small.
Then the Schumpeterian effect dominates.
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In the Appendix, we consider an alternative specification where 푐 is
drawn from the uniform distribution and show that our results are robust.
The robustness of our results is also shown in the next section.
III.4. ALTERNATIVE TIMING
We now consider an alternative timing where Stage 1 and 2 are inter-
changed. That is, the incumbent already knows (푐1, ..., 푐푁 ) when deciding
about investment. The optimal investment is denoted by 푘∗∗(푐).
When the rivals’ production costs are infinite we know from the pre-
vious analysis that entry never occurs. From (III.2) we get that the
incumbent’s investment is then
푘∗∗(∞) = ℎ′−1(1) > 0. (III.8)
Note, also for 푐 ≥ 1− 푡 there is also no entry threat, because even when
the incumbent does not invest, no rival would enter. So without an entry
threat the incumbent’s investment is the same in both timings.
The profit function, given that entry is deterred, is concave in 푘:
푑2휋no entry0 (푘)/푑푘
2 = ℎ′′(푘) < 0.
So when the incumbent deters entry, it either invests 푘∗∗(∞) or, if that
is not enough, just enough to deter entry:
푘deter entry(푐) =
{
푘∗∗(∞) = ℎ′−1(1) for 푐 ≥ 푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푡,
ℎ−1 (퐶 − 푡− 푐) otherwise.
(III.9)
When the incumbent does not want to deter entry, 휋0(푘) = −푘, see
(III.2). So the optimal investment is
푘do not deter entry(푐) = 0. (III.10)
This yields zero profits.13
13Note, even a zero investment may deter entry. So the previous equation is only
sensible when entry occurs, given a zero investment.
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Does the incumbent want to deter entry or not? Denote the invest-
ment, above which entry deterrence yields a loss, by 푘¯. It is implicitly
given by
1− 퐶 + ℎ(푘¯)− 푘¯ = 0. (III.11)
Through the assumptions made before, existence and uniqueness are
guaranteed.14
So when investing according to (III.9) yields an investment which is
at most 푘¯, it is optimal to deter entry and to follow this investment
rule. Otherwise, not deterring entry and zero investments are optimal,
see (III.10). The following lemma summarizes our findings. They are
illustrated in Figure III.2.15
L e m m a 3: When 푐 is below 푐0(푘¯)− 푡 the incumbent does not invest
and entry occurs. Otherwise the incumbent invests according to (III.9)
and entry is deterred.
Figure III.2 shows a hump-shaped relationship between the incum-
bent’s investment and 푐. But to make the results comparable to the one
yielded under the original timing we seek to answer the following ques-
tion: How large is the average investment of the incumbent, given 휆?
Again, we assume that rivals cost are drawn from an exponential density
function.
14푘¯ exists because ℎ is continuous in 푘, and 휋no entry0 (푘 = 1) < 0, 휋
no entry
0 (푘 = 0) >
0. This value is unique because 휋no entry0 (푘 = 0) > 0 and 휋
no entry
0 (푘) is a concave
function of 푘 through A1(ii).
15The following properties of 푘deter entry(푐) are useful to construct the Figure.
(i) 푘deter entry(푐) is continuous at 푐 = 푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푡,
(ii) it has a kink at 푐 = 푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푡:
lim푐↘푐0(푘∗∗(∞))−푡 푑푘
deter entry(푐)/푑푐 = 0 and
lim푐↗푐0(푘∗∗(∞))−푡 푑푘
deter entry(푐)/푑푐 = −1,
(iii) 푘deter entry(푐) is constant in 푐 for 푐 > 푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푡, and
(iv) 푘deter entry(푐) is decreasing and convex in 푐 for 푐 < 푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푡.
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푘¯
푘∗∗(∞) = ℎ′−1(1)
푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푡푐0(푘¯)− 푡
푘∗∗(푐)
푘
푐
Figure III.2: Incumbent’s investment decision
P r o p o s i t i o n 9 : lim휆→0 피[푘∣휆] = 푘
∗∗(∞), lim휆→∞ 피[푘∣휆] = 0. If(
푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푐0(푘¯)
)2
2
− (푐0(푘¯)− 푡)푘
∗∗(∞) > 0,
then the maximum of 피[푘∣휆] is greater than 푘∗∗(∞).
Proof: See Appendix.
Intuitively, when 휆→ 0 the probability that 푐 will lie in the right re-
gion of Figure III.2 approaches one. Therefore, the incumbent’s expected
investment is 푘∗∗(∞). When 휆 → ∞ the probability that 푐 will lie in
the left region of the Figure approaches one. Therefore, the incumbent’s
expected investment is zero.
The intuition for the sufficient condition is as follows: If 휆 is low,
it is very likely that 푐 will lie in the right region of Figure III.2. Then
피[푘∣휆] ≈ 푘∗∗(∞). When 휆 increases, it gets more likely that 푐 is in the
left or in the middle region of Figure III.2. When 푘∗∗(∞) is small enough,
피[푘∣휆] increases with 휆 for small 휆s. The reason is that the reduction of
the probability to get a medium investment 푘∗∗(∞) is overcompensated
through an increased probability to get a high investment.16
16Similarly, given some 푘∗∗(∞), the middle region must be large enough, so that(
푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푐0(푘¯)
)
must be high enough. The size of the left region is 푐0(푘¯) − 푡.
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The results with this alternative timing are qualitatively the same as
with the original timing: For a low entry threat the incumbent’s average
investment is moderate. For a medium threat the incumbent’s average
investment is, under some conditions, relatively high. For a huge entry
threat the incumbent’s expected investment approaches zero. Therefore,
the relationship between the incumbent’s investment and the entry threat
is again hump-shaped.
Additionally note, that the LHS of the sufficient condition in Propo-
sition 9 is decreasing in 퐶:
푑LHS
푑퐶
=
(
−푐0(푘
∗∗(∞)) + 푐0(푘¯)− 푘
∗∗(∞)
) 푑푐0(푘¯)
푑푘¯
푑푘¯
푑퐶
− 푘∗∗(∞) < 0.
Hence, with lower initial production costs 퐶 it is more likely that we get
a hump-shaped relationship between the incumbent’s R&D investment
and the entry threat. This finding concerning the alternative timing is
parallel to the one with the original timing; see Proposition 8.
III.5. HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE INCUMBENT’S INITIAL COSTS?
Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2009) show that a higher
entry threat increases incumbent’s investment when the firm is initially
close to the technological frontier, and it is the other way round when
the incumbent is further behind the frontier. Does this result also hold
in our model?
We have no frontier in our model. But closeness to the frontier corre-
sponds, in our model, to low initial production costs 퐶. As can be seen
from (III.4),
푑2피[휋0(푘, 퐹 )]
푑푘푑퐶
=
− 2ℎ′(푘)푓(퐶 − ℎ(푘)− 푡)) + (1− 퐶 + ℎ(푘))ℎ′(푘)푓 ′(퐶 − ℎ(푘)− 푡)).
The first term is negative, whereas the sign of the second term is am-
biguous. Under the exponential distribution the second term is negative,
When this region is small enough, only little of the probability mass goes in the left
region when 휆 increases, and hence 피[푘∣휆] increases with 휆 for small 휆s.
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too. Therefore we have 푑2피[휋0(푘, 퐹 )]/푑푘푑퐶 < 0.
17
P r o p o s i t i o n 10 : When there is an entry threat, the incum-
bent’s optimal investment is decreasing in the initial costs 퐶.
Proof: See Appendix.
Observe that without an entry threat the incumbent’s optimal invest-
ment is independent of 퐶. Therefore, Proposition 10 implies that with
high initial costs it is more likely that an entry threat decreases the in-
cumbent’s optimal investment. This is similar to the finding of Aghion,
Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2009). The intuition for our re-
sult is as follows. The Schumpeterian effect is more likely to dominate
the entry deterrence effect when the incumbent has initially high costs,
because high costs make entry deterrence (a) less profitable, since the
production costs are relatively high and (b) more difficult, since for a
given investment entry becomes more likely.
With the alternative timing similar arguments hold. Without an entry
threat the incumbent’s optimal investment is independent of the initial
costs. When there is an entry threat, higher initial costs lead to lower
expected investments. This is true because of two effects: (i) with a
higher 퐶, the range where the incumbent does not invest at all increases,
because entry can very often not be profitably deterred; (ii) the maximal
investment 푘¯ decreases.
III.6. CONCLUSIONS
The model formalizes the idea that an incumbent rests on its laurels when
there is no threat, fights when there is some moderate threat, and gives
up when the threat is huge. We measure the threat by the number and
quality of rival firms which may enter the market. A higher threat may
motivate an incumbent to invest more in R&D to deter entry or to make it
unlikely; then the entry deterrence effect dominates. However, when the
17This is also true with other distributions for which 푓 ′(⋅) is negative, zero, or “not
too” positive.
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threat is overwhelming, the incumbent has little chances to deter entry
and invests little or not at all; then the Schumpeterian effect dominates.
Therefore, the relationship between the incumbent’s investment and the
entry threat is hump-shaped.
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IV. AMBIGUITY IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where
the agent’s knowledge about the applied performance mea-
sure is ambiguous. We show that agent’s ambiguity aversion
leads to weaker incentives and a lower payoff for the princi-
pal, compared to the standard model without ambiguity and
without ambiguity aversion. Moreover, when there is enough
ambiguity the principal sets no incentives at all. Additionally,
the Informativeness Principle does not hold.
IV.1. INTRODUCTION
In principal-agent models with moral hazard, the principal motivates the
agent to spend effort via a performance-dependent wage scheme. Stan-
dard theory predicts that the wage scheme highly depends on perfor-
mance. However, in reality, wage schemes sometimes do not depend on
performance or the dependence is rather weak.1 Moreover, the Informa-
tiveness Principle,2 which is a key finding of the literature, “seems to be
violated in many occupations” (Prendergast 1999, p. 21). We show that
considering ambiguity and ambiguity aversion in an otherwise standard
model can bring theory in line with empirics.
In standard models of principal-agent relationships with moral hazard
it is implicitly assumed that the agent knows precisely the statistical
1See Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) or Prendergast (1999) and the references
therein.
2Roughly speaking, the Informativeness Principle says that the principal wants to
use all information in a compensation contract which is correlated with performance.
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properties of the performance measure. However, we think that this
is a rather strong—and in real life often unrealistic—assumption.3 We
relax it by assuming that the agent faces ambiguity with respect to the
performance measure.
The famous Ellsberg (1961) paradox shows that individuals are averse
to ambiguity. Ellsberg suggested the following experiment: there are two
urns, each containing 100 balls, each of which is either red or black. Urn
A contains 50 black balls and 50 red ones. There is no information on
urn B. One ball will be drawn from each urn. A subject has to choose
a bet; when she wins the bet she earns 100$. Empirically, subjects are
indifferent between the bets “the ball drawn from urn A is black” and
“... red”. This also holds for urn B. However, subjects prefer bets in
which urn A is involved over bets in which B is involved. This cannot
hold under the rational expectations hypothesis. Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) propose the following solution: “In case of urn B, the subject has
too little information to form a prior. Hence, (s)he considers a set of
priors as possible. Being uncertainty averse, (s)he takes into account
the minimal expected utility (over all priors in the set) while evaluating
a bet” (p. 142; italics provided). That is, subjects dislike bets with
ambiguity (unknown probabilities). They are ambiguity-averse.4
Maybe the simplest principal-agent model with moral hazard is the
LEN model: the wage scheme is l inear, the agent’s utility is exponential,
and the shock on the performance measure is normally distributed. We
use the standard LEN model except that we assume that the agent’s
3As Gollier (2008) notes, “[i]n many circumstances, it is difficult to assess the
precise probability distribution to describe the uncertainty faced by a decision maker.”
This view is also supported by Ghirardato (1994, see p. 3). Post, van den Assem,
Baltussen, and Thaler (2008, p. 39) emphasize that “real-life choices rarely come with
precise probabilities.”
4In contrast, according to the rational expectations hypothesis, in such circum-
stances, a subject nonetheless has a single probability measure in conformity with the
Bayesian model; see Savage’s (1954) axiomatization and the nontechnical discussion
of Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2008). For a neural empirical study on am-
biguity, see Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, and Camerer (2005). Note, ambiguity is
sometimes also called Knightian uncertainty following Knight (1921).
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knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and that he is
ambiguity-averse. Due to ambiguity the agent’s beliefs about the distri-
bution of the shock on the performance measure are not represented by a
single probability function, but instead by a set of probability functions.
We use Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) ambiguity aversion concept in
which an act is evaluated by the probability distribution that yields the
lowest expected utility. In our moral hazard framework this means that
the agent is pessimistic about the distribution of the shock on the per-
formance measure whenever rewards are subject to stochastics, which is
necessary in order to create incentives. As a consequence, the compensa-
tion demanded by the agent is relatively high, compared to the standard
LEN model (which neither considers ambiguity nor ambiguity aversion).
Since the principal has to ensure participation of the agent, this implies
that the principal’s cost of providing incentives is relatively high. As
a result, the principal sets relatively weak incentives which yield a rel-
atively low expected payoff. It may even be the case that the optimal
incentive scheme is a fixed wage. In the standard LEN model this can
never happen.5
When there are two performance measures it can be optimal for the
principal to ignore one of them (and potentially both), even though both
measures are informative. The reason is that with ambiguity, the inclu-
sion of a measure into a wage scheme causes costs which are not negligi-
ble even when the wage depends on the measure only to a small extent.
Hence, the Informativeness Principle does not hold in our model.
In contrast to the finance literature,6 the ambiguity concept is rarely
used in principal-agent theory. There are a few exceptions. Mukerji
(2003) inquires into the impact of ambiguity in procurement contracts
under cost uncertainty. He shows that the optimal linear contract sets
no financial incentives at all to induce exertion of cost-reducing effort
5Also, in Holmstro¨m and Milgrom’s (1991) multiple-tasks model, it can be optimal
to set weak or no monetary incentives. We show that this can also arise in a one-task
model when there is ambiguity.
6See, for example, Dow and Werlang (1992) or Epstein and Wang (1994).
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when ambiguity is sufficiently high. In contrast to our model, only a
binary shock realization is considered and the agent is assumed to be risk-
neutral. In Lang (2007) the agent is—as in Mukerji (2003)—risk-neutral.
He considers a framework with two tasks where only the performance of
one task can be rewarded via a linear contract. He shows that ambiguity
may lead to the provision of weak incentives. Ghirardato (1994) and
Karni (2006) also belong to this literature, but have different foci then
we have.
In the next section we first present and analyze the standard LEN
model. Then we extend it to incorporate ambiguity and ambiguity aver-
sion. In Section IV.3 we show that the Informativeness Principle does
not hold in our model. In Section IV.4 we discuss our model and its
results. Section IV.5 concludes.
IV.2. MODELS
IV.2.1. THE STANDARD LEN MODEL
Consider the LEN model specified by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005,
Ch. 4.2). There is a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent with
an exponential (i.e., CARA) utility function. The former makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the latter. It is assumed that the wage contract can
only be linear in the realization of the performance measure 푞: 푤 = 푡+푠푞,
where 푡 is the fix component and 푠 is the variable component.7 When the
agent rejects the contract he gets a monetary payoff of 푤¯ and the principal
of 휋¯, with 푤¯+휋¯ < 0.8 When the agent accepts, he has to choose an action
(also called effort) 푎 ∈ ℝ≥0. The effort costs are 휓(푎) =
1
2
푐푎2, where 푐 > 0
is a cost parameter. Performance depends on the agent’s effort as well as
on a shock: 푞 = 푎+휖, where 휖 ∼ 푁(0, 휎2). After the shock is realized, the
7Linear contracts are not optimal in this setting. They are, however, optimal in
the dynamic setting of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987). We plan to check whether or
not this remains true when there is ambiguity.
8The inequality guarantees that the principal prefers hiring an agent with the fixed
wage contract 푤 = 푤¯ over not hiring an agent. We add this assumption to make sure
that the principal always hires an agent.
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wage payment is made in accordance with the contract. The principal’s
payoff is 푞 − 푤. The agent’s payoff is 푢(⋅) = −푒−휂[푤−휓(푎)], where 휂 > 0 is
the agent’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Straightforward calculations yield that the agent chooses the effort
푎 =
{
푠/푐 for 푠 ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
The principal sets
푠∗standard = 1/(1 + 휂푐휎
2) (IV.1)
which generates her an expected payoff of
피[푞 − 푤]∗standard =
1
2푐(1 + 휂푐휎2)
− 푤¯. (IV.2)
IV.2.2. THE MODEL WITH AMBIGUITY AND AMBIGUITY AVERSION
How the Agent Evaluates a Wage Scheme.— Let there be a finite num-
ber of probability distributions of the shock on the performance measure
that are plausible, given the agent’s knowledge. We assume that the plau-
sible probability distributions are stochastically independent. For the
sake of consistency we assume that aggregating all these plausible distri-
butions yields the objective distribution 휖 ∼ 푁(0, 휎2). Given stochastic
independence, and since the objective distribution is normal, Crame´r’s
(1936) Theorem implies that the plausible probability distributions are
normal, too.
Each plausible distribution [푖, 푗] is characterized by its mean 휇푖 and
variance 휎2푗 . Suppose that there are 푁 × 푛 plausible distributions and
that the parameters describing the agent’s plausible distributions can be
ordered in a grid. See Figure IV.1 for a 4× 3 example. Formally, the set
of parameters characterizing the plausible distributions is
풮 := {(휇푖, 휎
2
푗 )∣휇푖 ∈ 흁, 휎
2
푗 ∈ 흈
2},
with 흁 := (휇1, ..., 휇푖, ..., 휇푁 ) and 흈
2 := (휎21, ..., 휎
2
푗 , ..., 휎
2
푛), where 휇푖 <
휇푖+1, 휎
2
푗 < 휎
2
푗+1.
9 According to the agent’s knowledge, the probability
9We specified the set of the plausible distributions such that the analysis is kept
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that the shock is drawn from the plausible distribution [푖, 푗] is 푝푖,푗 , where∑
풮 푝푖,푗 = 1. We assume that 푝푖,푗 > 0 for all 푖, 푗.
휇1 휇2 휇3 휇4 휇푖0
휎21
휎22
휎23
휎2푗
Figure IV.1: A 4×3 example of plausible distributions.
When there is only one plausible distribution we say that there is no
ambiguity.
D e f i n i t i o n 1 : When 푁 × 푛 = 1 there is no ambiguity and when
푁 × 푛 > 1 there is ambiguity.
D e f i n i t i o n 2 : There is more ambiguity when 휇1 decreases and
휎2푛 does not decrease, or 휇1 does not increase and 휎
2
푛 increases.
The motivation for Definition 2 is as follows: in our model, less precise
knowledge (i.e., more ambiguity) translates into a wider dispersion of 흁
and 흈2, i.e., into a decrease of 휇1 and an increase of 휎
2
푛.
The following lemma will be useful.
L e m m a 4: Suppose 푁 ×푛 > 1. Then 휇1 ≤ 0 and 휎
2
푛 > 휎
2. The first
inequality is strict for 푁 ≥ 2.
Proof: See Appendix.
simple. Our model, however, can easily be generalized to other specifications. When-
ever there exists a plausible distribution which has weakly the lowest mean and weakly
the highest variance, nothing changes at all. When there is no such plausible distri-
bution, the analysis gets more cumbersome: the distribution according to which the
agent evaluates the wage scheme depends on the incentives set by the principal.
47
In words, the plausible distribution with the lowest mean has a mean
which is lower or equal to the mean of the objective distribution and the
plausible distribution with the highest variance has a variance which is
greater than the variance of the objective distribution.10
Being ambiguity-averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
the agent assigns to each possible effort and contract the plausible dis-
tribution which leads to the lowest expected utility.11 That is, the agent
evaluates a wage scheme according to the most pessimistic plausible dis-
tribution.12
Suppose that the agent evaluates a contract according to the plausible
distribution [푖, 푗] and takes effort 푎. Calculations similar to the ones in
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) yield that the certainty equivalent of the
agent is then
푤ˆ(⋅) = 푡+ 푠푎+ 푠휇푖 −
1
2
휂푠2휎2푗 −
1
2
푐푎2. (IV.3)
But according to which plausible distribution does the agent evaluate
the contract? Consider the case where 푠 > 0. One directly sees that
푑푤ˆ(⋅)/푑휇푖 > 0 and 푑푤ˆ(⋅)/푑휎
2
푗 < 0. Hence, the lowest expected utility
is yielded when the variance is maximal and the mean minimal. So the
agent evaluates the wage scheme according to the plausible distribution
[1, 푛]. For 푠 = 0, all plausible distributions yield the same expected pay-
off. Hence, the plausible distribution used to evaluate the wage scheme is
arbitrary. Without loss of generality we can assume that also in this case
the agent uses the plausible distribution [1, 푛]. Moreover, it is straight-
10It is easy to show that Lemma 4 is also true for the case in which the realizations
of the plausible distributions are correlated (and the plausible distributions are still
normal). There is one exception: when the correlation is 1 and 푛 = 1 we have 휎2 = 휎2푛.
11There are other, more complicated concepts, for example Ghirardato, Maccheroni,
and Marinacci (2004) or Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). See Eichberger
and Kelsey (2009) for an overview.
12The feature of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) model that the agent assigns to
each effort the lowest expected value over his set of priors is not important for our
results. Suppose instead that the agent takes multiple priors into account and over-
weights the “bad” priors. Then a condition similar to Lemma 4 can be derived.
Therefore, all of our results stay qualitatively valid.
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forward that for 푠 < 0 the agent uses the plausible distribution [푁, 푛].
L e m m a 5: The agent evaluates a wage scheme with 푠 ≥ 0 according
to the plausible distribution [1, 푛] and a scheme with 푠 < 0 according to
the plausible distribution [푁, 푛].
Principal’s Problem.— The principal knows that 휖 ∼ 푁(0, 휎2).13
Moreover, in accordance with the standard LEN model, we assume that
the principal knows the agent’s preferences and his plausible distribu-
tions.
The principal solves the following program:
max
푠,푡
피[푞 − 푤] subject to
(푖) the incentive constraint that the desired effort level 푎∗ambiguity is
chosen by the agent: 푎∗ambiguity ∈ argmax푎푤ˆ(푎),
(푖푖) the participation constraint which guarantees that the agent signs
the wage scheme: 푤ˆ(푎∗ambiguity) ≥ 푤¯, and
(푖푖푖) the constraint that the agent evaluates the wage scheme with dis-
tribution [1, 푛] for 푠 ≥ 0 and with [푁, 푛] for 푠 < 0 (see Lemma
5).
We now seek to simplify the maximization problem. First, let us look
at the incentive constraint. From (IV.3) we directly get that the agent
chooses—as in the standard LEN model—
푎 =
{
푠/푐 for 푠 ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
Moreover, in the optimum the participation constraint holds with equal-
ity; otherwise the principal can decrease 푡 so that her payoff increases.
For both, 푠 = 0 and 푠 < 0, the agent chooses 푎 = 0. It is straightforward
to show that setting 푠 < 0 is strictly dominated by 푠 = 0 for the princi-
pal. So we can neglect the case 푠 < 0. Using the previous insights, the
13Thus, we consider a non-common prior setting (see also Eliaz and Spiegler 2006,
2008). Alternatively, we can also assume that the principal has—as the agent—
ambiguous information, but is not ambiguity averse.
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principal’s maximization problem simplifies to
max
푠
푠
푐
+ 푠휇1 − 휂푠
2휎2푛/2−
푠2
2푐
− 푤¯ s.t. 푠 ≥ 0. (IV.4)
The interpretation is simple: the first part is the effort induced by the
contract; the terms−(푠휇1−휂푠
2휎2푛/2) are the combined risk and ambiguity
premium which can be decomposed into a risk premium 휂푠2휎2/2 and an
ambiguity premium −푠휇1 + 휂푠
2(휎2푛 − 휎
2)/2; the term 푠
2
2푐
represents the
equilibrium effort costs; and 푤¯ is the monetary equivalent of the agent’s
outside option.
Simple optimization of (IV.4) yields that the principals sets the fol-
lowing incentives:
푠∗ambiguity =
{
1+푐휇1
1+휂푐휎2푛
for 1 + 푐휇1 > 0,
0 otherwise.
(IV.5)
From Lemma 4, we know that 휇1 ≤ 0 and 휎
2
푛 > 휎
2. Hence, we have the
following results.
P r o p o s i t i o n 11 : With ambiguity the incentives set by the prin-
cipal are weaker than without ambiguity. With ambiguity the principal
may set no incentives at all.
To understand both results, we come back to the interpretation of
(IV.4). Due to ambiguity there is another premium beside the risk pre-
mium which makes providing incentives more costly for the principal.
This explains why the principal sets weaker incentives.
Moreover, due to ambiguity the marginal costs of providing incentives
are not negligible even for weak incentives whenever 휇1 < 0. Formally,
lim푠→0 푑(ambiguity premium)/푑푠 = −휇1. At the same time the marginal
benefit of setting weak incentives (via inducing a higher effort) is 1/푐.
Hence, whenever it is sufficiently costly to provide even weak incentives
the principal sets no incentives at all.14
14When no incentives are set, zero effort is implemented. It may be more plausible
to assume that the agent wants to spend some effort even when no incentives are set.
This is indeed the case if, for example, 휓′(푎) ≤ 0 for 푎 ∈ [0, 푎¯], see Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom (1991, pp. 33-34).
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Without ambiguity there is no ambiguity premium. Then the margi-
nal costs of providing weak incentives are negligible.15 Therefore the
principal always sets incentives, see (IV.1).16
Plugging (IV.5) into (IV.4) yields the principal’s expected payoff in
equilibrium:
피[푞 − 푤]∗ambiguity =
{
(1+푐휇1)2
2푐(1+휂푐휎2푛)
− 푤¯ for 1 + 푐휇1 > 0,
−푤¯ otherwise.
(IV.6)
Since 휇1 ≤ 0 and 휎
2
푛 > 휎
2 (see Lemma 4) we get the following result.
P r o p o s i t i o n 12 : Ambiguity leads to a lower expected payoff for
the principal.
Intuitively, with ambiguity the principal has to compensate the agent
not only for his risk premium but also for his ambiguity premium. This
increases the principal’s cost of implementing any level of effort, and
hence also the principal’s cost when the optimal effort is implemented.
Comparative Statics.— More ambiguity leads to the provision of
weaker incentives: 푑푠∗ambiguity/푑휇1 > 0 and 푑푠
∗
ambiguity/푑휎
2
푛 < 0. Intu-
itively, more ambiguity increases the marginal costs of providing incen-
tives. Hence, the principal sets weaker incentives.
More ambiguity leads to a lower expected payoff of the principal:
푑피[푞 − 푤]∗ambiguity/푑휇1 ≥ 0 and 푑피[푞 − 푤]
∗
ambiguity/푑휎
2
푛 ≤ 0, where for
푠∗ambiguity > 0 the inequalities are strict. The logic is simple: The princi-
pal can set the same incentives with little ambiguity than with a lot of
ambiguity. Since more ambiguity leads to higher costs for the principal
in order to provide a certain level of incentives (see arguments before),
the principal must be better off with little ambiguity.
Finally note that in the standard LEN model as well as in the enriched
LEN model with ambiguity and ambiguity aversion a higher degree of
15For these insights it is not important that the effort costs are quadratic: it is
sufficient that the marginal effort costs are negligible for low efforts. In models with
limited liability of the agent, setting weak incentives can be costly for the principal.
See, for example, Besley and Ghatak (2008, Section 1).
16Note, risk aversion plays no role for weak incentives since the agent is first-order
risk neutral. Technically, lim푠→0 푑(risk premium)/푑푠 = 0.
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risk aversion 휂 (at least weakly) decreases the optimal incentives and the
principal’s payoff.
IV.3. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: VIOLATION OF THE INFORMA-
TIVENESS PRINCIPLE
Suppose there are two performance measures 푌 and 푍 with realizations
푦 and 푧, respectively. Similar to the case with one performance measure
we assume that
푦 = 푎+ 휖푌 , where 휖푌 ∼ 푁(0, 휎
2
푌 ),
푧 = 푎+ 휖푍 , where 휖푍 ∼ 푁(0, 휎
2
푍),
and that the principal’s expected payoff is 푎− 피[푤]. We assume that 휖푌
and 휖푍 are uncorrelated. Moreover, we assume that the agent only feels
ambiguity with respect to the performance measure 푍 and he is again
ambiguity-averse. The contract takes the form 푤 = 푡+푠푌 푦+푠푍푧. Simple
calculations yield that it is not always optimal for the principal to include
both performance measures into the contract.17
P r o p o s i t i o n 13 : The performance measure 푍 is included in the
wage scheme if and only if
휇푍,1 > −
휂휎2푌
1 + 휂푐휎2푌
.
The measure 푌 is always used.
Proof: See Appendix.
In the standard model (without ambiguity and without ambiguity
aversion) it is always optimal to use both measures. The intuition is sim-
ple (see Holmstro¨m 1979, p. 87). Suppose the optimal contract depends
17Note that this result does qualitatively neither depend on the assumption that
the agent only feels ambiguity with respect to the performance measure 푍, nor on the
assumption that 휖푌 and 휖푍 are uncorrelated. When he feels ambiguity with respect
to both measures the principal may optimally neglect both measures; that is, set a
fixed wage. This finding and the intuition is as in the case with only one performance
measure. When 휖푌 and 휖푍 are correlated it gets less worthwhile to include both
measures into a contract.
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only on the measure 푌 . By making the contract slightly dependent on
the measure 푍 the agent’s incentives can be improved. Because the agent
is locally risk-neutral, this does marginally not increase the agent’s risk
premium. Hence, the optimal contract uses 푌 and 푍.
This argument does not hold with ambiguity. The costs of making
a contract even slightly dependent on the measure 푍 are non-negligible
whenever we have an ambiguity-averse agent who is ambiguous about 푍.
Therefore, when there is a lot of ambiguity (i.e., when 휇푍,1 is low) the
principal does not use the measure 푍, even though 푍 reveals information;
see Proposition 13.18 This finding is valuable since “the Informativeness
Principle, i.e., that all factors correlated with performance should be
included in a compensation contract, seems to be violated in many oc-
cupations” (Prendergast 1999, p. 21).
IV.4. DISCUSSION
IV.4.1. WHEN PARTIES “AGREE TO DISAGREE”
The model stays mathematically equivalent when there is neither ambi-
guity nor ambiguity aversion, but it is instead the case that the agent and
the principal have different opinions about the distribution of the shock
on the performance measure. That is, both parties “agree to disagree”.
Suppose that the principal thinks that the shock is normally distributed
with variance 휎2 and (normalized) mean 0, whereas the agent thinks that
the shock is normally distributed with variance 휎2푛 and mean 휇1. When
the agent is more pessimistic about the distribution than the principal we
have 휇1 < 0 and 휎
2
푛 > 휎
2, as in the case with ambiguity and ambiguity
18The previous finding that with one performance measure a fixed wage may be
optimal (see Proposition 11) can also be seen as a violation of the Informativeness
Principle: there is a performance measure which reveals information about the agent’s
effort, but the measure may not be used. Similarly, without ambiguity, one perfor-
mance measure, and linear effort costs of 푐˜푎, a fixed wage contract is optimal when-
ever 푐˜ ≥ 1. Therefore we prefer to interpret the Informativeness Principle as follows:
Whenever some incentives are set, any measure of performance that reveals informa-
tion on the effort is included in the contract.
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aversion.19
IV.4.2. MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS AND COMPETITION
Suppose there are multiple principals who compete for the agent. When
a principal offers a wage scheme, she essentially offers the agent a certain
expected utility level. Hence, we can depict competition simply as a
variation of the reservation monetary payoff 푤¯. Since our results do not
depend on 푤¯—as long as the principal wants to hire the agent, which is
also true for competition—our results are robust to the introduction of
competition.
IV.4.3. AGENT’S WELFARE
Given some agent who is either ambiguity-averse (and there is ambiguity)
or not. When is he better off? Since the principal makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer, the agent’s expected ex-ante utility is in both cases equal
to the utility from the reservation payoff 푤¯. However, when the agent is
ambiguity-averse, there is a difference between expected ex-ante utility
and expected ex-post utility: the agent is in expectation better off ex-
post than expected ex-ante. Hence, from an ex-post perspective the
agent yields a higher surplus with ambiguity aversion than without it.
The agent’s higher surplus is at the principal’s expense, see Proposition
12.20
Do these results also hold with multiple principals? Suppose multi-
ple principals compete perfectly for the agent. Then, in equilibrium all
principals must make zero expected profits. This is true with or without
ambiguity aversion of the agent. Hence, the principals’ surpluses do not
change due to agent’s ambiguity aversion. Next we show that the agent
19The agent may also be more optimistic than the principal so that we have 휇1 > 0
and 휎2푛 < 휎
2. Then the principal sets very high-powered incentives and receives a
very high expected payoff, compared to the case with a common prior.
20That a party profits from its distorted prior is non-standard. For example, in
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), the party with the undistorted prior exploits the
party with the distorted prior.
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is ex-ante and ex-post worse off with ambiguity aversion than without.
The expected ex-post total surplus is 피[푞−푤]+푤˜, where 푤˜ is the ex-post
certainty equivalent which equals 푡+ 푠푎− 1
2
휂푠2휎2 − 1
2
푐푎2. Maximization
of the expected ex-post total surplus yields that 푠∗total = 1/(1 + 휂푐휎
2).
Observe that 푠∗total = 푠
∗
standard. With ambiguity aversion the principal sets
different incentives: 푠∗total ∕= 푠
∗
ambiguity. Hence, with an ambiguity-averse
agent, the expected ex-post total surplus is lower than without ambiguity
aversion. From before we know that with perfect competition the prin-
cipal’s surplus does not change due to ambiguity aversion of the agent.
Hence, from an ex-post perspective the agent is worse off with ambiguity
aversion than without it. This result is the reverse yielded with only one
principal.
IV.4.4. HISTORY DEPENDENCE
Our insights can be applied further. Suppose a principal has to select
one out of two performance measures to design a linear wage contract.
The first is well known by the agent (there is no ambiguity), but is very
inexact (i.e., it has a high variance); the properties of the second are the
other way round. One can use the formulas of Proposition 12 to compare
them. It may well turn out that the principal prefers the first measure,
although it is less exact.
When substituting an old with a new measure in a wage scheme, the
agent’s knowledge about the new is scarcer than about the old.21 Hence,
old measures have a comparative advantage over new measures.
IV.5. CONCLUSIONS
We considered a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard where
the agent’s knowledge of the performance measure is ambiguous and he
is averse to ambiguity. This has the effect that the agent is pessimistic
21This argument is supported by the findings described by Rustichini (2005, p.
1625) “that the ambiguity premium declines as subjects repeat their choices: People
slowly adjust to ambiguity”.
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about the distribution of the shock on the performance measure. Hence,
the compensation demanded by the agent is relatively high, compared to
the standard model. This implies that the principal’s cost of providing
incentives are relatively high. Therefore, the principal sets relatively weak
incentives which yield a relatively low expected payoff. The principal
may even set a fixed wage. This can never be optimal in the standard
model. Moreover, in the enriched model with two performance measures
the famous Informativeness Principle does not hold: It can be optimal
for the principal to ignore one measure (or potentially both), even though
both measures are informative.
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V. THE OPTIMALITY OF SIMPLE CONTRACTS:
MORAL HAZARD AND LOSS AVERSION
Joint work with
Fabian Herweg and Daniel Mu¨ller
This paper extends the standard principal-agent model with
moral hazard to allow for agents having reference-dependent
preferences according to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).
When loss aversion is the predominant determinant of the
agent’s risk preferences, the principal optimally offers a sim-
ple bonus contract, i.e., when the agent’s performance exceeds
a certain threshold, he receives a fixed bonus payment. Also
when risk aversion becomes more important, the optimal con-
tract displays less complexity than predicted by orthodox the-
ory. Thus, loss aversion introduces an endogenous complexity
cost into contracting.
V.1. INTRODUCTION
The recent literature provides very strong evidence that contractual forms have
large effects on behavior. As the notion that “incentive matters” is one of the
central tenets of economists of every persuasion, this should be comforting to
the community. On the other hand, it raises an old puzzle: if contractual form
matters so much, why do we observe such a prevalence of fairly simple con-
tracts?
— Bernard Salanie´ (2003)
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A lump-sum bonus contract, with the bonus being a payment for
achieving a certain level of performance, is probably the most simple
incentive scheme for employees one can think of. According to Steen-
burgh (2008), salesforce compensation plans provide incentives mainly
via a lump-sum bonus for meeting or exceeding the annual sales quota.1
Simple contracts are commonly found not only in labor contexts but
also in insurance markets. A prevalent form of insurance contracts is a
straight-deductible contract, widely used, for example, in automobile in-
surance. The observed plainness of contractual arrangements, however,
is at odds with predictions made by economic theory, as nicely stated in
the above quote by Salanie´. While Prendergast (1999) already referred
to the discrepancy between theoretically predicted and actually observed
contractual form, over time this question was raised again and again,
recently by Lazear and Oyer (2007), and the answer still is not fully
understood.2
Beside this gap between theoretical prediction and observed prac-
tice, both theoretical as well as empirical studies demonstrate that these
simple contractual arrangements create incentives for misbehavior of the
agent that is outside the scope of most standard models. As Oyer (1998)
points out, facing an annual sales quota provides incentives for sales-
1Incentives for salespeople in the food manufacturing industry often are solely cre-
ated by a lump-sum bonus, see Oyer (2000). Moreover, in his book about designing
effective sales compensation plans, Moynahan (1980) argues that for a wide range of
industries lump-sum bonus contracts are optimal. For a survey on salesforce compen-
sation plans see Joseph and Kalwani (1998).
2For evidence on deductibles in the automobile insurance, see Puelz and Snow
(1994) or Chiappori et al. (2006). As was shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),
the use of deductibles can theoretically be explained if the insurance market is sub-
ject to adverse selection. Besides adverse selection, however, moral hazard plays an
important role in automobile insurance. Deductibles were found to be optimal under
moral hazard by Holmstro¨m (1979) if the insured person’s action influences only the
probability of an accident but not its severity. As pointed out by Winter (2000),
however, “[d]riving a car more slowly and carefully reduces both the probability of an
accident and the likely costs of an accident should it occur.” Thus, existing theories
cannot explain the prevalence of deductibles in these markets.
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people to manipulate prices and timing of business to maximize their
own income rather than firms’ profits. For insurance markets, Dionne
and Gagne´ (2001) show that “deductible contracts can introduce per-
verse effects when falsification behavior is potentially present”.3 These
observations raise “the interesting question of why these [...] contracts
are so prevalent. [...] It appears that there must be some benefit of these
contracts that outweighs these apparent costs” (Lazear and Oyer, 2007).
To give one possible explanation for the widespread use of these con-
tractual arrangements, we consider a principal-agent model with moral
hazard, framed as an employer-employee relationship, which is com-
pletely standard but for one twist: the agent is assumed to be loss-averse
in the sense of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). With the tradeoff be-
tween incentive provision and risk sharing being at the heart of moral
hazard, allowing for a richer description of the agent’s risk preferences
that goes beyond standard risk aversion seems a natural starting point
to gain deeper insights into contract design. Our main finding is that
a simple (lump-sum) bonus scheme is optimal when loss aversion is the
driving force of the agent’s risk preferences.4 This is in stark contrast
to the findings for a standard risk-averse agent. An agent who is risk
but not loss-averse exhibits local risk neutrality, which implies that pay-
ing slightly different wages for different signals improves incentives at
negligible cost. A loss-averse agent, on the other hand, is first-order risk-
averse. Since losses loom larger than equally-sized gains, in expectations
the agent suffers from deviations from his reference point. With the ref-
erence point being multidimensional under the concept of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin, the agent is first-order risk-averse at all possible wage levels. In
3For evidence on fraudulent claims being a major problem in the car insurance
market see Caron and Dionne (1997), who estimated the cost of fraud in the Que´bec
automobile insurance market in 1994 at $100 million, just under 10% of total claims.
For an estimation of the costs of fraudulent claims in the United States, see Foppert
(1994).
4In the following, we will use the terms bonus contract and bonus scheme inter-
changeably to refer to a contract that specifies exactly two distinct wage payments,
a base wage and a lump-sum bonus.
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consequence, paying even slightly different wages reduces the agent’s ex-
pected utility, for which in turn he demands to be compensated. Thus,
by offering a simple contract, that specifies only few different wage levels,
the principal can lower the expected payment necessary to compensate
the agent for the induced losses.
We present our model of a principal-agency that is subject to moral
hazard in Section V.2. The principal, who is both risk and loss neutral,
does not observe the agent’s effort directly. Instead, she observes a mea-
sure of performance that is correlated with the agent’s effort decision.
Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin, we posit that a decision maker – next to
intrinsic consumption utility from an outcome – also derives gain-loss
utility from comparing the actual outcome with his rational expectations
about outcomes. More precisely, the sensation of gains and losses is
derived by comparing a given outcome to all possible outcomes. To illus-
trate this point, consider an employee who receives a wage of $5000 for
good performance, a wage of $4400 for mediocre performance, and a wage
of $4000 for bad performance. If the employee’s performance is mediocre,
this generates mixed feelings, a loss of $600 and a gain of $400.5 The
key feature of the Ko˝szegi-Rabin model is that expectations matter in
determining the reference point.6 While mainly based on findings in the
psychological literature,7 evidence for this assumption is provided also
by two recent contributions to the economic literature. In a real-effort
experiment, Abeler et al. (2009) find strong evidence for individuals tak-
ing their expectations as a reference point, rather than the status quo.8
Similarly, analyzing decision making in a large-stake game show, Post
5For at least suggestive evidence on mixed feelings, see Larsen et al. (2004).
6The feature that the reference point is determined by the decision maker’s
forward-looking expectations is shared with the disappointment aversion models of
Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986), and Gul (1991).
7For instance, Mellers et al. (1999) and Breiter et al. (2001) document that both
the actual outcome and unattained possible outcomes affect subjects’ satisfaction with
their payoff.
8The status quo was most often assumed as reference point in the wake of Kahne-
man and Tversky’s (1979) original formulation of prospect theory.
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et al. (2008) come to the conclusion that observed behavior “is consis-
tent with the idea that the reference point is based on expectations.”
Regarding applications, the Ko˝szegi-Rabin concept is used by Heidhues
and Ko˝szegi (2005, 2008) to introduce consumer loss aversion into other-
wise standard models of industrial organization. While the former paper
explains why monopoly prices react less sensitive to cost shocks than pre-
dicted by orthodox theory, the latter provides an answer to the question
why non-identical competitors charge identical prices for differentiated
products.
As a benchmark, in Section V.3 we reconsider the case of a purely
risk-averse agent: Under the optimal contract, signals that are more in-
dicative of higher effort are rewarded strictly higher, thereby giving rise
to a strictly increasing wage profile. We then turn to the analysis of a
purely loss-averse agent who does not exhibit risk aversion in the usual
sense. After providing sufficient conditions for the first-order approach
to be valid, we establish our main result: when the agent is loss-averse,
it is optimal to offer a bonus contract. No matter how rich the set of
possible realizations of the performance measure, the optimal contract
comprises of only two different wage payments. We already touched on
the intuition underlying this finding: With the agent’s action being un-
observable, the necessity to create incentives makes it impossible for the
principal to bear the complete risk. With losses looming larger than
equally sized gains, this ex ante imposes an expected net loss on the
agent, which equals the sum over the ex ante expected wage differences
weighted by the product of the corresponding probabilities. To illustrate,
let us return to the example introduced above. Suppose the agent expects
to perform well, moderately, or poorly with probability 푝퐺, 푝푀 and 푝퐵,
respectively. Then, ex ante, the agent expects a wage difference – or net
loss – of $600 with probability 푝푀푝퐺, a net loss of $400 with probability
푝퐵푝푀 , and a net loss of $1000 with probability 푝퐵푝퐺. The agent demands
to be compensated for his overall expected net loss, which the principal
therefore seeks to minimize. Consider, for the sake of argument, a prin-
cipal who wants to strengthen incentives to provide effort, starting out
from a not fully differentiated wage scheme. There are two ways to do so.
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First, the principal can introduce a new wage spread, i.e., pay slightly
different wages for two signals that were rewarded equally in the original
wage scheme, while keeping the differences between all other neighboring
wages constant. Secondly, the principal can increase an existing wage
spread, holding constant all other spreads between neighboring wages.
Both procedures increase the overall expected net loss by increasing the
size of some of the expected losses without reducing others. Introducing
a new wage spread, however, additionally increases the overall expected
net loss by increasing the ex ante expected probability of experiencing
a loss. Therefore, in order to improve incentives, it is advantageous to
increase an existing wage spread without adding to the contractual com-
plexity in the sense of increasing the number of different wages. In this
sense, reference-dependent preferences according to Ko˝szegi and Rabin
introduce an endogenous complexity cost into contracting based on psy-
chological foundations.
Thereafter, we establish several properties displayed by the optimal
contract. Let a signal that is the more likely to be observed the higher
the agent’s effort be referred to as a good signal. We find that the subset
of signals that are rewarded with the high wage contains either only good
signals, or all good signals and possibly a few bad signals as well.9 When
abstracting from integer-programming problems, it is optimal for the
principal to order the signals according to their relative informativeness
(likelihood ratio), i.e., the agent receives the high wage for all signals that
are more indicative of high effort than a cutoff signal. Last, we show that
an increase in the agent’s degree of loss aversion may allow the principal
to use a lower-powered incentive scheme in order to implement a desired
level of effort. The reason is that a higher degree of loss aversion may be
associated with a stronger incentive for the agent to choose a high effort
9The theoretical prediction that inferior performance may also well be rewarded
with a bonus is in line with both Joseph and Kalwani (1998)’s suggestion that organi-
zations tend to view the payment of a bonus as a reward for good or even acceptable
performance rather than an award for exceptional performance, and Churchill et al.
(1993)’s prescription that bonuses should be based on objectives that can be achieved
with reasonable rather than Herculean efforts.
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in order to reduce the probability of incuring a loss. The overall cost of
implementation, however, increases in the agent’s degree of loss aversion.
In the last part of Section V.3, we analyze the general case in which
the agent is both risk and loss-averse. It is shown that our results are
robust towards a small degree of risk aversion. Moreover, we give a
heuristic reasoning why a reduction in the complexity of the contract
is also to be expected to be optimal for a non-negligible degree of risk
aversion, and confirm our conjecture by means of a numerical example.10
Returning to the case of a purely loss-averse agent, in Section V.4
we relax the assumptions that guaranteed validity of the first-order ap-
proach. Here, to keep the analysis tractable, we focus on binary measures
of performances. If the agent’s degree of loss aversion is sufficiently high
and if the performance measure is sufficiently informative, then only ex-
treme actions – work as hard as possible or do not work at all – are incen-
tive compatible. Put differently, the principal may face severe problems
in fine-tuning the agent’s incentives. These implementation problems,
however, can be remedied if the principal can commit herself to stochas-
tically ignoring the low realization of the performance measure, i.e., by
turning a blind eye from time to time. Besides alleviating implementation
problems, turning a blind eye may also lower the cost of implementing
a certain action. Thus, the sufficiency part of Blackwell’s theorem does
not hold when the agent has reference-dependent preferences.
After briefly summarizing our main findings, Section V.5 concludes by
discussing robustness of our results with respect to imposed assumptions.
All proofs are given in the appendix.
RELATED LITERATURE
Before presenting our model, we relate our paper to the small but steadily
growing literature that analyzes the implications of loss aversion on in-
10This finding also relates to the observation that, within a firm, pay for individuals
often seems to be less variable than productivity, as recently surveyed by Lazear and
Shaw (2007). Our model suggests an alternative explanation for this pay compression
outside the realms of inequity aversion, tournament theory, and influence activities.
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centive design.11 With reference-dependent preferences being at the heart
of loss aversion on the one hand, but with no unifying approach provided
how to determine a decision maker’s reference point on the other hand,
it is little surprising that all contributions differ in this particular aspect.
While Dittmann et al. (2007) posit that the reference income is exoge-
nously given by the previous year’s fixed wage, Iantchev (2005), who
considers a market environment with multiple principals competing for
the services of multiple agents, applies the concept of Rayo and Becker
(2007). Here, an agent’s reference point is endogenously determined by
the equilibrium conditions in the market. When focusing on a particu-
lar principal-agent pair, however, both the principal and the agent take
the reference point as exogenously given. An exogenous reference point
does not always seem plausible. Starting out from the premise that the
reference point is forward looking and depends on the distributions of
outcomes, as suggested by ample evidence, De Meza and Webb (2007)
consider both exogenous as well as endogenous formulations of the refer-
ence point. Concluding that the disappointment concept of Gul (1991),
which equates the reference point with the certainty equivalent of the in-
come distribution, does yield some questionable implications,12 De Meza
and Webb propose that the reference income is the median income, which
11Beside loss aversion there are other behavioral biases that are incorporated into
contracting problems with moral hazard. Non-standard risk preferences in a moral
hazard framework are analyzed by Schmidt (1999), who applies Yaari’s (1987) concept
of dual expected utility theory. Englmaier and Wambach (2006) characterize the
optimal contract for the case of an inequity-averse agent in the sense of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999). A multi-agent contracting problem in which agents care about their
own status is investigated by Besley and Ghatak (2008) in a static context, and by
Auriol and Renault (2008) in a dynamic setting. By introducing worker overconfidence
into a multi-agent moral-hazard problem, Fang and Moscarini (2005) show that it can
be optimal not to screen workers according to their skills. For a review of behavioral
economics of organizations see Camerer and Malmendier (2007).
12De Meza and Webb consider two otherwise identical agents who differ only in
their degree of loss aversion. They point out that with the certainty equivalent as
reference point, there are situations where the less loss-averse agent experiences a loss,
but the more loss-averse agent does not.
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captures the idea that the agent incurs a loss at all incomes for which
it is odds-on that a higher income would be drawn. Taking median in-
come as reference income, however, suffers from the drawback that it is
discontinuous in the underlying probability distribution.13
All of the aforementioned contributions explore questions of both em-
pirical importance as well as theoretical interest: Dittmann et al. (2007)
find that a loss aversion model dominates an equivalent risk aversion
model in explaining observed CEO compensation contracts if the refer-
ence point is equal to the previous year’s fixed wage. Iantchev (2005)
finds evidence for his theoretically predicted results in panel data from
Safelite Glass Corporation. Last, by explaining why bonuses are paid
for good performance rather than penalties for poor performance, De
Meza and Webb (2007) provide a theoretical underpinning for the fre-
quent usage of option-like incentive schemes in CEO compensation. The
contractual form predicted by these papers, however, is rather complex:
while the optimal contract typically displays a range where pay is in-
dependent of performance, for performance above this range payment
varies with performance in a fairly complex way, depending crucially on
the underlying distribution of signals. Theoretical predictions differ in
whether or not the optimal contract includes punishment for very poor
performance or where in the wage schedule the optimal contract features
discontinuities. Thus, none of these papers provides a rationale for the
prevalence of fairly simple contracts, bonus contracts in particular.14
To the best of our knowledge, Daido and Itoh (2007) is the only paper
that also applies the concept of reference dependence a` la Ko˝szegi and
13For example, suppose that with a probability of .51 a manager earns $1m and
with a probability of .49 he earns $2m. With median income as reference point the
manager will never suffer a loss because his reference income is $1m. A small shift
in probabilities, however, makes the median income equal to $2m. Now, the agent
suffers a loss in almost 50% of all cases.
14De Meza and Webb (2007) find conditions under which a simple bonus contract
is optimal. For this to be the case, however, they assume that the reference point is
exogenously given and that all wage payments are in the loss region, where the agent
is assumed to be risk loving.
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Rabin to a principal-agent setting. The focus of Daido and Itoh, how-
ever, greatly differs from ours. Assuming that the performance measure
comprises of only two signals, two types of self-fulfilling prophecy are
explained, the Galatea and the Pygmalion effects.15 While sufficient to
capture these two effects, the assumption of a binary measure of perfor-
mance does not allow one to inquire into the form that contracts take
under moral hazard.
V.2. MODEL
There are two parties, a principal and an agent.16 The principal of-
fers a one-period employment contract to the agent, who has an outside
employment opportunity (or reservation utility) yielding expected util-
ity 푢¯. If the agent accepts the contract, then he chooses an effort level
푎 ∈ 풜 ≡ [0, 1]. The agent’s action 푎 equals the probability that the
principal receives a benefit 퐵 > 0. The principal’s expected net benefit
is
휋 = 푎퐵 − 퐸[푊 ],
where 푊 is the compensation payment the principal pays to the agent.17
The principal is assumed to be risk and loss neutral, thus she maximizes
휋. We wish to inquire into the form that contracts take under moral
hazard and loss aversion. Therefore, we focus on the cost minimization
problem to implement a certain action 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1).18
15Roughly speaking, the former effect refers to empirical findings that an agent’s
self-expectation about his performance is an important determinant of his actual
performance, whereas the latter effect refers to the phenomenon that a principal’s
expectation about the agent’s performance has an impact on the agent’s actual per-
formance.
16The framework is based on MacLeod (2003), who analyzes subjective performance
measures without considering loss-averse agents.
17The particular functional form of the principal’s profit function is not crucial for
our analysis. We assume this specific structure since it allows for a straight-forward
interpretation of the performance measure.
18The second-best action maximizes the principal’s expected benefit, 푎퐵, minus
the minimum cost of implementing action 푎. The overall optimal contract exhibits
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The action choice 푎 ∈ 풜 is private information of the agent and un-
observable for the principal. Furthermore, the realization of 퐵 is not
directly observable. A possible interpretation is that 퐵 corresponds to
a complex good whose quality cannot be determined by a court, thus a
contract cannot depend on the realization of 퐵. Instead the principal ob-
serves a contractible measure of performance, 휸ˆ, with 푠 ∈ 풮 ≡ {1, . . . , 푆}
being the realization of the performance measure, also referred to as sig-
nal. Let 푆 ≥ 2. The probability of observing signal 푠 conditional on
퐵 being realized is denoted by 훾퐻푠 . Accordingly, 훾
퐿
푠 is the probability
of observing signal 푠 conditional on 퐵 not being realized. Hence, the
unconditional probability of observing signal 푠 for a given action 푎 is
훾푠(푎) ≡ 푎훾
퐻
푠 +(1− 푎)훾
퐿
푠 . For technical convenience, we make the follow-
ing assumption.
A s s u m p t i o n A3: For all 푠, 휏 ∈ 풮 with 푠 ∕= 휏 ,
(i) 훾퐻푠 /훾
퐿
푠 ∕= 1 (informative signals),
(ii) 훾퐻푠 , 훾
퐿
푠 ∈ (0, 1) (full support),
(iii) 훾퐻푠 /훾
퐿
푠 ∕= 훾
퐻
휏 /훾
퐿
휏 (different signals).
Assumption (i) guarantees that any signal 푠 is either a good or a bad
signal, in the sense that the overall probability of observing that signal
unambiguously increases or decreases in 푎. Part (ii) ensures that for all
푎 ∈ 풜, all signals occur with positive probability. Last, with assumption
(iii) signals can unambiguously be ranked according to the relative im-
pact of an increase in effort on the probability of observing a particular
signal.19
The contract which the principal offers to the agent consists of a
payment for each realization of the performance measure, {푤푠}
푆
푠=1 ∈
the same characteristics as the contract that minimizes the cost of implementing an
arbitrary action 푎ˆ.
19Formally, for all 푎 ∈ [0, 1], (훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )/훾푠(푎) > (훾
퐻
휏 − 훾
퐿
휏 )/훾휏 (푎) ⇐⇒ 훾
퐻
푠 /훾
퐿
푠 >
훾퐻휏 /훾
퐿
휏 .
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ℝ
푆.20
The agent is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences in the
sense of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006): Overall utility from consuming 풙 =
(푥1, . . . , 푥퐾) ∈ ℝ
퐾 – when having reference level 풓 = (푟1, . . . , 푟퐾) ∈ ℝ
퐾
for each dimension of consumption – is given by
푣(풙∣풓) ≡
퐾∑
푘=1
푚푘(푥푘) +
퐾∑
푘=1
휇(푚푘(푥푘)−푚푘(푟푘)).
Put verbally, overall utility is assumed to have two components: con-
sumption utility and gain-loss utility. Consumption utility, also called in-
trinsic utility, from consuming in dimension 푘 is denoted by푚푘(푥푘). How
a person feels about gaining or losing in a dimension is assumed to depend
in a universal way on the changes in consumption utility associated with
such gains and losses. The universal gain-loss function 휇(⋅) satisfies the
assumptions imposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1991) on their “value
function”.21 In our model, the agent’s consumption space comprises of
two dimensions, money income (푥1 = 푊 ) and effort (푥2 = 푎).
22 The
agent’s intrinsic utility for money is assumed to be a strictly increasing,
(weakly) concave, and unbounded function. Formally, 푚1(푊 ) = 푢(푊 )
with 푢′(⋅) > 휀 > 0, 푢′′(⋅) ≤ 0. The intrinsic disutility from exerting
effort 푎 ∈ [0, 1] is a strictly increasing, strictly convex function of effort,
푚2(푎) = −푐(푎) with 푐
′(0) = 0, 푐′(푎) > 0 for 푎 > 0, 푐′′(⋅) > 0, and
lim푎→1 푐(푎) = ∞. We assume that the gain-loss function is piece-wise
20Restricting the principal to offer non-stochastic wage payments is standard in the
principal-agent literature and also in accordance with observed practice. In a later
section we comment on this assumption.
21Roughly speaking, 휇(푧) is strictly increasing, continuous for all 푧, twice differen-
tiable for all 푧 ∕= 0 with 휇(0) = 0, convex over the range of losses, and concave over
the range of gains. For a more formal statement of these properties, see Bowman et
al. (1999).
22We implicitly assume that the agent is a “narrow bracketer” in the sense that he
ignores that the risk from the current employment relationship is incorporated with
substantial other risk.
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linear,
휇(푚) =
{
푚 , for 푚 ≥ 0
휆푚, for 푚 < 0
.
The parameter 휆 characterizes the weight put on losses relative to gains.23
The weight on gains is normalized to one. When 휆 > 1, the agent is loss-
averse in the sense that losses loom larger than equally-sized gains.24
Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), the agent’s reference point
is determined by his rational expectations about outcomes. A given out-
come is then evaluated by comparing it to all possible outcomes, where
each comparison is weighted with the ex-ante probability with which the
alternative outcome occurs. With the actual outcome being itself uncer-
tain, the agent’s ex ante expected utility is obtained by averaging over
all these comparisons.25 We apply the concept of choice-acclimating per-
sonal equilibrium (CPE) as defined in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), which
assumes that a person correctly predicts his choice set, the environment
23Alternatively, one could assume that 휇(푚) = 휂푚 for gains and 휇(푚) = 휂휆푚
for losses, where 휂 ≥ 0 can be interpreted as the weight attached to gain-loss utility
relative to intrinsic utility. Our implicit normalization 휂 = 1 is without loss of gen-
erality due to the applied concept of choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE).
Carrying 휂 through the whole analysis would only replace (휆 − 1) by 휂(휆 − 1) in all
formulas.
24The assumption of a piece-wise linear gain-loss function is not uncommon in the
literature on incentive design with loss-averse agents, see De Meza and Webb (2007),
Daido and Itoh (2007). In their work on asset pricing, Barberis et al. (2001) also
apply this particular functional form, reasoning that “curvature is most relevant when
choosing between prospects that involve only gains or between prospects that involve
only losses. For gambles that can lead to both gains and losses, [...] loss aversion at
the kink is far more important than the degree of curvature away from the kink.”
25Suppose the actual outcome 풙 and the vector of reference levels 풓 are distributed
according to distribution functions 퐹 and 퐺, respectively. As introduced above, over-
all utility from two arbitrary vectors 풙 and 풓 is given by 푣(풙∣풓). With the reference
point being distributed according to probability measure 퐺, the utility from a certain
outcome is the average of how this outcome feels compared to all other possible out-
comes, 푈(풙∣퐺) =
∫
푣(풙∣풓) 푑퐺(풓). Last, with 풙 being drawn according to probability
measure 퐹 , utility is given by 퐸[푈(퐹 ∣퐺)] =
∫∫
푣(풙∣풓) 푑퐺(풓)푑퐹 (풙). Since we use
choice acclimating personal equilibrium, 퐹 = 퐺.
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he faces, in particular the set of possible outcomes and how the distri-
bution of these outcomes depends on his decisions, and his own reaction
to this environment. The eponymous feature of CPE is that the agent’s
reference point is affected by his choice of action. As pointed out by
Ko˝szegi and Rabin, CPE refers to the analysis of risk preferences re-
garding outcomes that are resolved long after all decisions are made.
This environment seems well-suited for many principal-agent relation-
ships: Often the outcome of a project becomes observable, and thus
performance-based wage compensation feasible, long after the agent fin-
ished working on that project. Under CPE, the expectations relative
to which a decision’s outcome is evaluated are formed at the moment
the decision is made and, therefore, incorporate the implications of the
decision. More precisely, suppose the agent chooses action 푎 and that
signal 푠 is observed. The agent receives wage 푤푠 and incurs effort cost
푐(푎). While the agent expected signal 푠 to come up with probability
훾푠(푎), with probability 훾휏 (푎) he expected signal 휏 ∕= 푠 to be observed.
If 푤휏 > 푤푠, the agent experiences a loss of 휆(푢(푤푠) − 푢(푤휏 )), whereas
if 푤휏 < 푤푠, the agent experiences a gain of 푢(푤푠) − 푢(푤휏 ). If 푤푠 = 푤휏 ,
there is no sensation of gaining or losing involved. The agent’s utility
from this particular outcome is given by
푢(푤푠)+
∑
{휏 ∣푤휏<푤푠}
훾휏 (푎)(푢(푤푠)−푢(푤휏 ))+
∑
{휏 ∣푤휏≥푤푠}
훾휏 (푎)휆(푢(푤푠)−푢(푤휏 ))−푐(푎).
Averaging over all possible outcomes yields the agent’s expected utility
from choosing action 푎:
퐸[푈(푎)] =
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎)
{
푢(푤푠) +
∑
{휏 ∣푤휏<푤푠}
훾휏 (푎)(푢(푤푠)− 푢(푤휏 ))
+
∑
{휏 ∣푤휏≥푤푠}
훾휏 (푎)휆(푢(푤푠)− 푢(푤휏 ))
}
− 푐(푎).
Note that since the agent’s expected and actual effort choice coincide,
there is neither a gain nor a loss in the effort dimension.
We conclude this section by briefly summarizing the underlying tim-
ing.
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1) The principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent.
2) The agent either accepts or rejects the contract. If the agent rejects
the game ends and each party receives her/his reservation payoff.
If the agent accepts the game moves to the next stage.
3) The agent chooses his action and forms rational expectations about
the monetary outcomes. The agent’s rational expectations about
the realization of the performance measure determine his reference
point.
4) Both parties observe the realization of the performance measure
and payments are made according to the contract.
V.3. ANALYSIS
Let the inverse function of the agent’s intrinsic utility of money be ℎ(⋅),
i.e., ℎ(⋅) := 푢−1(⋅). Thus, the monetary cost for the principal to offer
the agent utility 푢푠 is ℎ(푢푠) = 푤푠. Due to the assumptions imposed on
푢(⋅), ℎ(⋅) is a strictly increasing and weakly convex function. Following
Grossman and Hart (1983), we regard 풖 = {푢1, . . . , 푢푆} as the principal’s
control variables in her cost minimization problem to implement action
푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1). The principal offers the agent a contract that specifies for
each signal a monetary payment or, equivalently, an intrinsic utility level.
With this notation, the agent’s expected utility from exerting effort 푎 is
given by
퐸[푈(푎)] =
∑
푠∈풮
훾푠(푎)푢푠
− (휆− 1)
∑
푠∈풮
∑
{휏 ∣푢휏>푢푠}
훾휏 (푎)훾푠(푎)(푢휏 − 푢푠)− 푐(푎). (V.1)
For 휆 = 1 the agent’s expected utility equals expected net intrinsic util-
ity. Thus, for 휆 = 1 we are in the standard case without loss aversion.
Moreover, from the above formulation of the agent’s utility it becomes
clear that 휆 captures not only the weight put on losses relative to gains,
but (휆− 1) also characterizes the weight put on gain-loss utility relative
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to intrinsic utility. Thus, for 휆 ≤ 2, the weight attached to gain-loss util-
ity is below the weight attached to intrinsic utility. For a given contract
풖, the agent’s marginal utility of effort
퐸[푈 ′(푎)] =
∑
푠∈풮
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )푢푠
− (휆−1)
∑
푠∈풮
∑
{휏 ∣푢휏>푢푠}
[훾휏 (푎)(훾
퐻
푠 −훾
퐿
푠 )+훾푠(푎)(훾
퐻
휏 −훾
퐿
휏 )](푢휏 −푢푠)−푐
′(푎).
(V.2)
Suppose the principal wants to implement action 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1). The optimal
contract minimizes the expected wage payment to the agent subject to
the usual incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints:
min
푢1,...,푢푆
∑
푠∈풮
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ(푢푠)
subject to 퐸[푈(푎ˆ)] ≥ 푢¯ , (IR)
푎ˆ ∈ argmax
푎∈풜
퐸[푈(푎)]. (IC)
As a first benchmark, consider the case where the agent’s action choice
is observable and contractible, i.e., the incentive constraint (IC) is ab-
sent. In order to implement action 푎ˆ in this first-best situation, the
principal pays the agent 푢퐹퐵 = 푢¯+ 푐(푎ˆ) irrespective of the realization of
the performance measure if the agent chooses the desired action, thereby
compensating him for his outside option and his effort cost. In the pres-
ence of moral hazard, on the other hand, the principal faces the classic
tradeoff between risk sharing and providing incentives: When the agent
is anything but risk and loss neutral, it is neither optimal to have the
agent bear the complete risk, nor to fully insure the agent.
At this point we simplify the analysis by imposing two assumptions.
These assumptions are sufficient to guarantee that the principal’s cost
minimization problem exhibits the following two properties: First, there
are incentive-compatible wage contracts, i.e., contracts under which it
is optimal for the agent to choose the desired action 푎ˆ. Existence of
such contracts is not generally satisfied with the agent being loss-averse.
Second, the first-order approach is valid, i.e., the incentive constraint to
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implement action 푎ˆ can equivalently be represented as 퐸[푈 ′(푎ˆ)] = 0. The
first assumption that we introduce requires that the weight attached to
gain-loss utility does not exceed the weight put on intrinsic utility.
A s s u m p t i o n A4: No dominance of gain-loss utility, 휆 ≤ 2.
As carefully laid out in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), CPE implies a strong
notion of risk aversion, in the sense that a decision maker may choose
stochastically dominated options when 휆 > 2.26 The reason is that,
with losses looming larger than gains of equal size, the person ex ante
expects to experience a net loss. In consequence, if reducing the scope
of possibly incuring a loss is the decision maker’s primary concern, the
person would rather give up the slim hope of experiencing a gain at all
in order to avoid the disappointment in case of not experiencing this
gain. In our model, if the agent is sufficiently loss-averse, the principal
may be unable to implement any action 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1). The reason is that
the agent minimizes the ex ante expected net loss by choosing one of
the two extreme actions. The values of 휆 for which this behavior is
optimal for the agent depend on the precise structure of the performance
measure. Assumption A4 is sufficient, but not necessary, to ensure that
there is a contract such that 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1) satisfies the necessary condition for
incentive compatibility. Moreover, the tendency to choose stochastically
dominated options seems counterintuitive.27 Next to ensuring existence
of an incentive compatible contract, A4 rules out that our findings are
driven by such counterintuitive behavior of the agent. It is worthwhile
to emphasize, that our main findings (Propositions 15 and 19) still hold
26Suppose a loss-averse person has to choose between two lotteries: lottery 1 pays 푥
for sure; lottery 2 pays 푥+ 푦 with probability 푝, where 푦 > 0, and 푥 otherwise. Then,
for each 휆 > 2, the decision maker prefers the dominated lottery 1 if 푝 < (휆−2)/(휆−1).
For further details on this point, see Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007).
27The“uncertainty effect” identified by Gneezy et al. (2006) refers to people valuing
a risky prospect less than its worst possible outcome. While this may be interpreted
as experimental evidence for people having preferences for stochastically dominated
options, this finding crucially relies on the lottery currency not being stated in purely
monetary terms. Therefore, we believe that in the context of wage contracts most
people do not choose dominated options.
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for 휆 > 2 as long as existence and validity of the first-order approach are
guaranteed. In Section V.4 we relax Assumption A4 and discuss in detail
the implications of higher degrees of loss aversion.
To keep the analysis tractable we impose the following assumption.
A s s u m p t i o n A5: Convex marginal cost function, ∀ 푎 ∈ [0, 1] :
푐′′′(푎) ≥ 0.
Given A4, Assumption A5 is a sufficient but not a necessary condition
for the first-order approach to be applicable.28 Alternatively, it would
also suffice to have 휆 sufficiently small, or the slope of the marginal cost
function sufficiently steep. In fact, our results only require the validity of
the first-order approach, not that Assumption A5 holds. In Section V.4
we consider the case in which the first-order approach is invalid.
L e m m a 6: Suppose A3-A5 hold, then the constraint set of the prin-
cipal’s cost minimization problem is nonempty for all 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1).
The above lemma states that there are wage contracts such that the
agent is willing to accept the contract and then chooses the desired action.
Moreover, we will show that a second-best optimal contract exists. This,
however, is shown separately for the three cases analyzed in this section:
pure risk aversion, pure loss aversion, and the intermediate case.
Sometimes it will be convenient to state the constraints in terms of
increases in intrinsic utilities instead of absolute utilities. Note that what-
ever contract {푢ˆ푠}푠∈풮 the principal offers, we can relabel the signals such
that this contract is equivalent to a contract {푢푠}
푆
푠=1 with 푢푠−1 ≤ 푢푠
for all 푠 ∈ {2, . . . , 푆}. This, in turn, allows us to write the contract as
푢푠 = 푢1 +
∑푠
휏=2 푏휏 , where 푏휏 = 푢휏 − 푢휏−1 ≥ 0 is the increase in intrinsic
utility for money when signal 휏 instead of signal 휏 − 1 is observed. Let
풃 = (푏2, . . . , 푏푆). Using this notation allows us to rewrite the individual
28The validity of the first-order approach under assumptions A3-A5 is rigorously
proven in the appendix. The reader should be aware, however, that the proof requires
some notation introduced later on. We therefore recommend to defer reading the
proof until having read the preliminary considerations up to Section V.3.1.
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rationality constraint as follows:
푢1 +
푆∑
푠=2
푏푠
[
푆∑
휏=푠
훾휏 (푎ˆ)− 휌푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ)
]
≥ 푢¯+ 푐(푎ˆ) , (IR′)
where
휌푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) := (휆− 1)
[ 푆∑
휏=푠
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
][ 푠−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
]
.
Let 흆(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) = (휌2(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ), . . . , 휌푆(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ)). The first part of the agent’s
utility, 푢1 +
∑푆
푠=2 푏푠(
∑푆
휏=푠 훾휏 (푎ˆ)), is the expected intrinsic utility for
money. Due to loss aversion, however, the agent’s utility has a sec-
ond negative component, the term 풃′흆(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ). Where does this term
come from? With bonus 푏푠 being paid to the agent whenever a signal
higher or equal to 푠 is observed, the agent expects to receive 푏푠 with
probability
∑푆
휏=푠 훾휏 (푎ˆ). With probability
∑푠−1
푡=1 훾푡(푎ˆ), however, a signal
below 푠 will be observed, and the agent will not be paid bonus 푏푠. Thus,
with “probability” [
∑푆
휏=푠 훾휏 (푎ˆ)][
∑푠−1
푡=1 훾푡(푎ˆ)] the agent experiences a loss
of 휆푏푠. Analogous reasoning implies that the agent will experience a gain
of 푏푠 with the same probability. With losses looming larger than gains
of equal size, in expectation the agent suffers from deviations from his
reference point. This ex ante expected net loss is captured by the term,
풃′흆(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ), which we will refer to as the agent’s “loss premium”.29 A
crucial point is that the loss premium increases in the complexity of the
contract. When there is no wage differentiation at all, i.e., 풃 = 0, then
the loss premium vanishes. If, in contrast, the contract specifies many
different wage payments, then the agent ex ante considers a deviation
from his reference point very likely. Put differently, for each additional
wage payment an extra negative term enters the agent’s loss premium
and therefore reduces his expected utility.30
29Our notion of the agent’s loss premium is highly related to the average self-
distance of a lottery defined by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007). Let 퐷(풖) be the average
self-distance of incentive scheme 풖, then [(휆− 1)/2]퐷(풖) = 풃′흆(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ).
30While the exact change of the loss premium from adding more and more wage
payments is hard to grasp, this point can heuristically be illustrated by considering
the upper bound of the loss premium. Suppose the principal sets 푛 ≤ 푆 different
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Given the first-order approach is valid, the incentive constraint can
be rewritten as
푆∑
푠=2
푏푠훽푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) = 푐
′(푎ˆ), (IC′)
where
훽푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) :=
(
푆∑
휏=푠
(훾퐻휏 − 훾
퐿
휏 )
)
− (휆− 1)
⋅
[(
푠−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
)(
푆∑
휏=푠
(훾퐻휏 − 훾
퐿
휏 )
)
+
(
푆∑
휏=푠
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
)(
푠−1∑
푡=1
(훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 )
)]
.
Here, 훽푠(⋅) is the marginal effect on incentives of an increase in the wage
payments for signals above 푠− 1. Without loss aversion, i.e., 휆 = 1, this
expression equals the marginal probability of observing at least signal 푠.
If the agent is loss-averse, on the other hand, an increase in the action also
affects the agent’s loss premium. The probability of bearing a loss of size
푏푠 is a quadratic function of the probability of observing at least signal
푠. The agent’s action balances the tradeoff between maximizing intrinsic
utility and minimizing the expected net loss. Depending on the precise
signal structure and the action to be implemented, loss aversion may
facilitate as well as hamper the creation of incentives. Let 휷(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) =
(훽2(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ), . . . , 훽푆(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ)).
As in the standard case, incentives are created solely by increases in
intrinsic utilities, 풃. In consequence, (IR′) is binding in the optimum.
If this was not the case, i.e., if 풃 satisfies (IC′) but (IR′) holds with
strict inequality, then the principal can lower payment 푢1 up to the point
where the (IR′) is satisfied with equality. Thus, reducing 푢1 while holding
풃 constant lowers the principal’s expected wage payment while preserving
incentives.
It is obvious that (IC′) can only be satisfied if there exists at least one
훽푠 > 0. If, for example, signals are ordered according to their likelihood
wages. It is readily verified that the loss premium is bounded from above by (휆 −
1)[(푢푆 − 푢1)/2] × [(푛 − 1)/푛], and that this upper bound increases as 푛 increases.
Note, however, that even for 푛→∞ the upper bound of the loss premium is finite.
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ratios, then 훽푠(⋅) > 0 for all 푠 = 2, . . . , 푆. More precisely, for a given or-
dering of signals, under A4 the following equivalence follows immediately
from the fact that
∑푠−1
푡=1(훾
퐻
푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 ) = −
∑푆
휏=푠(훾
퐻
휏 − 훾
퐿
휏 ):
훽푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) > 0 ⇐⇒
푆∑
휏=푠
(훾퐻휏 − 훾
퐿
휏 ) > 0. (V.3)
V.3.1. TWO POLAR CASES: PURE RISK AVERSION VS. PURE LOSS
AVERSION
In this part of the paper we analyze the two polar cases: The standard
case where the agent is only risk-averse but not loss-averse, on the one
hand, and the case of a loss-averse agent with a risk-neutral intrinsic
utility function, on the other hand.
Pure Risk Aversion
First consider an agent who is risk-averse in the usual sense, i.e., ℎ′′(⋅) >
0, but does not exhibit loss aversion. As discussed earlier, the latter
requirement corresponds to the case where 휆 = 1. With the agent not
being loss-averse, the first-order approach is valid even without Assump-
tion A5.
P r o p o s i t i o n 14 (Holmstro¨m, 1979) : Suppose A3 holds,
ℎ′′(⋅) > 0, and 휆 = 1. Then there exists a second-best optimal contract
to implement 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1). The second-best contract has the property
that 푢푠 ∕= 푢휏 ∀푠, 휏 ∈ 풮 and 푠 ∕= 휏 . Moreover, 푢푠 > 푢휏 if and only if
훾퐻푠 /훾
퐿
푠 > 훾
퐻
휏 /훾
퐿
휏 .
Proposition 14, restates the well-known finding by Holmstro¨m (1979)
for discrete signals: Signals that are more indicative of higher effort, i.e.,
signals with a higher likelihood ratio 훾퐻푠 /훾
퐿
푠 , are rewarded strictly higher.
Thus, the optimal wage scheme is complex in the sense that it is fully
differentiated, with each signal being rewarded differently.
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Pure Loss Aversion
Having considered the polar case of pure risk aversion, we now turn to
the other extreme, a purely loss-averse agent. Formally, intrinsic utility
of money is a linear function, ℎ′′(⋅) = 0, and the agent is loss-averse,
휆 > 1. As we have already reasoned, whatever contract the principal
offers, relabeling the signals always allows us to represent this contract
as an (at least weakly) increasing intrinsic utility profile. Therefore we
can decompose the principal’s problem into two steps: first, for a given
ordering of signals, choose a nondecreasing profile of intrinsic utility levels
that implements the desired action 푎ˆ at minimum cost; second, choose the
signal ordering with the lowest cost of implementation. As we know from
the discussion at the end of the previous section, a necessary condition
for an upward-sloping incentive scheme to achieve incentive compatibility
is that for the underlying signal ordering at least one 훽푠(⋅) > 0. In
what follows we restrict attention to the set of signal orderings that are
incentive feasible in the afore-mentioned sense. Nonemptiness of this set
follows immediately from Lemma 6.
Consider the first step of the principal’s problem, i.e., taking the
ordering of signals as given, find the nondecreasing payment scheme with
the lowest cost of implementation. In what follows, we write the agent’s
intrinsic utility in terms of additional payments, 푢푠 = 푢1 +
∑푆
휏=2 푏휏 .
With ℎ(⋅) being linear, the principal’s objective function is 퐶(푢1, 풃) =
푢1 +
∑푆
푠=2 푏푠(
∑푆
휏=2 훾휏 (푎ˆ)). Remember that at the optimum, (IR
′) holds
with equality. Inserting (IR′) into the principal’s objective allows us to
write the cost minimization problem for a given order of signals in the
following simple way:
Program ML:
min
풃∈ℝ푆−1
+
풃′흆(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ)
subject to 풃′휷(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) = 푐′(푎ˆ) (IC′)
The minimization problem (ML) has a simple intuition. The principal
seeks to minimize the agent’s expected net loss subject to the incentive
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compatibility constraint. Similar to the case of pure risk aversion, where
the principal would like to cut back the agent’s risk premium, here she is
interested in minimizing the agent’s loss premium. Due to the incentive
constraint, however, this loss premium has to be strictly positive.
We want to emphasize that solving Program ML also yields insights
for the more general case with a concave intrinsic utility function. Even
though the principal’s objective will not reduce to minimizing the agent’s
loss premium alone when intrinsic utility is non-linear, this nevertheless
remains an important aspect of the principal’s problem. Since the solu-
tion to Program ML tells us how to minimize the agent’s loss premium
irrespective of the functional form of intrinsic utility, one should expect
its properties to carry over to some extent to the solution of the more
general problem.
The principal’s cost minimization problem for a given order of signals
is a simple linear programming problem: minimize a linear objective
function subject to one linear equality constraint. Since we restricted
attention to orderings of signals with 훽푠(⋅) > 0 for at least one signal 푠,
a solution to (ML) exists. Due to the linear nature of problem (ML),
(generically) this solution sets exactly one 푏푠 > 0 and all other 푏푠 = 0.
Put differently, the problem is to find that 푏푠 which creates incentives at
the lowest cost.
So far we have seen that, for a given ordering of signals, the principal
considers it optimal to offer the agent a bonus contract: pay a low wage
for signals below some threshold, and a high wage for signals above this
threshold. What remains to do for the principal, in a second step, is to
find the signal ordering that leads to the lowest cost of implementation.
With the number of different orders of signals being finite, this problem
clearly has a solution.
Before summarizing the above discussion more concisely, we want to
relate our finding to the benchmark case of pure risk neutrality. As is
well-known, with both contracting parties being risk (and loss) neutral a
broad range of contracts – including simple bonus schemes – is optimal.
With the agent being loss-averse even to a negligible degree, however,
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the unique optimal contractual form is a bonus scheme.31
P r o p o s i t i o n 15 : Suppose A3-A5 hold, ℎ′′(⋅) = 0 and 휆 > 1.
Then there exists a second-best optimal contract to implement action
푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1). Generically, the second-best optimal incentive scheme {푢∗푠}
푆
푠=1
is a bonus contract, i.e., 푢∗푠 = 푢
∗
퐻 for 푠 ∈ ℬ
∗ ⊂ 풮 and 푢∗푠 = 푢
∗
퐿 for
푠 ∈ 풮 ∖ ℬ∗, where 푢∗퐻 > 푢
∗
퐿.
According to Proposition 15, the principal considers it optimal to offer
the agent a bonus contract which entails only a minimum degree of wage
differentiation in the sense that, no matter how rich the signal space, the
contract specifies only two different wage payments. This endeavor to
reduce the complexity of the contract is plausible, since a high degree of
wage differentiation increases the agent’s loss premium: With the em-
ployment contract she offers to the agent, the principal determines the
dimensionality of the agent’s reference point. The higher the dimension-
ality of the reference point is, the more likely it is that the agent incurs a
loss in a particular dimension. Therefore, with the concept of reference-
dependent preferences developed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin, it truly pains a
person to be exposed to numerous potential outcomes. This disutility
of the agent from facing several possible (monetary) outcomes, which he
demands to be compensated for, makes it costly for the principal to offer
complex contracts. In consequence, the optimal contract entails only a
minimum of wage differentiation. To provide a more intuitive explanation
for this finding, consider a principal who – starting out from a given wage
scheme – has to improve incentives. There are basically two ways to do
so. On the one hand, the principal can introduce a new wage spread, i.e.,
pay slightly different wages for two signals that were rewarded equally
31If, in addition to both the principal and the agent being risk-neutral, the agent is
protected by limited liability, Park (1995), Kim (1997), Oyer (2000), and Demougin
and Fluet (1998) show that the optimal contract is a bonus scheme. These findings,
however, immediately collapse when the agent is somewhat risk-averse as is demon-
strated by Jewitt et al. (2008). Our findings, on the other hand, are robust towards
introducing a slightly concave intrinsic utility function, as we will illustrate in Section
V.3.2.
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in the original wage scheme, while keeping the differences between all
other neighboring wages constant. On the other hand, the principal can
increase an existing wage spread, holding constant all other spreads be-
tween neighboring wages. Both procedures increase the loss premium by
increasing the size of some of the the expected losses without reducing
others. Introducing a new wage spread, however, additionally increases
the loss premium by increasing the ex ante expected probability of expe-
riencing a loss. Therefore, in order to improve incentives for a loss-averse
agent, it is advantageous to increase a particular existing wage spread
without adding to the contractual complexity in the sense of increasing
the number of different wages. Under the standard notion of a risk-
averse agent, however, one should not expect to encounter this tendency
to reduce the complexity of contracts. The reason is that increasing in-
centives by introducing a small new wage spread is basically costless for
the principal because locally the agent is risk-neutral. Therefore, under
risk aversion different signals are rewarded differently.
Up to now, however, we have not specified which signals are generally
included in the set ℬ∗. In light of the above observation, the principal’s
problem boils down to choosing a binary partition of the set of signals,
ℬ ⊂ 풮, which characterizes for which signals the agent receives the high
wage and for which signals he receives the low wage. The wages 푢퐿 and
푢퐻 are then uniquely determined by the corresponding individual ratio-
nality and incentive compatibility constraints. The problem of choosing
the optimal partition of signals, ℬ∗, which minimizes the principal’s ex-
pected cost of implementing action 푎ˆ is an integer programming problem.
As is typical for this class of problems, and as is nicely illustrated by the
well-known“0-1 Knapsack Problem”, it is impossible to provide a general
characterization of the solution.32
32The “0-1 Knapsack Problem” refers to a hiker who has to select from a group
of items, all of which may be suitable for her trip, a subset that has greatest value
while not exceeding the capacity of her knapsack. Suppose there are 푛 items, each
item 푗 has a value 푣푗 > 0 and a weight 푤푗 > 0. Let the capacity of the knapsack be
푐 > 0. The 0-1 Knapsack Problem may be formulated as the following maximization
problem: max
∑푛
푗=1 푣푗푥푗 subject to
∑푛
푗=1 푤푗푥푗 ≤ 푐 and 푥푗 ∈ {0, 1} for 푗 = 1, . . . , 푛.
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Next to these standard intricacies of integer programming, there is an
additional difficulty in our model: the principal’s objective behaves non-
monotonically when including an additional signal into the“bonus set”ℬ.
This is due to different – possibly conflicting – targets that the principal
pursues when deciding how to partition the set 풮. From Program (ML) it
follows that, for a given“bonus set”ℬ, the minimum cost of implementing
action 푎ˆ is given by
퐶ℬ = 푢¯+ 푐(푎ˆ) +
푐′(푎ˆ)(휆− 1)푃ℬ(1− 푃ℬ)
[
∑
푠∈ℬ 훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 ][1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ)]
, (V.4)
where 푃ℬ :=
∑
푠∈ℬ 훾푠(푎ˆ). The above costs can be rewritten such that the
principal’s problem amounts to
max
ℬ⊂풮
[∑
푠∈ℬ
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]{
1
(휆− 1)푃ℬ(1− 푃ℬ)
−
1
푃ℬ
+
1
1− 푃ℬ
}
. (V.5)
This objective function illustrates the tradeoff that the principal faces
when deciding how to partition the signal space. The first term,
∑
푠∈ℬ(훾
퐻
푠
−훾퐿푠 ), is the aggregate marginal impact of effort on the probability of
the bonus 푏 := 푢퐻 − 푢퐿 being paid out. In order to create incentives
for the agent, the principal would like to make this term as large as
possible, which in turn allows her to lower the bonus payment. This can
be achieved by including only good signals in ℬ. The second term, on the
other hand, is maximized by making the probability of paying the agent
the high wage either as large as possible or as small as possible, depending
on the exact signal structure and the action to be implemented. With
the loss premium being given by (휆 − 1)푃ℬ(1 − 푃ℬ)푏, this is intuitive:
By making the event of paying the high wage very likely or unlikely,
the principal minimizes the scope for the agent to experience a loss that
he demands to be compensated for. Depending on the signal structure,
these two goals may conflict with each other, which makes a complete
characterization of the optimal contract very intricate. Nevertheless, it
can be shown that the optimal contract displays the following plausible
property.
P r o p o s i t i o n 16 : Let 풮+ ≡ {푠 ∈ 풮∣훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 > 0}. The optimal
partition of the signals for which the high wage is paid, ℬ∗, has the
following property: either ℬ∗ ⊆ 풮+ or 풮+ ⊆ ℬ∗.
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Put verbally, the optimal partition of the signal set takes one of the
two possible forms: the high wage is paid out to the agent (i) either only
for good signals though possibly not for all good signals, or (ii) for all
good signals and possibly a few bad signals as well. Loosely speaking, if
the principal considers it optimal to pay the high wage very rarely, she
will reward only good signals with the extra payment 푏. If, on the other
hand, she wants the agent to receive the high wage with high probability,
then she will reward at least all good signals.
Without further assumptions, due to the discrete nature of the prob-
lem it is hard to characterize the signals that are included in ℬ∗. Back
to the “0-1 Knapsack Problem”, here it is well-established for the con-
tinuous version of the problem that the solution can easily be found by
ordering the items according to their value-to-weight ratio.33 Defining
휅 := max{푠,푡}⊆풮 ∣훾푠(푎ˆ) − 훾푡(푎ˆ)∣, we can obtain a similar result. Assum-
ing that 휅 is sufficiently small, which is likely to hold if the performance
measure is, for instance, sales revenues measured in cents, makes the
principal’s problem of choosing ℬ∗ similar to a continuous problem.34
With this assumption, we can show that it is optimal to order the signals
according to their likelihood ratios.
P r o p o s i t i o n 17 : Suppose 휅 is sufficiently small, then there ex-
ists a constant 퐾 such that ℬ∗ = {푠 ∈ 풮 ∣ 훾퐻푠 /훾
퐿
푠 ≥ 퐾}.
Though wage payments are only weakly increasing in the likelihood
ratio, this finding resembles the standard result for a risk-averse agent,
where the incentive scheme is strictly increasing in the likelihood ratio.
Before moving on to the discussion of the more general case in which
the agent is both risk and loss-averse, we want to pause to point out the
following comparative static results.
P r o p o s i t i o n 18 : An increase in the agent’s degree of loss aver-
sion (i) strictly increases the minimum cost of implementing action 푎ˆ;
33In the continuous “0-1 Knapsack Problem” the constraints on the variables 푥푗 ∈
{0, 1} are relaxed to 푥푗 ∈ [0, 1], e.g. Dantzig (1957).
34Here, the probability of observing a specific signal, say, sales revenues of exactly
$13,825.32 is rather small.
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(ii) decreases the necessary wage spread to implement action 푎ˆ if and
only if 푃ℬ∗ > 1/2, given that the change in 휆 does not lead to a change
of ℬ∗.
Part (ii) of Proposition 18 relates to the reasoning by Ko˝szegi and Ra-
bin (2006) that if the agent is loss-averse and expectations are the driving
force in the determination of the reference point, then “in principal-agent
models, performance-contingent pay may not only directly motivate the
agent to work harder in pursuit of higher income, but also indirectly
motivate [him] by changing [his] expected income and effort.” As can
be seen from (V.1), the agent’s expected utility under the second-best
contract comprises of two components, the first of which is expected net
intrinsic utility from choosing effort level 푎ˆ, 푢퐿 + 푏
∗
∑
푠∈ℬ∗ 훾푠(푎ˆ) − 푐(푎ˆ).
Due to loss aversion, however, there is a second component: With losses
looming larger than equally sized gains, in expectation the agent suffers
from deviations from his reference point. While the strength of this ef-
fect is determined by the degree of the agent’s loss aversion, 휆, his action
choice – together with the signal parameters – determines the probabil-
ity that such a deviation from the reference point actually occurs. We
refer to this probability, which is given by 푃ℬ∗(1−푃ℬ∗), as loss probabil-
ity. Therefore, when choosing his action, the agent has to balance off two
possibly conflicting targets, maximizing expected net intrinsic utility and
minimizing the loss probability. The loss probability, which is a strictly
concave function of the agent’s effort, is locally decreasing at 푎ˆ if and only
if 푃ℬ∗ > 1/2. In this case, an increase in 휆, which makes reducing the
loss probability more important, may lead to the agent choosing a higher
effort level, which in turn allows the principal to use lower-powered incen-
tives. The principal, however, cannot capitalize on this since, according
to part (i) of Proposition 18, the overall cost of implementation strictly
increases in the agent’s degree of loss aversion.
V.3.2. THE GENERAL CASE: LOSS AVERSION AND RISK AVERSION
We now turn to the intermediate case where the agent is both risk and
loss-averse. The agent’s intrinsic utility for money is a strictly increasing
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and strictly concave function, which implies that ℎ(⋅) is strictly increasing
and strictly convex. Moreover, the agent is loss-averse, i.e., 휆 > 1. From
Lemma 6, we know that the constraint set of the principal’s problem
is nonempty. By relabeling signals, each contract can be interpreted as
a contract that offers the agent a (weakly) increasing intrinsic utility
profile. This allows us to assess whether the agent perceives receiving 푢푠
instead of 푢푡 as a gain or a loss. As in the case of pure loss aversion, we
analyze the optimal contract for a given feasible ordering of signals.
The principal’s problem for a given arrangement of the signals is given
by
Program MG:
min
푢1,...,푢푆
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ(푢푠) subject to
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)푢푠 − (휆− 1)
푆−1∑
푠=1
푆∑
푡=푠+1
훾푠(푎ˆ)훾푡(푎ˆ)[푢푡 − 푢푠]− 푐(푎ˆ) = 푢¯ , (IR퐺)
푆∑
푠=1
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )푢푠 − (휆− 1)
⋅
푆−1∑
푠=1
푆∑
푡=푠+1
[
훾푠(푎ˆ)(훾
퐻
푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 ) + 훾푡(푎ˆ)(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]
[푢푡 − 푢푠] = 푐
′(푎ˆ) ,
(IC퐺)
푢푆 ≥ 푢푆−1 ≥ . . . ≥ 푢1. (OC퐺)
Since the objective function is strictly convex and the constraints are all
linear in 풖 = {푢1, . . . , 푢푆}, the Kuhn-Tucker theorem yields necessary
and sufficient conditions for optimality. Put differently, if there exists a
solution to the problem (MG) the solution is characterized by the partial
derivatives of the Lagrangian associated with (MG) set equal to zero.
L e m m a 7: Suppose A3-A5 hold and ℎ′′(⋅) > 0, then there exists a
second-best optimal incentive scheme for implementing action 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1),
denoted 풖∗ = {푢∗1, . . . , 푢
∗
푆}.
In order to interpret the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian to
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problem (MG) it is necessary to know whether the Lagrangian multipliers
are positive or negative.
L e m m a 8: The Lagrangian multipliers of program (MG) associated
with the incentive compatibility constraint and the individual rationality
constraint are both strictly positive, i.e., 휇퐼퐶 > 0 and 휇퐼푅 > 0.
We now give a heuristic reasoning why pooling of information may
well be optimal in this more general case. For the sake of argument,
suppose there is no pooling of information in the sense that it is optimal
to set distinct wages for distinct signals. In this case all order constraints
are slack; formally, if 푢푠 ∕= 푢푠′ for all 푠, 푠
′ ∈ 풮 and 푠 ∕= 푠′, then 휇푂,푠 = 0 for
all 푠 ∈ {2, . . . , 푆}. In this case, i.e., when none of the ordering constraints
is binding, then the first-order condition of optimality with respect to 푢푠,
∂ℒ(풖)/∂푢푠 = 0, can be written as follows:
ℎ′(푢푠) =
(
휇퐼푅 + 휇퐼퐶
훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠
훾푠(푎ˆ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:퐻푠
[
1− (휆− 1)
(
2
푠−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ) + 훾푠(푎ˆ)− 1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Γ푠
− 휇퐼퐶(휆− 1)
[
2
푠−1∑
푡=1
(훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 ) + (훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Λ푠
. (V.6)
For 휆 = 1 we have ℎ′(푢푠) = 퐻푠, the standard “Holmstro¨m-formula”.
35
Note that Γ푠 > 0 for 휆 ≤ 2. More importantly, irrespective of the signal
ordering, we have Γ푠 > Γ푠+1. The third term, Λ푠, can be either positive
or negative. If the compound signal of all signals below 푠 and the signal
푠 itself are bad signals, then Λ푠 < 0.
Since the incentive scheme is nondecreasing, when the order con-
straints are not binding it has to hold that ℎ′(푢푠) ≥ ℎ
′(푢푠−1). Thus,
if 휇푂퐶,푠−1 = 휇푂퐶,푠 = 휇푂퐶,푠+1 = 0 the following inequality is satisfied:
퐻푠 × Γ푠 − Λ푠 ≥ 퐻푠−1 × Γ푠−1 − Λ푠−1. (V.7)
35See Holmstro¨m (1979). This formula is also referred to as the modified Borch
sharing rule (Borch, 1962).
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Note that for the given ordering of signals, if there exists any pair of
signals 푠, 푠− 1 such that (V.7) is violated, then the optimal contract for
this ordering involves pooling of wages. Even when 퐻푠 > 퐻푠−1, as it is
the case when signals are ordered according to their likelihood ratio, it
is not clear that inequality (V.7) is satisfied. In particular, when 푠 and
푠 − 1 are similarly informative it seems to be optimal to pay the same
wage for these two signals as can easily be illustrated for the case of two
good signals: If 푠 and 푠 − 1 are similarly informative good signals then
퐻푠 ≈ 퐻푠−1 > 0 but Γ푠 < Γ푠−1 and Λ푠 > Λ푠−1, thus condition (V.7) is
violated. In summary, it may well be that for a given incentive-feasible
ordering of signals, and thus overall as well, the order constraints are
binding, i.e., it may be optimal to offer a contract which is less complex
than the signal space allows for. We illustrate this conjecture in the
following with an example.
Application with Constant Relative Risk Aversion
In the general case of a risk and loss-averse agent the principal seeks
to minimize the loss and the risk premium. Roughly speaking, the risk
premium is increasing in the curvature of the agent’s intrinsic utility func-
tion. Put differently, when the agent’s intrinsic utility function becomes
close to linearity the risk premium goes to zero. Thus, for a slightly
concave intrinsic utility function one should expect that the principal’s
main objective is to minimize the loss premium, which is achieved by a
bonus scheme as is shown in Section V.3.1. In the following we show that
these reasoning is correct for the case of an intrinsic utility function that
features constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
Suppose ℎ(푢) = 푢푟, with 푟 ≥ 0 being a measure for the agent’s
risk aversion. More precisely, the Arrow-Pratt measure for relative risk
aversion of the agent’s intrinsic utility function is 푅 = 1− 1
푟
and therefore
constant. The following result states that the optimal contract is still a
bonus contract when the agent is not only loss-averse, but also slightly
risk-averse.
P r o p o s i t i o n 19 : Suppose A3-A5 hold, ℎ(푢) = 푢푟 with 푟 > 1,
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and 휆 > 1. Generically, for 푟 sufficiently small the optimal incentive
scheme {푢∗푠}
푆
푠=1 is a bonus scheme, i.e., 푢
∗
푠 = 푢
∗
퐻 for 푠 ∈ ℬ
∗ ⊂ 풮 and
푢∗푠 = 푢
∗
퐿 for 푠 ∈ 풮∖ℬ
∗ where 푢∗퐿 < 푢
∗
퐻 .
Without loss aversion, in contrast, according to Proposition 14 the
optimal contract is fully differentiated even for intrinsic utility being ar-
bitrarily close to linearity.
Next, we demonstrate by means of an example that pooling of signals
may well be optimal even for a non-negligible degree of risk aversion.
Suppose the agent’s effort cost is 푐(푎) = (1/2)푎2 and the effort level to be
implemented is 푎ˆ = 1
2
. Moreover, we assume that the reservation utility
푢¯ = 10, which guarantees that all utility levels are positive.36 To keep the
example as simple as possible, it is assumed that the agent’s performance
can take only three values, i.e., the agent’s performance is either excellent
(E), satisfactory (S) or inadequate (I). We consider two specifications of
the performance measure. In the first specification the satisfactory signal
is a good signal, whereas in the second specification it is a bad signal.
In all parameter constellations we consider, it turns out that it is always
(weakly) optimal to order signals according to their likelihood ratio, i.e.,
푢1 = 푢퐼 , 푢2 = 푢푆 and 푢3 = 푢퐸. In the first specification the conditional
probabilities take the following values:
훾퐻퐸 = 5/10 훾
퐿
퐸 = 1/10
훾퐻푆 = 4/10 훾
퐿
푆 = 3/10
훾퐻퐼 = 1/10 훾
퐿
퐼 = 6/10.
The structure of the optimal contract for this specification and various
values of 푟 and 휆 is presented in Table V.1.
Table V.1 suggests that the optimal contract typically involves pooling
of the two good signals, in particular when the agent’s intrinsic utility
is not too concave, i.e., if the agent is not too risk-averse. Table V.1
nicely illustrates the trade-off the principal faces when the agent is both,
risk and loss-averse: If the agent becomes more risk-averse pooling is less
36Increasing 푢¯ makes the agent less (absolutely) risk-averse and thus is similar to a
reduction in 푟.
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H
H
H
H
H
H
H
푟
휆
1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5
1.5 푢1 < 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 < 푢2 = 푢3 푢1 < 푢2 = 푢3 푢1 < 푢2 = 푢3
2 푢1 < 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 < 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 < 푢2 = 푢3 푢1 < 푢2 = 푢3
3 푢1 < 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 < 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 < 푢2 = 푢3 푢1 < 푢2 = 푢3
Table V.1: Structure of the optimal contract with two “good” signals.
likely to be optimal. If, on the other hand, he becomes more loss-averse,
pooling is more likely to be optimal.37
In the second specification we assume that there are two bad signals.
The conditional probabilities are as follows:
훾퐻퐸 = 6/10 훾
퐿
퐸 = 1/10
훾퐻푆 = 2/10 훾
퐿
푆 = 4/10
훾퐻퐼 = 2/10 훾
퐿
퐼 = 5/10.
The results for this case are presented in Table V.2.
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
푟
휆
1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5
1.5 푢1 < 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 = 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 = 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 = 푢2 < 푢3
2 푢1 < 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 = 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 = 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 = 푢2 < 푢3
3 푢1 < 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 = 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 = 푢2 < 푢3 푢1 = 푢2 < 푢3
Table V.2: Structure of the optimal contract with two “bad” signals.
In this specification, a binary statistic that pools the two bad signals
seems to be optimal almost always. The reason behind this observation
is that the two bad signals are very similar. In consequence, paying the
same wage for satisfactory as well as inadequate performance increases
37For a given 푟, the degree of pooling does not monotonically increase in 휆. As
discussed at the end of Section V.3.1, a higher degree of loss aversion of the agent
may help the principal to create incentives. If this is the case, a contract that contains
less pooling is preferred from an incentive point of view. If this positive effect of less
pooling on incentives outweighs the negative effect on the agent’s loss premium, then
the optimal contract consists of more distinct wage payments when 휆 increases. This
can happen, however, only locally: at some point the degree of pooling increases in 휆.
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the risk premium only slightly. On the other hand, by pooling satisfactory
and inadequate performance it becomes less likely for the agent ex ante
to experience a loss, i.e., the loss premium is reduced. Therefore, it is
optimal for the principal to use a bonus scheme even when the agent’s
degree of loss aversion is small.
V.4. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS, TURNING A BLIND EYE, AND
STOCHSTIC CONTRACTS
In this section, we relax the assumptions that guaranteed the validity
of the first-order approach. In particular, in order to explore the im-
plications of a higher degree of loss aversion, we relax A4. We restrict
attention to two simplifications of the former model. First, we return
to the assumption of a purely loss-averse agent. Second, only binary
measures of performance are considered.
V.4.1. THE CASE OF A BINARY MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE
As before, the principal cannot observe the agent’s action 푎 or whether
the benefit 퐵 was realized or not. Instead she observes a contractible
binary measure of performance, i.e., 풮 = {1, 2}. For notational conve-
nience , let (1− 훾퐻) and 훾퐻 denote the probabilities of observing signal
푠 = 1 and 푠 = 2, respectively, conditional on 퐵 being realized. Accord-
ingly, (1 − 훾퐿) and 훾퐿 are the probabilities of observing signal 푠 = 1
and 푠 = 2, respectively, conditional on 퐵 not being realized.38 Thus, the
unconditional probability of observing signal 푠 = 2 for a given action 푎
is 훾(푎) ≡ 푎훾퐻 + (1− 푎)훾퐿. Let 휸ˆ = (훾퐻 , 훾퐿). We reformulate A3 for the
binary case as follows.
A s s u m p t i o n A6: 1 > 훾퐻 > 훾퐿 > 0 .
With only two possible signals to be observed, the contract takes the
form of a bonus contract: the agent is paid a base wage which yields
38In the notation introduced above, we have 훾퐻1 = 1− 훾
퐻 , 훾퐻2 = 훾
퐻 , 훾퐿1 = 1− 훾
퐿
and 훾퐿2 = 훾
퐿.
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intrinsic utility 푢 if the bad signal is observed, and he is paid the base
wage plus a bonus 푏 resulting in intrinsic utility 푢 + 푏 if the good signal
is observed. For now assume that 푏 ≥ 0.39 We assume that the agent’s
intrinsic disutility of effort is a quadratic function, 푐(푎) = (푘/2)푎2.40 The
agent’s expected utility from choosing effort level 푎 then is
퐸 [푈(푎)] = 푢+ 훾(푎)푏−
푘
2
푎2 − (휆− 1)훾(푎)(1− 훾(푎))푏. (V.8)
As before, the first component is expected net intrinsic utility from choos-
ing effort level 푎, that is, expected wage payment minus effort cost. The
second component is the loss premium, with 훾(푎)(1− 훾(푎)) denoting the
loss probability.
V.4.2. INVALIDITY OF THE FIRST-ORDER APPROACH
The first derivative of expected utility with respect to effort is given by
퐸 [푈 ′(푎)] = (훾퐻 − 훾퐿)푏 [2− 휆+ 2훾(푎)(휆− 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
푀퐵(푎)
− 푘푎︸︷︷︸
푀퐶(푎)
. (V.9)
While the marginal cost, 푀퐶(푎), obviously is a straight line through the
origin with slope 푘, the marginal benefit, 푀퐵(푎), also is a positively
sloped, linear function of effort 푎. An increase in 푏 unambiguously makes
푀퐵(푎) steeper. Letting 푎0 denote the intercept of 푀퐵(푎) with the
horizontal axis, we have
푎0 =
휆− 2− 2훾퐿(휆− 1)
2(훾퐻 − 훾퐿)(휆− 1)
.
The cases for 푎0 < 0 and 푎0 > 0 are depicted in Figures V.1 and V.2,
respectively. Implementation problems in our sense refer to a situation
where there are actions 푎 ∈ (0, 1) that are not incentive compatible for
any bonus payment.
39The assumption 푏 ≥ 0 is made only for expositional purposes, the results hold
true for 푏 ∈ ℝ.
40This functional form does not fit exactly the assumptions on 푐(⋅) that we imposed
above, but is made for expositional convenience. Allowing for more general effort cost
functions does not qualitatively change the insights that are to be obtained.
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replacemen
푎푎ˆ푎0
푀퐶(푎) 푀퐵(푎)
Figure V.1: 푀퐵(푎) and 푀퐶(푎)
for 푎0 < 0.
푎푎ˆ푎0
푀퐵(푎) 푀퐶(푎)
Figure V.2: 푀퐵(푎) and 푀퐶(푎)
for 푎0 > 0.
P r o p o s i t i o n 20 : Suppose A6 holds, then effort level 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1)
is implementable if and only if 푎0 ≤ 0.
Implementation problems arise when 푎0 > 0, or equivalently, when
훾퐿 < 1/2 and 휆 > 2(1− 훾퐿)/(1− 2훾퐿) > 2. Somewhat surprisingly, this
includes performance measures with 훾퐿 < 1/2 < 훾퐻 , which (possibly)
are highly informative. Informative in this context means that it is more
likely to observe the bad signal if benefit 퐵 was not realized, whereas
it is more likely to observe the good signal if 퐵 was realized. So, why
do these implementation problems arise in the first place? Remember
that the agent has two targets: First, as in classic models, he seeks to
maximize net intrinsic utility, 푢+ 푏훾(푎)− (푘/2)푎2. When the agent cares
only about this net intrinsic utility (e.g., he is loss neutral) then each
action can be implemented by choosing a sufficiently high bonus. Due to
loss aversion, however, the agent has a second target which is minimizing
the expected loss. How can the agent pursue this goal? He can do so by
choosing an action such that the loss probability, 훾(푎)(1−훾(푎)), becomes
small. The crucial point is that these two targets may conflict with each
other in the sense that an increase in effort may increase net intrinsic
utility but at the same time also increases the loss probability. First
of all, note that implementation problems never arise when 훾퐿 ≥ 1/2
or 휆 ≤ 2. For 훾퐿 ≥ 1/2, the loss probability is strictly decreasing in
the agent’s action. Consequently, with both targets of the agent being
aligned, an increase in the bonus unambiguously leads to an increase in
the agent’s action. For 휆 ≤ 2, the weight put on gain-loss utility, 휆− 1,
is lower than the weight put on intrinsic utility, so the agent is more
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interested in maximizing net intrinsic utility than in minimizing the loss
probability. For 훾퐿 < 1/2, on the other hand, implementation problems
do arise when 휆 is sufficiently large. Roughly speaking, being sufficiently
loss-averse, the agent primarily cares about reducing the loss probability.
With the loss probability being inverted U-shaped, the agent achieves
this by choosing one of the two extreme actions 푎 ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore,
the principal cannot motivate the agent to choose an action 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1)
when 훾퐿 < 1/2 and the agent’s loss aversion is sufficiently severe.
V.4.3. TURNING A BLIND EYE
As we have seen in the preceding analysis, the principal faces implementa-
tion problems whenever 푎0 > 0. One might wonder if there is a remedy for
these implementation problems. The answer is “yes”, there is a remedy.
The principal can manipulate the signal in her favor by not paying atten-
tion to the signal from time to time but nevertheless paying the bonus in
these cases. Formally, suppose the principal commits herself to stochas-
tically ignoring the signal with probability 푝 ∈ [0, 1).41 Thus, the overall
probability of receiving the bonus is given by 훾(푎; 푝) ≡ 푝 + (1 − 푝)훾(푎).
This strategic ignorance of information gives rise to a transformed per-
formance measure 휸ˆ(푝) = (훾퐻(푝), 훾퐿(푝)). As before, 훾퐻(푝) denotes the
probability that the bonus is paid to the agent conditional on benefit
퐵 being realized. Given that 퐵 is realized, this happens either when
the performance measure is ignored, or – if the principal pays atten-
tion to the performance measure – when the good signal is realized.
Hence, 훾퐻(푝) = 푝 + (1 − 푝)훾퐻 . Analogously, the probability of the
bonus being paid out conditional on 퐵 not being realized is given by
훾퐿(푝) = 푝 + (1− 푝)훾퐿. As it turns out, ignoring the whole performance
measure with probability 푝 is formally equivalent to ignoring only the
41Always ignoring the signal, i.e., setting 푝 = 1, would be detrimental for incentives
because then the agent’s monetary payoff is independent of his action. Hence, he
would choose the least cost action 푎 = 0. Therefore, we a priori restrict the principal
to choose 푝 from the interval [0, 1).
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bad signal with probability 푝.42 For this reason, we refer to the princi-
pal not paying attention to the performance measure as turning a blind
eye on bad performance of the agent. It is readily verified that under
the transformed performance measure 휸ˆ(푝) the intercept of the 푀퐵(푎)
function with the horizontal axis,
푎0(푝) ≡
휆− 2− 2
[
푝+ (1− 푝)훾퐿
]
(휆− 1)
2(1− 푝)(훾퐻 − 훾퐿)(휆− 1)
,
not only is decreasing in 푝 but also can be made arbitrarily small, in par-
ticular, arbitrarily negative. Formally, 푑푎0(푝)/푑푝 < 0 and lim푝→1 푎0(푝) =
−∞. In the light of Proposition 20 this immediately implies that the
principal can eliminate any implementation problems by choosing 푝 suf-
ficiently high, that is, by turning a blind eye sufficiently often.
Besides alleviating possible implementation problems, turning a blind
eye can also benefit the principal from a cost perspective. Using the defi-
nition of 훾(푎; 푝) it can be shown that the minimum cost of implementing
action 푎ˆ under the transformed performance measure, 퐶(푎ˆ; 푝), takes the
following form:
퐶(푎ˆ; 푝) = 푢+
푘
2
푎ˆ2 +
푘푎ˆ(휆− 1)(1− 훾(푎ˆ))
(훾퐻 − 훾퐿)
⋅
훾(푎ˆ) + 푝(1− 훾(푎ˆ))
1− (휆− 1) [1− 2훾(푎ˆ)− 2푝(1− 훾(푎ˆ))]
(V.10)
Differentiating the principal’s cost with respect to 푝 reveals that sign
{푑퐶(푎ˆ; 푝)/푑푝} = sign{2 − 휆}. Hence, an increase in the probability
of ignoring the bad signal decreases the cost of implementing a certain
action if and only if 휆 > 2. Hence, whenever the principal turns a blind
eye in order to remedy implementation problems, she will do so to the
42In this latter case, the agent receives the bonus either when the good signal is
observed, which happens with probability 훾(푎), or when the bad signal is observed but
is ignored, which happens with probability (1−훾(푎))푝. Hence, the overall probability
of the bonus being paid out is given by 훾(푎) + (1− 훾(푎))푝.
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largest possible extent.43,44 We summarize the preceding analysis in the
following proposition.
P r o p o s i t i o n 21 : Suppose the principal can commit herself to
stochastic ignorance of the signal. Then each action 푎ˆ ∈ [0, 1] can be
implemented. Moreover, the implementation costs are strictly decreasing
in 푝 if and only if 휆 > 2.
We restricted the principal to offer non-stochastic payments condi-
tional on which signal is observed. If the principal was able to do just
that, then she could remedy implementation problems by paying the base
wage plus a lottery in the case of the bad signal. For instance, when the
lottery yields 푏 with probability 푝 and zero otherwise, this is just the same
as turning a blind eye. This observation suggests that the principal may
benefit from offering a contract that includes randomization, which is in
contrast to the finding under conventional risk aversion, see Holmstro¨m
(1979).45
V.4.4. BLACKWELL REVISITED
We conclude this section by briefly pointing out an interesting impli-
cation of the above analysis. Suppose the principal has no access to a
randomization device, i.e., turning a blind eye is not possible. Then the
above considerations allow a straight-forward comparison of performance
43Formally, for 휆 > 2, the solution to the principal’s problem of choosing the optimal
probability to turn a blind eye, 푝∗, is not well defined because 푝∗ → 1. If the agent
is subject to limited liability or there is a cost of ignorance, however, the optimal
probability of turning a blind eye is well defined.
44This is in the spirit of Becker and Stigler (1974), who show that despite a small
detection probability of malfeasance, incentives can be maintained if the punishment
is sufficiently severe.
45The finding that stochastic contracts may be optimal is not novel to the principal-
agent literature. Haller (1985) shows that in the case of a satisficing agent, who wants
to achieve certain aspiration levels of income with certain probabilities, randomization
may pay for the principal. Moreover, Strausz (2006) finds that deterministic contracts
may be suboptimal in a screening context.
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measures 휻ˆ = (휁퐻 , 휁퐿) and 휸ˆ = (훾퐻 , 훾퐿) if 휻ˆ is a convex combination of
휸ˆ and 1 ≡ (1, 1).
C o r o l l a ry 1: Let 휻ˆ = 푝1 + (1 − 푝)휸ˆ with 푝 ∈ (0, 1). Then the
principal at least weakly prefers performance measure 휻ˆ to 휸ˆ if and only
if 휆 ≥ 2.
The finding that the principal prefers the “garbled”performance mea-
sure 휻ˆ over performance measure 휸ˆ is at odds with Blackwell’s theorem.
To see this, let performance measures 휸ˆ and 휻ˆ be characterized, respec-
tively, by the stochastic matrices
푷 훾 =
(
1− 훾퐻 훾퐻
1− 훾퐿 훾퐿
)
and 푷 휁 =
(
1− 휁퐻 휁퐻
1− 휁퐿 휁퐿
)
.
According to Blackwell’s theorem, any decision maker prefers information
system 휸ˆ to 휻ˆ if and only if there exists a non-negative stochastic matrix
푴 with
∑
푗 푚푖푗 = 1 such that 푷 휁 = 푷 훾푴 .
46 It is readily verified that
this matrix 푴 exists and takes the form
푴 =
(
1− 푝 푝
0 1
)
.
Thus, even though comparison of the two performance measures accord-
ing to Blackwell’s theorem implies that the principal should prefer 휸ˆ over
휻ˆ, the principal actually prefers the “garbled” information system 휻ˆ over
information system 휸ˆ. While Kim (1995) has already shown that the
necessary part of Blackwell’s theorem does not hold in the agency model,
the sufficiency part was proven to be applicable to the agency framework
by Gjesdal (1982).47 Our findings, however, show that this is not the
case anymore when the agent is loss-averse.
46See Blackwell (1951, 1953).
47In order to avoid confusion: The necessary part of Blackwell’s theorem states that
the principal being better off implies that she uses a more informative performance
measure. The sufficiency part conversely states that making use of more informative
performance measure implies that the principal is better off.
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V.5. ROBUSTNESS, EXTENSIONS, AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explore the implications of reference-dependent pref-
erences on contract design in an otherwise standard model of principal-
agency. We find that introducing a loss-averse agent leads to a reduction
in the complexity of the optimal contractual arrangement. When loss
aversion is the predominant feature of the agent’s risk preferences, the
optimal contract takes the form of a simple bonus contract even if the
agent is also risk-averse: some realizations of the performance measure
are rewarded with a bonus payment, while others are not. Thus, loss
aversion provides a theoretical rationale for bonus contracts, the wide
application of which is hard to reconcile with obvious drawbacks – as
seasonality effects or insurance fraud – that come along with this partic-
ular contractual form.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the robustness of our
results. After a brief and semi-formal analysis of an alternative equilib-
rium concept, we explore the consequences of non quadratic effort costs
for implementation problems. Finally, we conclude by discussing dimin-
ishing sensitivity of the gain-loss function. Throughout the whole anal-
ysis, we adopted the concept of choice-acclimating personal equilibrium
(CPE). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) provide another concept, called
unacclimating personal equilibrium (UPE). The major difference between
UPE and CPE is the timing of expectation formation and actual decision
making. Under UPE a decision maker first forms his expectations, which
determine his reference point, and thereafter, given these expectations,
chooses the optimal action. To rule out that people can systematically
cheat themselves, for action 푎ˆ to be an UPE, it must be optimal for
the decision maker to choose 푎ˆ given that he expected to do so. In the
following, we will argue that applying UPE instead of CPE does not
change our main findings. Intuitively, the optimality of simple contracts
is rooted in the agent’s dislike of being exposed to numerous outcomes,
which is reflected in the functional form of his ex ante expected utility.
With expectations being met on the equilibrium path under UPE, the
expected utility takes the same form under both equilibrium concepts.
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Thus, one should expect simple contracts to be optimal also under UPE.
For the sake of a more formal argument, consider the case of a purely
loss-averse agent, i.e., suppose intrinsic utility is linear. The agent’s ex
ante expected utility from choosing action 푎 when expecting action 푎ˆ is
퐸[푈(푎∣푎ˆ)] =
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎)
[
푢푠 +
푠−1∑
푗=1
훾푗(푎ˆ)(푢푠 − 푢푗)− 휆
푆∑
푡=푠+1
훾푡(푎ˆ)(푢푡 − 푢푠)
]
− 푐(푎) + 휇(푐(푎ˆ)− 푐(푎)).
The agent’s ex ante expected utility, and in consequence the individ-
ual rationality constraint, takes the same form under both equilibrium
concepts, CPE and UPE. The incentive compatibility constraint, on the
other hand, depends on the applied equilibrium concept. Given the agent
expected to choose 푎ˆ, his marginal utility from choosing 푎 is
퐸[푈 ′(푎∣푎ˆ)] =
푆∑
푠=1
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )푢푠 +
푆∑
푠=1
푠−1∑
푗=1
훾푗(푎ˆ)(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )(푢푠 − 푢푗)
− 휆
푆∑
푠=1
푆∑
푗=푠+1
훾푗(푎ˆ)(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )(푢푗 − 푢푠)− 푐
′(푎) + 휇′(푐(푎ˆ)− 푐(푎)).
Note that either 휇′(⋅) = 1 or 휇′(⋅) = 휆, depending on whether 푎ˆ is greater
or lower than 푎. Even though 퐸[푈(푎∣푎ˆ)] is a strictly concave function
in the agent’s actual action choice 푎 for all values of 휆 ≥ 1, under UPE
there arises the problem of multiplicity of equilibria. More precisely, for a
given incentive scheme 풖, there exists a range of actions 푎 ∈ [푎(풖), 푎¯(풖)]
all of which constitute a UPE. This problem can be circumvented by
assuming that the agent chooses the highest action which constitutes a
UPE. In this case there is no need to impose additional assumptions on
the cost function or to assume that 휆 is sufficiently small.48 By imposing
48For given expectations 푎ˆ, let 퐸푈푔 and 퐸푈푙 denote the agent’s expected utility
given that 휇(푥) = 푥 and 휇(푥) = 휆푥, respectively. Both 퐸푈푔 and 퐸푈푙 are strictly
concave functions, with 퐸푈푔 achieving its maximum at a strictly higher action than
퐸푈푙. 퐸푈푔 and 퐸푈푙 intersect at 푎ˆ. Action 푎ˆ is an UPE if it lies between the maximizing
actions of 퐸푈푔 and 퐸푈푙. Therefore, expecting to choose the action which maximizes
퐸푈푔 not only constitutes an UPE, but also is the highest possible UPE.
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this alternative assumption, the incentive compatibility constraint can
be rewritten as
푆∑
푠=2
푏푠
{(
푆∑
푡=푠
(훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 )
)(
1 +
푠−1∑
푗=1
훾푗(푎ˆ)
)
−휆
(
푆∑
푡=푠
훾푡(푎ˆ)
)(
푠−1∑
푗=1
(훾퐻푗 − 훾
퐿
푗 )
)}
= 2푐′(푎ˆ).
Clearly, the incentive compatibility constraint is linear in the additional
payments 풃 = (푏2, . . . , 푏푆). Thus, our bonus contract result is robust with
respect to this change of assumptions.
There is another way to resolve the multiplicity problem under UPE.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) define a preferred personal equilibrium
(PPE) as a decision maker’s ex ante favorite plan among those plans
he actually will follow through. Put differently, given incentive scheme
풖, the agent chooses the action 푎푃푃퐸 ∈ [푎(풖), 푎¯(풖)] that maximizes
expected utility among those actions that constitute a UPE. If for all
incentive-compatible incentive schemes we have 푎푃푃퐸 ∈ (푎(풖), 푎¯(풖)) then
PPE and CPE coincide, i.e., 푎푃푃퐸 is determined by the first-order condi-
tion that characterizes the agent’s action under CPE. Thus, by imposing
the PPE-analogue of A4 and A5 we can derive results identical to those
under CPE. If 푎푃푃퐸 ∈ {푎(풖), 푎¯(풖)} for all incentive-compatible incen-
tive schemes, the optimal contract also is a bonus contract since both
boundary actions are determined by functions linear in 풃 = (푏2, . . . , 푏푆).
49
In the intermediate case, however, where 푎푃푃퐸 ∈ (푎(풖), 푎¯(풖)) for some
incentive-compatible incentive schemes but 푎푃푃퐸 ∈ {푎(풖), 푎¯(풖)} for oth-
ers, the optimal contract is not necessarily a bonus scheme.
If the agent’s action is characterized by PPE, for all actions 푎ˆ ∈
(0, 1) to be implementable we still need the assumption that 휆 is not
too high. Put differently, similar implementation problems as discussed
in Section V.4 also arise under PPE. Compared to CPE, however, these
49The case of 푎푃푃퐸 = 푎¯(풖) corresponds to the alternative assumption to A4 dis-
cussed above. If 푎푃푃퐸 = 푎(풖), on the other hand, then 푎푃푃퐸 maximizes 퐸푈푙, as
defined in the previous footnote.
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implementation problems are less severe. For instance, actions close to
zero are always implementable under PPE.
For the discussion of implementation problems in Section V.4, we
restricted attention to quadratic effort costs. The finding that imple-
mentation problems are a potential issue, however, holds true for a wide
variety of cost functions. Depending on the particular functional form of
the corresponding marginal costs, these implementation problems may
be more or less severe. For instance, the result that there are implemen-
tation problems if 푎0 > 0 holds true for all strictly increasing and strictly
convex cost functions with 푐′(0) = 0. As for strictly concave marginal
costs with 푐′(0) = 0, no action 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1) is implementable if 푎0 ≥ 0; and
even for 푎0 < 0 there may be actions, in particular actions close to 1,
that are not implementable.
Moreover, we kept the whole analysis simple by ignoring diminishing
sensitivity, that is, by considering a piece-wise linear gain-loss function. A
more general gain-loss function makes the analysis far more complicated:
Both the incentive compatibility constraint and the individual rational-
ity constraint are no longer linear functions in the intrinsic utility levels,
and thus the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are not necessarily sufficient. Nev-
ertheless, we expect that a reduction in the complexity of the contract
will benefit the principal in this case as well. Diminishing sensitivity of
the agent’s utility implies that the sum of two net losses of two monetary
outcomes exceeds the net loss of the sum of these two monetary out-
comes. Therefore, in addition to the effects discussed in the paper, under
diminishing sensitivity there is another channel through which melting
two bonus payments into one “big” bonus affects, and in tendency re-
duces, the agent’s expected net loss. There is, however, an argument
running counter to this intuition. As we have shown, loss aversion may
help the principal to create incentives. Therefore, setting many different
wage payments, and thereby – in a sense – creating many kinks, prox-
imity to which the agent strongly dislikes under diminishing sensitivity,
may have favorable incentive effects. Exploring the effects of diminishing
sensitivity in a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard is therefore
an open question for future research.
VI. TECHNOLOGY OF SKILL FORMATION AND
HIDDEN INFORMATION
VI.1. INTRODUCTION
The formation of human capital is a central issue in economics. Cunha
and Heckman (2007; henceforth CH) consider an economic model of child
development, where the formation of human capital occurs in multiple
stages via investments. They solve for the optimal intertemporal invest-
ment plan, which is important to derive policy implications.
We extend their framework by assuming that children are differenti-
ated in the sense that a child’s type determines what type of investment
is most productive for him/her, and that this information is not avail-
able when a child is young. That is, there is hidden information for the
parents when the child is young (in the first phase). However, we assume
that when a child is older (in the second phase) its type is revealed. How
does the optimal investment plan change as a result of hidden informa-
tion? Put differently, how should parents react to uncertainty about how
to treat their young child best?
There are two intuitive guesses: (i) it is optimal to invest less in the
first and a more in the second phase, because in the second one can
tailor the investments to a child’s type and therefore yield a high return
of investment; (ii) invest more in the first and less in the second phase
to make sure that, despite low returns in the first phase, the effective
investment in the first phase is not “too bad”.
We show that the answer crucially depends on the substitutability
of investment between phases: when investments are easily substitutable
(easier than Cobb-Douglas), intuition (i) is right; when substitution is
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difficult (more difficult than Cobb-Douglas), (ii) is right. More specif-
ically, hidden information weakens the importance of early investments
in children when inter-phase investments are easily substitutable, but
strengthen them when substitution is difficult.
In the next section we first present and analyze CH’s model. Then
we extend it by introducing differentiated investments and hidden infor-
mation. In Section VI.3 we conclude and discuss.
VI.2. MODELS
VI.2.1. CUNHA AND HECKMAN’S MODEL
There is a child with two periods of childhood, 푡 = 1, 2. Child’s adult
stock of skill ℎ, also called human capital, is given by
ℎ = 푚 (ℎ푝, 휃1, 퐼1, 퐼2) ,
where ℎ푝 is the skill of the parents, 휃1 the child’s initial ability, and 퐼1
and 퐼2 are investments in the first and second period respectively.
1 For
concreteness CH consider the following form, where 퐼 is given by a CES
function:
ℎ = 푚 (ℎ푝, 휃1, 퐼) , 퐼 =
[
훾퐼휙1 + (1− 훾)퐼
휙
2
]1/휙
. (VI.1)
The parameter 훾, 0 < 훾 < 1, is interpreted as a skill multiplier. It
reveals the productivity of early investment not only in directly boosting
ℎ, but also in raising the productivity of 퐼2 by increasing the second
period ability through high first-period investments; see CH (p. 38).
The parameter 휙, 휙 ≤ 1, describes how easy investments in different
periods can be substituted for each other. For 휙 = 1, we have a linear
relationship: 퐼 = [훾퐼1 + (1− 훾)퐼2]. That is, investments are perfect
substitutes. For 휙→ −∞ investments are not substitutable; the function
is of the Leontief type. For 휙 = 0 one gets the Cobb-Douglas function.
The elasticity of substitution is 1/(1− 휙).
We assume that parents at the beginning of 푡 = 1 maximize the
1We use a slightly different notation than CH.
103
present value of net wealth of their children2
피[휋] = 푤피 [ℎ]− 퐼1 −
1
1 + 푟
퐼2
over {퐼1, 퐼2}. The costs of second period investments are discounted by
the factor 1/(1+푟), where 푟 is the interest rate. The life-time discounted
wage per unit of skill is denoted by 푤. So that an optimum exists we
assume that 푑2푚(⋅)/푑퐼2 < 0. To guarantee that it is optimal to invest
some positive amount we assume that lim퐼→0 푑푚(⋅)/푑퐼 is “sufficiently
large”. For 휙 < 1, optimization yields that the ratio of the monetary
investments in period 1 relative to that in period 2 is3
퐼1
퐼2
=
(
훾
(1− 훾)(1 + 푟)
) 1
1−휙
. (VI.2)
CH interpret their formula as follows: “High productivity of initial in-
vestment (the skill multiplier 훾) drives the parent toward making early
investments. The interest rate drives the parent to invest late” (p. 39).
VI.2.2. THE MODEL WITH HIDDEN INFORMATION
We now extend the model by considering hidden information. We assume
that there are two types of investment in every period: 퐼ˆ푡 and 퐼ˇ푡.
4 For
example, 퐼ˆ푡 may be the investment in child’s sporting abilities whereas
퐼ˇ푡 may denote investments in creative abilities. How 퐼ˆ푡 and 퐼ˇ푡 combine
to determine the effective investment depends on the child’s type 훼:
퐼effective푡 = (1 + 훼)퐼ˆ푡 + (1− 훼)퐼ˇ푡. (VI.3)
2This is the maximization problem considered by Cunha, Flavio, James Heckman,
Lance Lochner, and Dimitriy Masterov (2005). An alternative approach is to consider
a dynamic overlapping generations model (see the same paper or CH). But, as the
authors note, “the main conclusions of the simple, static model ... are valid in a more
fully specified economic environment.” To focus on the main points we use the simple
static model.
3For 휙 = 1 one gets corner solutions and the ratio need not be defined.
4Also CH consider differentiated investments. But they do not consider hidden
information.
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With equal probability the type is 훽 or −훽, with 0 < 훽 < 1. Hence,
when the child is of type 훽 it is most productive to invest in 퐼ˆ푡 and not
in 퐼ˇ푡; it is the other way round when the type is −훽. The height of
the parameter 훽 captures how strong the productivity of the different
intra-period investments differs.
In 푡 = 1, the child’s type 훼 is not known to the parents. There is
hidden information. Hence they cannot be sure how to best tailor the
investment to the child.5 That is, the parents do not know whether they
should invest in the child’s sporting or creative abilities. In 푡 = 2, when
the child is older, the parents learn the child’s type. Obviously, then it
is optimal not to invest in the less productive type of investment: 퐼ˆ2 = 0
when 훼 = −훽 and 퐼ˇ2 = 0 when 훼 = 훽. We denote the highly productive
investments by 퐼퐻2 . That is, 퐼
퐻
2 = 퐼ˆ2 when 훼 = 훽 and 퐼
퐻
2 = 퐼ˇ2 when
훼 = −훽.
As in CH’s model we assume that the relationship between effective
per period investments and effective total investment 퐼 is given by a CES
function:
퐼 =
[
훾
(
퐼effective1
)휙
+ (1− 훾)
(
퐼effective2
)휙]1/휙
. (VI.4)
The parents’ investment policy
{
퐼ˆ1, 퐼ˇ1, 퐼
퐻
2
∣∣
훼=훽
, 퐼퐻2
∣∣
훼=−훽
}
maximizes
피훼[휋] = 푤피훼 [ℎ]− 퐼ˆ1 − 퐼ˇ1 −
1
1 + 푟
퐼퐻2 . (VI.5)
Note, since at 푡 = 2 the child’s type 훼 is known the investment in 푡 = 2
can be made contingent on 훼.
L e m m a 9: It is optimal to choose 퐼ˆ1 = 퐼ˇ1 and 퐼
퐻
2
∣∣
훼=−훽
= 퐼퐻2
∣∣
훼=훽
.
For 휙 < 1 it is optimal to invest in both periods.
Proof: See Appendix.
The first part of Lemma 9 says that it is optimal to diversify in-
vestments completely by choosing 퐼ˆ1 = 퐼ˇ1. The second part states that
5We do not consider mechanism that reveal the child’s type. This is justified
because young children are simply unable to reveal their types (or maybe they cannot
be convinced to take part in any kind of mechanism).
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although the type of the second period investment depends on 훼, the
height of the second period investments, i.e. 퐼퐻2 , is independent of 훼.
As in CH’s model we would like to determine the ratio of the monetary
investments in period 1 (퐼푇1 := 퐼ˆ1+ 퐼ˇ1) relative to that in period 2 (퐼
푇
2 :=
퐼ˆ2+퐼ˇ2). From the first-order conditions of the problem (see the Appendix)
and Lemma 9 one directly yields that for 휙 < 1 the ratio is
퐼푇1
퐼푇2
=
(
훾
(1− 훾)(1 + 푟)(1 + 훽)휙
) 1
1−휙
. (VI.6)
P r o p o s i t i o n 22 : Suppose that 휙 < 1. When 휙 > (<)0 the ratio
of the monetary investments in period 1 relative to that in period 2 with
hidden information is smaller (larger) than without hidden information.
The intuition is as follows. The return of second period investments
is high because they can be tailored to the child’s type. When invest-
ments can be substituted easily (easier than Cobb-Douglas), a low first
period investment can easily be compensated by a high second period
investment. Hence, it is optimal to invest little in the first and a lot in
the second period. However, when investments are difficult to substitute
(more difficult than Cobb-Douglas), this is not the case. A low first pe-
riod investment can only be compensated by a very high second period
investment. This would be very costly. Hence, it is optimal to invest a lot
in the first period to make sure that the effective first period investment
is substantial.6
Finally, looking at (VI.2) and (VI.6) yields the following insights.7
6The results we found are mathematically closely related to Acemoglu (2002). He
considers how the augmentation of one factor changes the relative marginal products
of both factors of production. He shows that when the elasticity of substitution is
above 1, then the relative marginal product of the factor which is augmented improves.
When the elasticity of substitution is below 1, then it is the other way round. In our
model, hidden information augments investments in period 2 relative to investments
in period 1.
7As in CH’s model the investment ratio need not be defined for 휙 = 1. Some simple
calculations yield that the results stated in Proposition 23 is also valid for 휙 = 1.
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P r o p o s i t i o n 23 : The first period investment exceeds the second
period investment in the model without hidden information if 훾 > (1 −
훾)(1+ 푟). With hidden information this is true for 훾 > (1−훾)(1+ 푟)(1+
훽)휙. It is the other way round when the formulas hold with <.
So when 휙 > 0, i.e., when substitution is easier than with a Cobb-
Douglas function, the skill multiplier 훾 must be larger in the model with
hidden information than in the model without so that the first period
investment exceeds the second period investment. For 휙 < 0, i.e., when
substitution is more difficult than with a Cobb-Douglas function, the
multiplier 훾 can be lower.
To sum up both propositions, hidden information weakens the impor-
tance of early investments in children when inter-period investments are
easily substitutable. When substitution is difficult, early investments get
more important.
For completeness, consider the case when there is no hidden infor-
mation. Then it is optimal to invest only in the productive type of
investment in both periods. The parameter 훽 appears in both first-order
conditions in the same way. Hence, the term 훽 cancels out in the in-
vestment ratio. So (VI.6) applies when one sets 훽 = 0. That is, the
investment ratio is as in CH’s model, see (VI.2).
VI.3. CONCLUSIONS & DICUSSION
We have extended the model of CH by introducing hidden information
about a child’s type when it is young. We have shown that hidden in-
formation weakens the importance of early investment in children when
inter-period investments are easily substitutable, but strengthens their
importance when substitution is difficult.
We have assumed that the differentiated investments of a period com-
bine linear to the effective investment of a period, see (VI.3). This simpli-
fication can be defended as follows: With a more complicated functional
form it stays in general true that knowing a child’s type allows tailored
investments which yield a higher return than not tailored ones. That
is, investing later yields a return on effective second period investment
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which is greater, say by a factor (1 + 훽), than the expected return early
investments have on the effective first period investment. Since the factor
(1 + 훽) comes back we can use the linear specification as a reduced form
of the more general specification.8
Extending the model to three periods, in which there is uncertainty
only in the first period, can lead to richer patterns. Roughly speaking,
the optimal relative investment of the first and the second periods is
governed by the extended model with hidden information. That between
the second and third periods by the model without hidden information.
So the optimal investments may be non-monotone in time. Inverted-U
or U patterns are possible.
Eliciting the hidden information through scientific tests allows a tai-
lored investment policy also for young children. Then the same adult
skill levels are attainable with lower investments. Alternatively, with
the same investments higher skill levels can be achieved. Hence, those
tests are important to improve adult skill and the effectiveness of child
investments.
The model we consider can be interpreted more broadly: There is a
multi-period investment problem with only initial uncertainty about the
most productive way to invest.
8This arguments show that the inter -period investment problem does not change
due to a more general specification. That is, the investment ratio stays the same.
However, the intra-period investment problem changes. With a more general specifi-
cation it may be optimal to always invest in both types of investments. Then it may
be optimal to invest more in an old child’s ability in which he/she is less talented.
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VII. APPENDICES
VII.1. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II
It is useful to define 휇퐽(푝) as the probability that firm 퐽 ∈ {퐼, 퐸} will
invest in research. Also define 휏(푝)
(
= 푝휇퐸(푝)
)
as the probability that
entry will occur. Both variables are measured after 푝 and before 푘 is
drawn.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From Lemma 2 we get that
휇퐼(푝) =
∫ (1−휋퐼(푐¯,−))(1−푝)푝
0
ℎ(푘∣푝)푑푘 +
∫ 휋퐸(푐¯,푐)푝
휋퐸(푐¯,푐)(1−푝)푝
ℎ(푘∣푝)푑푘
and
휇퐸(푝) =
∫ (1−휋퐼(푐¯,−))(1−푝)푝
0
ℎ(푘∣푝)푑푘 +
∫ 휋퐸(푐¯,푐)(1−푝)푝
(1−휋퐼(푐¯,−))(1−푝)푝
ℎ(푘∣푝)푑푘.
Hence, 휇퐼(푝) > 휇퐸(푝) if and only if∫ 휋퐸(푐¯,푐)푝
휋퐸(푐¯,푐)(1−푝)푝
ℎ(푘∣푝)푑푘 >
∫ 휋퐸(푐¯,푐)(1−푝)푝
(1−휋퐼(푐¯,−))(1−푝)푝
ℎ(푘∣푝)푑푘. (VII.1)
So 휇퐼(푝) > 휇퐸(푝) if and only if it is more likely that the replacement
effect will determine the outcome than that the efficiency effect will.
Using A1, (VII.1) is
푝2휋퐸(푐¯, 푐) > (1− 푝)푝
[
휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)− (1− 휋퐼(푐¯,−))
]
.
So 휇퐼(푝) > 휇퐸(푝) if (and only if)
푝 > 푝˙ :=
휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)− (1− 휋퐼(푐¯,−))
2휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)− (1− 휋퐼(푐¯,−))
.
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From Lemma 1 follows that 푝˙ ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, 휇퐼(푝) < 휇퐸(푝) if (and
only if) 푝 < 푝˙. Note, the “only if” part is not included in Proposition 1
because it is an artefact of the uniform assumption upon ℎ. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Start with some notation. Let the expected 푝, conditional that firm 퐽
invests, be
푃 퐽 :=
∫ 1
0
푝푔퐽(푝)푑푝,
where
푔퐽(푝) :=
푔(푝)휇퐽(푝)∫ 1
0
푔(푝)휇퐽(푝)푑푝
is the density of 푝, conditional that 퐽 ∈ {퐼, 퐸} invests. The associated
distribution function is denoted by 퐺퐽(푝). We seek to show that 푃 퐼 >
푃퐸.
Step 1. Using Lemma 2 and A1,
푑
(
휇퐼(푝)
휇퐸(푝)
)
푑푝
=
1
(1− 푝)2
.
Since 푔
퐼(푝)
푔퐸(푝)
= 휇
퐼(푝)
휇퐸(푝)
∫ 1
0 푔(푟)휇
퐸(푟)푑푟∫ 1
0 푔(푟)휇
퐼(푟)푑푟
, it follows that 푑
(
푔퐼(푝)
푔퐸(푝)
)
/푑푝 is positive
and finite ∀푝 ∈ (0, 1).
Step 2. Claim: 푔퐼(푝) < 푔퐸(푝) for 푝 → 0 and 푔퐼(푝) > 푔퐸(푝) for
푝→ 1.
Proof: Since 푔(푝) and 휇퐽(푝) are positive and finite ∀푝 ∈ (0, 1], it
follows that 푔퐽(푝) is positive and finite ∀푝 ∈ (0, 1] as well. From step
1, 푑
(
푔퐼(푝)
푔퐸(푝)
)
/푑푝 > 0 ∀푝 ∈ (0, 1), and by definition
∫ 1
0
푔퐼(푝)푑푝 = 1 and∫ 1
0
푔퐸(푝)푑푝 = 1. Hence it must hold that 푔퐼(푝) < 푔퐸(푝) for 푝 → 0, and
푔퐼(푝) > 푔퐸(푝) for 푝→ 1.
Step 3. Claim: there exists a 푝˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that 푔퐼(푝) = (<,>)푔퐸(푝)
for 푝 = (<,>)푝˜.
Proof: Step 1 says that
푑
푔퐼 (푝)
푔퐸(푝)
푑푝
is positive and finite ∀푝 ∈ (0, 1).
So 푔
퐼(푝)
푔퐸(푝)
is continuous and increasing in 푝, ∀푝 ∈ (0, 1). This implies,
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together with the intermediate value theorem and step 2, that there exists
a 푝˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that 푔퐼(푝˜) = 푔퐸(푝˜). Since 푔
퐼(푝)
푔퐸(푝)
is increasing in 푝
∀푝 ∈ (0, 1), and 푔퐼(푝) < (>)푔퐸(푝) for 푝 → 0(1) by step 2, it holds that
푔퐼(푝) < (>)푔퐸(푝) for 푝 < (>)푝˜.
Step 4. By Proposition 6.D.1 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Greene
(1995, p. 195) 푔퐼(푝) first-order stochastically dominates 푔퐸(푝) if and only
if ∫ 푥
0
푔퐼(푝)푑푝 ≤
∫ 푥
0
푔퐸(푝)푑푝 ∀푥 ∈ (0, 1]. (VII.2)
We seek to show a slightly different property.
Claim: The inequality in (VII.2) is strict ∀푥 ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Suppose there exists a 푥ˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∫ 푥ˆ
0
푔퐼(푝)푑푝 ≥∫ 푥ˆ
0
푔퐸(푝)푑푝.
Case 1: 푥ˆ ≤ 푝˜. From step 3, 푔퐼(푝) < 푔퐸(푝) ∀푝 ∈ (0, 푝˜), and 푔퐼(푝˜) =
푔퐸(푝˜). Hence,
∫ 푥ˆ
0
푔퐼(푝)푑푝 ≥
∫ 푥ˆ
0
푔퐸(푝)푑푝 is false.
Case 2: 푥ˆ > 푝˜. If
∫ 푥ˆ
0
푔퐼(푝)푑푝 ≥
∫ 푥ˆ
0
푔퐸(푝)푑푝, then∫ 1
푥ˆ
푔퐼(푝)푑푝 ≤
∫ 1
푥ˆ
푔퐸(푝)푑푝, (VII.3)
since
∫ 1
0
푔퐼(푝)푑푝 = 1 and
∫ 1
0
푔퐸(푝)푑푝 = 1. From step 3, ∀푝 ∈ (푝˜, 1) it
is true that 푔퐼(푝) > 푔퐸(푝). From Lemma 2 follows that 푔퐸(1) = 0. By
definition 푔퐼(1) ≥ 0. Hence, (VII.3) is false.
Step 5. Using the definition of 푃퐸 and 푃 퐼 , we get by integrating by
parts that
푃 퐼 = 1−
∫ 1
0
퐺퐼(푝)푑푝, 푃퐸 = 1−
∫ 1
0
퐺퐸(푝)푑푝.
From step 4 we know that 퐺퐼(푝) < 퐺퐸(푝) ∀푝 ∈ (0, 1). By definition
퐺퐼(1) = 퐺퐸(1). Hence,
∫ 1
0
퐺퐼(푝)푑푝 <
∫ 1
0
퐺퐸(푝)푑푝 and so 푃 퐼 > 푃퐸. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
A1 implies that ℎ(푘∣푝) = ℎ(푝) ∀푘 ∈ 풮. By the definition of a density,∫ 푝휋퐸(푐¯,푐)
0
ℎ(푝)푑푘 ≤ 1
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or rewritten
ℎ(푝) ≤
1
푝휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)
.
Together with Lemma 2 this implies that
휇퐸(푝) = ℎ(푝)휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)(1− 푝)푝 ≤
1
푝휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)
휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)(1− 푝)푝 = 1− 푝.
Since, by definition 휏(푝) = 푝휇퐸(푝), it follows that 휏(푝) ≤ 푝(1− 푝). □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The total welfare, excluding potential investments in research, when the
incumbent has production costs 푐퐼 and the potential entrant costs 푐퐸
is denoted by 푡(푐퐼 , 푐퐸). It consists of the firms’ Bertrand profits and
consumer welfare (for sake of clearness we do not use the normalization
휋퐼(푐,−) = 1):
푡(푐¯,−) =
∫ ∞
휙퐼(푐¯,−)
퐷(휙)푑휙+ 휋퐼(푐¯,−),
푡(푐,−) =
∫ ∞
휙퐼(푐,−)
퐷(휙)푑휙+ 휋퐼(푐,−),
푡(푐, 푐) =
∫ ∞
푐
퐷(휙)푑휙+ 0,
푡(푐¯, 푐) =
∫ ∞
휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
퐷(휙)푑휙+ 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐),
where 휙퐽(푐퐼 , 푐퐸) is the price set by firm 퐽 ∈ {퐼, 퐸}. Let 푇 (푎퐼 , 푎퐸) be the
expected total welfare taking into account firms’ investments. Straight-
forward calculations yield:
푇 (0, 0) = 푡(푐¯,−),
푇 (0, 1) = 푝푡(푐¯, 푐) + (1− 푝)푡(푐¯,−)− 푘,
푇 (1, 0) = 푝푡(푐,−) + (1− 푝)푡(푐¯,−)− 푘,
푇 (1, 1) = 푝2푡(푐, 푐) + 푝(1− 푝)푡(푐,−)
+푝(1− 푝)푡(푐¯, 푐) + (1− 푝)2푡(푐¯,−)− 2푘.
Observe that for a drastic innovation 휙퐸(푐¯, 푐) = 휙퐼(푐,−) and so 푇 (0, 1) =
푇 (1, 0). However, when the innovation is non-drastic 휙퐸(푐¯, 푐) < 휙퐼(푐,−)
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and so 푇 (0, 1) > 푇 (1, 0). Next we explore the question whether there is
socially too much or too little investment. We look at the second best
world in which pricing cannot be regulated.
Overinvestment when 푎∗ = (1, 0)?— Consider first the case that in
equilibrium only the incumbent invests. Is it socially desirable that no
firm invests? Using the formulas derived before yields
푇 (1, 0)− 푇 (0, 0) = 푝
[∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐼(푐,−)
퐷(휙)푑휙+ 휋퐼(푐,−)− 휋퐼(푐¯,−)
]
− 푘.
From Lemma 2 we know that for 푎∗ = (1, 0),
푘 = 푝휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)− (+term),
where the positive term can be arbitrarily small. Then
푇 (1, 0)− 푇 (0, 0) =
푝
[∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐼(푐,−)
퐷(휙)푑휙+ 휋퐼(푐,−)− 휋퐼(푐¯,−)− 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)
]
+ (+term).
(VII.4)
For a drastic innovation, 휋퐼(푐,−) = 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐). The profit term 휋퐼(푐¯,−)
can be rewritten as ∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
푐¯
퐷(휙퐼(푐¯,−))푑휙.
Since we assumed that the monopolist’ optimal price is unique we have
that for a drastic innovation 휙퐼(푐,−) ≤ 푐¯. Hence, 푇 (1, 0)− 푇 (0, 0) > 0.
However, when the innovation is non-drastic, then it can be the case
that 푇 (1, 0)−푇 (0, 0) < 0. This is true in the following example: (+term)
is small; 휙퐼(푐¯,−) ≈ 휙퐼(푐,−) so that the integral term in (VII.4) is small;
let 휋퐼(푐,−)− 휋퐼(푐¯,−) be well below 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐) (this is possible due to the
replacement effect).
Overinvestment when 푎∗ = (0, 1)?— When in equilibrium only 퐸
invests, is it socially desirable that no firm invests?
푇 (0, 1) − 푇 (0, 0) = 푝
[∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
퐷(휙)푑휙+ 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)− 휋퐼(푐¯,−)
]
− 푘.
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From Lemma 2, when 푎∗ = (0, 1) then
푘 = 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)(1− 푝)푝− (+term),
and so
푇 (0, 1)−푇 (0, 0) = 푝
[∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
퐷(휙)푑휙+ 푝휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)− 휋퐼(푐¯,−)
]
+(+term).
Are the terms in the square brackets also positive if 푝 → 0? Yes, since
휙퐼(푐¯,−) > 푐¯ ≥ 휙퐸(푐¯, 푐) and the demand is decreasing in the price:
∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
퐷(휙)푑휙 ≥
∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
푐¯
퐷(휙)푑휙 >
∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
푐¯
퐷(휙퐼(푐¯,−))푑휙 = 휋퐼(푐¯,−).
Obviously, for all 푝 the terms in the square brackets are positive, and so
it holds that 푇 (0, 1)− 푇 (0, 0) > 0.
Overinvestment when 푎∗ = (1, 1)?— Next consider the case when
both firms invest in research. Is it socially desirable that instead only
the potential entrant invests?
푇 (1, 1)− 푇 (0, 1)
= 푝
[
푝
(∫ 휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
푐
퐷(휙)푑휙− 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)
)
+
(1− 푝)
(∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐼(푐,−)
퐷(휙)푑휙+ 휋퐼(푐,−)− 휋퐼(푐¯,−)
)]
− 푘.
From Lemma 2 we know that when 푎∗ = (1, 1), then
푘 = 푝(1− 푝)(휋퐼(푐,−)− 휋퐼(푐¯,−))− (+term).
Using this we get that
푇 (1, 1)− 푇 (0, 1) = 푝
[
푝
(∫ 휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
푐
퐷(휙)푑휙− 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)
)
+ (1− 푝)
(∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐼(푐,−)
퐷(휙)푑휙
)]
+ (+term).
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The second integral is nonnegative because 휙퐼(푐,−) ≤ 휙퐼(푐¯,−), see Tirole
(1988, p. 66). The term
∫ 휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
푐
퐷(휙)푑휙− 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐) can be rewritten as
∫ 휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
푐
퐷(휙)푑휙−
∫ 휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
푐
퐷(휙퐸(푐¯, 푐))푑휙,
which is positive because demand is decreasing in the price and 휙퐸(푐¯, 푐) >
푐. Hence, 푇 (1, 1)− 푇 (0, 1) > 0.
We know that 푇 (0, 1) ≥ 푇 (1, 0). Hence also 푇 (1, 1)− 푇 (1, 0) > 0.
Finally, is 푇 (1, 1) socially preferred to 푇 (0, 0)?
푇 (1, 1)− 푇 (0, 0) = 푝2 [푡(푐, 푐)− 푡(푐,−)− 푡(푐¯, 푐) + 푡(푐¯,−)]
+ 푝 [푡(푐,−) + 푡(푐¯, 푐)− 2푡(푐¯,−)]− 2푘.
Again, for 푎∗ = (1, 1) it holds that
푘 = 푝(1− 푝)(휋퐼(푐,−)− 휋퐼(푐¯,−)) + (+term).
Hence, after some calculations,
푇 (1, 1)− 푇 (0, 0)
= 푝2
[∫ 휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
푐
퐷(휙)푑휙−
∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐼(푐,−)
퐷(휙)푑휙− 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐) + 휋퐼(푐,−)− 휋퐼(푐¯,−)
]
+푝
[∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐼(푐,−)
퐷(휙)푑휙+
∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
퐷(휙)푑휙+ 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)− 휋퐼(푐,−)
]
+(+term).
(VII.5)
If 푝 = 1, one gets that
푇 (1, 1)− 푇 (0, 0) =
∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
푐
퐷(휙)푑휙− 휋퐼(푐¯,−) + (+term),
which is obviously positive.
If 푝→ 0, only the last line of (VII.5) is important. The replacement
effect holds and so 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)−휋퐼(푐,−) = −휋퐼(푐¯,−)+(+term), see Lemma
1. So the last line of (VII.5) can be rewritten as
푝
[∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐼(푐,−)
퐷(휙)푑휙+
∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
퐷(휙)푑휙− 휋퐼(푐¯,−)
]
+ (+term).
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From before (see the case 푎∗ = (0, 1)) we know that
∫ 휙퐼(푐¯,−)
휙퐸(푐¯,푐)
퐷(휙)푑휙 >
휋퐼(푐¯,−), and so the last line is positive. Hence, also for 푝→ 0, 푇 (1, 1)−
푇 (0, 0) > 0. Since for 푝 = 1 and for 푝→ 0 we have 푇 (1, 1)− 푇 (0, 0) > 0,
and through the functional form of (VII.5), we get that 푇 (1, 1)−푇 (0, 0) >
0 ∀푝 ∈ (0, 1].
Underinvestment.— Note, when 푎∗ = (0, 0) the previous analysis
of the case 푎∗ = (1, 0) applies expect that there is no positive term,
but instead a negative term. When 푘 is close to the boundary where
푎∗ = (1, 0), the negative term is close to zero. Hence, our analysis shows
that it may be socially desirable that one firm invests when in fact no
firm invests. The same arguments hold when in fact one firm invests
and one asks the question whether investments of both firms is socially
preferable. Hence, firm may invest too little. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Denote firm 퐽 ’s valuation as 푣퐽 , 퐽 ∈ {퐼, 퐸}. 퐼’s valuation 푣퐼 is given
through the 푘 which equates (II.5), and so 푣퐼 = 푝. Similarly, from (II.1)
we get 푣퐸 = 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐)푝. If the innovation is non-drastic, 휋퐸(푐¯, 푐) < 1, and
hence 푣퐼 > 푣퐸 ∀푝 ∈ (0, 1]. Since we consider a first-price auction with
complete and perfect information, 퐼 will always win. □
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VII.2. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
The derivative of (III.7) is
푑피 [휋0(푘, 휆)]
푑푘
= ℎ′(푘)푒−휆(퐶−ℎ(푘)−푡)+(1− 퐶 + ℎ(푘)) 푒−휆(퐶−ℎ(푘)−푡)휆ℎ′(푘)−1.
(VII.6)
First consider the case of no entry threat. This is captured by 휆 = 0.
Then 푑피 [휋0(푘, 0)] /푑푘 = ℎ
′(푘)− 1. The optimal investment 푘∗(0) solves
ℎ′(푘∗(0)) = 1. So 푘∗(0) = ℎ′−1(1), which is positive through Assumption
A2(v).
Next, consider the other extreme of 휆 → ∞. Then Assumption
A2(iv) implies that entry occurs for sure for all investment levels 푘. So
피 [휋0(푘, 휆)] = −푘 for all 푘. Therefore the incumbent chooses not to
invest. That is, 푘∗(∞) = 0.
Finally, we prove the last part of Proposition 6. By Assumption 2
(iv) and 푡 > 0 we have 푐0(푘) > 0 ∀푘. Moreover, the expected revenue
is at most 1. Hence, 푘 ≥ 1 leads to a loss for the incumbent. This is
dominated by 푘 = 0, which yields a nonnegative profit. Therefore, an
investment of 푘 ≥ 1 can never be optimal.
From (III.7) we get that ∀푘 ∈ [푘ˆ, 1] we have
피 [휋0(푘, 휆)] = (1− 푐0(푘)) 푒
−휆(푐0(푘)−푡) − 푘
≤ (1− 푐0(1)) 푒
−휆(푐0(1)−푡) − 푘
≤ (1− 푐0(1)) 푒
−휆(푐0(1)−푡) − 푘ˆ.
When 휆 is sufficiently high
(1− 푐0(1)) 푒
−휆(푐0(1)−푡) − 푘ˆ < 0
and therefore also
피 [휋0(푘, 휆)] < 0 ∀푘 ∈ [푘ˆ, 1].
This is dominated by 푘 = 0. Hence, an investment of 푘 ∈ [푘ˆ,∞) cannot
be optimal. □
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
We look at the effect of 휆 on the marginal return of investment:
푑2피 [휋0(푘, 휆)]
푑푘푑휆
= −ℎ′(푘)푒−휆(퐶−ℎ(푘)−푡)(퐶 − ℎ(푘)− 푡)
+ (1− 퐶 + ℎ(푘)) 푒−휆(퐶−ℎ(푘)−푡)ℎ′(푘)
− (1− 퐶 + ℎ(푘)) 푒−휆(퐶−ℎ(푘)−푡)휆ℎ′(푘)(퐶 − ℎ(푘)− 푡).
The first term on the RHS is negative: a higher 휆 increases the proba-
bility of entry. That is, the return to investment decreases due to the
Schumpeterian effect. The remaining terms capture the effect on the
entry deterrence effect. The sign of the sum of the remaining terms is
ambiguous. That is, entry deterrence may or may not become more at-
tractive when 휆 increases. Given some 푘, when 휆 is small (large), the
remaining terms are positive (negative). Since we seek to explore whether
it is possible that a higher entry threat increases the optimal investment,
we consider the case 휆→ 0:
lim
휆→0
푑2피 [휋0(푘, 휆)]
푑푘푑휆
= −ℎ′(푘)(퐶 − ℎ(푘)− 푡) + (1− 퐶 + ℎ(푘))ℎ′(푘),
which has the same sign as
1− 2퐶 + 2ℎ(푘) + 푡.
So when
퐶 < ℎ(푘) +
1 + 푡
2
,
we have that lim휆→0
푑2피[휋0(푘,휆)]
푑푘푑휆
> 0. When
퐶 <
1 + 푡
2
,
this is true for all 푘.
피 [휋0(푘
∗(0), 0)] ≥ 피
[
휋0(푘˙, 0)
]
∀푘˙ ∈ ℝ++ by the optimality of 푘∗(0). The inequality also holds for the
subset 푘˙ ∈ [0, 푘∗(0)), which can equivalently be written as∫ 푘∗(0)
푘˙
푑피 [휋0(푘, 0)]
푑푘
푑푠 ≥ 0 ∀푘˙ ∈ [0, 푘∗(0)).
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Let 휆 be small. Since 퐶 < 1+푡
2
we know from before that 푑
2
피[휋0(푘,휆)]
푑푘푑휆
> 0.
Hence, ∫ 푘∗(0)
푘˙
푑피 [휋0(푘, 0)]
푑푘
푑푠 > 0 ∀푘˙ ∈ [0, 푘∗(0)).
This implies that
피 [휋0(푘
∗(0), 휆)] > 피
[
휋0(푘˙, 휆)
]
∀푘˙ ∈ [0, 푘∗(0)).
This proofs that 푘∗(휆) ≥ 푘∗(0).
Moreover, since 푑
2
피[휋0(푘,휆)]
푑푘푑휆
> 0 we have that
푑 피 [휋0(푘, 휆)]∣푘∗(0) /푑푘 > 0.
Hence, 푘∗(휆) ∕= 푘∗(0). Together with the previous finding and the fact
that through the assumptions made a 푘∗(휆) exists, this implies that
푘∗(휆) > 푘∗(0). □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
With help of Lemma 3 we yield that the incumbent’s expected investment
is
피[푘∣휆] =
∫ 푐0(푘¯)−푡
0
0푑퐹 (푐) +
∫ 푐0(푘∗∗(∞))−푡
푐0(푘¯)−푡
푘∗∗(⋅)푑퐹 (푐) (VII.7)
+
∫ ∞
푐0(푘∗∗(∞))−푡
푘∗∗(∞)푑퐹 (푐),
where 푘∗∗(∞) = ℎ′−1(1) and 푘∗∗(⋅) = ℎ−1 (퐶 − 푡− 푐) for the second
integral, see (III.9). All three integrals always have a positive probability
mass because A1(iv) implies that 푐0(푘¯)− 푡 > 0 for all 푘.
The analysis when 휆→ 0 or 휆→∞ is especially easy. When 휆→ 0,
the probability that 푐 is so high that the incumbent will invest 푘∗∗(∞)
approaches one. Moreover, for other levels of 푐 the investments are ∈
[0, 푘¯]. Hence, lim휆→0 피[푘∣휆] = 푘
∗∗(∞). On the contrary, if 휆 → ∞, the
probability that 푐 is in the region where the incumbent does not invest
approaches one. This implies that lim휆→∞ 피[푘∣휆] = 0.
But how large is 피[푘∣휆] if we have a medium 휆 value? Since all areas
have a positive weight, 푘∗∗(∞) as well as 푘∗∗(⋅) are nonnegative and at
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most 푘¯, it follows that 푘¯ > 피[푘∣휆] > 0. But under what conditions can
피[푘∣휆] exceed 푘∗∗(∞)?
For medium values of 푐, i.e., when 푐0(푘¯)− 푡 < 푐 < 푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푡, the
optimal investment is given by (see Lemma 3)
ℎ−1 (퐶 − 푡− 푐) .
Denote this part of the investment function by 푘∗∗medium(⋅). The first order
Taylor approximation of 푘∗∗medium(⋅) is
푘∗∗medium(⋅) ≈ 푘
∗∗(∞) + 푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푐− 푡.
Since 푑2푘∗∗medium(⋅)/푑푐
2 > 0 (see previous analysis) we do not overestimate
푘∗∗medium(⋅) by the approximation. Next, we put the approximation of
푘∗∗medium(⋅) into (VII.7), so
피[푘∣휆] ≥
∫ 푐0(푘¯)−푡
0
0푑퐹 (푐)
+
∫ 푐0(푘∗∗(∞))−푡
푐0(푘¯)−푡
(푘∗∗(∞) + 푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푐− 푡) 푑퐹 (푐)
+
∫ ∞
푐0(푘∗∗(∞))−푡
푘∗∗(∞)푑퐹 (푐).
For the exponential density function this is
피[푘∣휆] ≥
∫ 푐0(푘∗∗(∞))−푡
푐0(푘¯)−푡
(푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푐− 푡)휆푒−휆푐푑푐 (VII.8)
+
∫ ∞
푐0(푘¯)−푡
푘∗∗(∞)휆푒−휆푐푑푐.
Since the exponential density is decreasing in 푐 and the term in brackets
(푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푐− 푡) is linear in 푐, an approximation and a lower bound
of the first integral of (VII.8) is
∫ 푐0(푘∗∗(∞))−푡
푐0(푘¯)−푡
(푐0(푘∗∗(∞))− 푐0(푘∗∗(∞)) + 푡− 푡) +
(
푐0(푘∗∗(∞))− 푐0(푘¯) + 푡− 푡
)
2
휆푒−휆푐푑푐
=
∫ 푐0(푘∗∗(∞))−푡
푐0(푘¯)−푡
푐0(푘∗∗(∞))− 푐0(푘¯)
2
휆푒−휆푐푑푐.
With (VII.8) we get
피[푘∣휆] ≥
푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푐0(푘¯)
2
[
푒−휆(푐0(푘¯)−푡) − 푒−휆(푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))−푡)
]
+푘∗∗(∞)푒−휆(푐0(푘¯)−푡) =: Ω(휆)
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Obviously, lim휆→0Ω(휆) = 푘
∗∗(∞), and
푑Ω(휆)
푑휆
푒휆(푐0(푘¯)−푡) =
푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푐0(푘¯)
2[
−(푐0(푘¯)− 푡) + (푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푡)푒−휆(푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))−푐0(푘¯))
]
− (푐0(푘¯)− 푡)푘
∗∗(∞).
By A1(v), 푐0(푘¯) > 푡. From the analysis before, 푐0(푘
∗∗(∞)) > 푐0(푘¯).
Hence, 푐0(푘
∗∗(∞)) > 푡. Therefore the RHS is decreasing in 휆. Moreover,
since 푒휆(푐0(푘¯)−푡) > 0 the LHS has the same sign as 푑Ω(휆)/푑휆.
We seek to explore whether Ω(휆) can exceed 푘∗∗(∞). Observe that
lim
휆→0
RHS > 0 ⇐⇒
(
푐0(푘
∗∗(∞))− 푐0(푘¯)
)2
2
− (푐0(푘¯)− 푡)푘
∗∗(∞) > 0.
When this condition holds, Ω(휆) is increasing in 휆 when 휆 is sufficiently
small. Together with lim휆→0Ω(휆) = 푘
∗∗(∞), this implies that the maxi-
mum of Ω(휆) is greater than 푘∗∗(∞). Since 피[푘∣휆] ≥ Ω(휆), then also the
maximum of 피[푘∣휆] is greater than 푘∗∗(∞). This establishes the result
that under this condition the maximum of 피[푘∣휆] is greater than 푘∗∗(∞).
□
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10
Let the function 푘∗∗∗(퐶∣휆) denote the optimal investment depending on
incumbent’s initial costs 퐶, given some 휆. We next proof by contradic-
tion. Let 퐶퐼 < 퐶퐼퐼 and suppose that 푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼퐼 ∣휆) ≥ 푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼 ∣휆). One can
rewrite the incumbent’s expected profit as
피[휋0(푘
∗∗∗(퐶퐼퐼 ∣휆)∣퐶퐼퐼)] =
피[휋0(푘
∗∗∗(퐶퐼 ∣휆)∣퐶퐼퐼)] +
∫ 푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼퐼 ∣휆)
푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼 ∣휆)
∂피[휋0(푘∣퐶
퐼퐼)]
∂푘
푑푘.
The optimality of 푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼퐼 ∣휆) requires that the term with the integral is
nonnegative. The optimality of 푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼 ∣휆) requires that
피[휋0(푘
∗∗∗(퐶퐼 ∣휆)∣퐶퐼)] ≥ 피[휋0(푘
∗∗∗(퐶퐼퐼 ∣휆)∣퐶퐼)],
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or rewritten that ∫ 푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼퐼 ∣휆)
푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼 ∣휆)
∂피[휋0(푘, 퐶
퐼)]
∂푘
푑푘 ≤ 0.
But since
푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼퐼 ∣휆) ≥ 푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼 ∣휆), 퐶퐼 < 퐶퐼퐼 , and 푑2피[휋0(푘, 퐹 )]/푑푘푑퐶 < 0,
it follows that∫ 푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼퐼 ∣휆)
푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼 ∣휆)
∂피[휋0(푘, 퐶
퐼)]
∂푘
푑푘 >
∫ 푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼퐼 ∣휆)
푘∗∗∗(퐶퐼 ∣휆)
∂피[휋0(푘, 퐶
퐼퐼)]
∂푘
푑푘,
which is a contradiction.
Observe that this result does not require that 푐 is exponentially dis-
tributed. We only used 푑2피[휋0(푘, 퐹 )]/푑푘푑퐶 < 0, which also holds with
other distributions. □
UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION
We assumed that consumers have a unit demand and that rivals’ costs
are exponentially distributed. Both assumptions are made to simplify
calculations. Since the intuition for our results seems to be quite general,
we are optimistic that our results also hold with alternative assumptions.
To illustrate, we next consider the case where 푐 is uniformly distributed.
퐹 (푐) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 for 푐 < 0,
휆푐 for 푐 ∈ [0, 1/휆],with 휆 ≥ 0,
1 otherwise.
The strength of the entry threat is again captured by the parameter 휆.
Since we want to yield explicit solutions we consider a concrete functional
form of ℎ(푘). Let
ℎ(푘) = 훼푘1/2.
This functional form violates Assumption A2(iv). But this causes no
problems when 훼 is small enough. It is useful to define
푘ˇ ≡ 푘1/2.
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We now can write the incumbent’s objective function as
피[휋0(푘ˇ)] = (1− 퐶 + 훼푘ˇ)(1− 퐹 (퐶 − 훼푘ˇ − 푡))− 푘ˇ
2.
Suppose that for the optimal investment entry is possible with a proba-
bility strictly between 0 and 1. Then 퐹 (퐶 − 훼푘ˇ − 푡) = 휆(퐶 − 훼푘ˇ − 푡).
The first order condition 푑피[휋0(푘ˇ)]/푑푘ˇ = 0 yields
푘ˇFOC =
훼
2
1− 2휆퐶 + 휆푡+ 휆
1− 훼2휆
. (VII.9)
Observe that
푑푘ˇFOC
푑휆
=
훼
2
1− 2퐶 + 푡+ 훼2
(1− 훼2휆)2
.
It is easy to see that, as in the original specification with an exponential
distribution of rivals’ production costs, 퐶 ≤ 1/2 is a sufficient condition
that the optimal investment—if it is given by the first-order condition—is
increasing in the degree of the entry threat.
It is not obvious whether it is optimal to invest according to the first-
order condition. Corner solutions may be preferable. Additionally, it
must be checked whether with (VII.9) the probability of entry is indeed
strictly between zero and one. To simplify the exercise we consider the
very special case with
퐶 =
1
2
, 푡 =
1
4
, 훼 =
1
4
.
Then
푘ˇFOC =
4 + 휆
32− 2휆
. (VII.10)
Since 푘 ∈ ℝ++, investing according to formula (VII.10) is possible only
for 휆 ∈ [0, 16). The check whether with (VII.10) the probability of entry
is indeed strictly between zero and one yields that we have to restrict the
application of formula (VII.10) further to 휆 ∈ [0, 28/3].
Setting 피[휋0(푘ˇ
FOC)] = 0 yields three solutions: 휆1 = 44/9, 휆2 =
12, 휆3 = 16. Observe that only 휆1 ∈ [0, 28/3]. As Figure VII.1 shows,
only for the subinterval 휆 ∈ [0, 44/9] yields investing 푘ˇFOC nonnegative
expected profits.
Is not investing at all preferable to investing according to (VII.10)?
One can show that no investment is strictly dominated by using (VII.10)
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피[휋0(푘ˇ
FOC)]
Figure VII.1: Incumbent’s expected profit when following (VII.10).
for all 휆 ∈ (−4, 16). The other corner solution is that entry is deterred for
sure. Then 푘ˇ has to be at least 1 for all 휆 > 0, because then 푐0(푘) ≤ 1/4 =
푡. But then the incumbent makes at most a profit of zero. This is worse
than not investing because this yields at least a small positive expected
profit. So for 휆 > 44/9 the incumbent is best off by not investing; for 0 <
휆 < 44/9 the optimal investment is given by (VII.10); for 휆 = 44/9 the
incumbent is indifferent between not investing and investing according to
(VII.10). We assume that in case of indifference the incumbent chooses
to invest. It can, moreover, easily be shown that for 휆 = 0, investing
according to (VII.10) is optimal. So we conclude that
푘∗(휆) =
{ (
4+휆
32−2휆
)2
for 휆 ∈ [0, 44/9],
0 for 휆 > 44/9.
That is, the relationship between incumbent’s R&D investment and the
entry threat is again hump-shaped, and for large entry threats the in-
cumbent does not invest at all.
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VII.3. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Stochastic independence of the plausible distributions implies that
∑
풮
푝푖,푗휖푖,푗 ∼ 푁
(∑
풮
푝푖,푗휇푖,
∑
풮
푝2푖,푗휎
2
푗
)
.
We assumed that aggregating the plausible distributions yields the ob-
jective distribution. So∑
풮
푝푖,푗휇푖
!
= 0 and
∑
풮
푝2푖,푗휎
2
푗
!
= 휎2.
The following chain shows that 휎2 < 휎2푛:
휎2 =
∑
풮
푝2푖,푗휎
2
푗 <
∑
풮
푝푖,푗휎
2
푗 ≤
∑
풮
푝푖,푗휎
2
푛 = 휎
2
푛.
For 푁 ≥ 2 we can show that 휇1 < 0:
0 =
∑
풮
푝푖,푗휇푖 >
∑
풮
푝푖,푗휇1 = 휇1.
For 푁 = 1, the chain holds with equality. Therefore, 휇1 = 0. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 13
Consider the case with an ambiguity-averse agent. The agent’s belief
about the distribution of 휖푍 is characterized by (휇푍,푖, 휎
2
푍,푗). Simple cal-
culations yield that the agent’s certainty equivalent is
푤ˆ(⋅) = 푡+ (푠푌 + 푠푍)푎+ 푠푍휇푍,푖 −
1
2
휂
(
푠2푌 휎
2
푌 + 푠
2
푍휎
2
푍,푗
)
−
1
2
푐푎2. (VII.11)
Therefore, the agent chooses
푎 =
{
푠푌 +푠푍
푐
for 푠푌 + 푠푍 ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
It is straightforward that setting 푠푍 < 0 makes no sense for the principal.
For the same reasons as in case with only one performance measure we
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then have 휇푖,푍 = 휇푍,1 and 휎
2
푍,푗 = 휎
2
푍,푛. The principal’s maximization
problem can be simplified to
max
푠푌 ,푠푍
푠푌 + 푠푍
푐
+푠푍휇푍,1−
1
2
휂(푠2푌 휎
2
푌 +푠
2
푍휎
2
푍,푛)−
1
2
(푠푌 + 푠푍)
2
푐
−푤¯ s.t. 푠푍 ≥ 0.
(VII.12)
The derivatives are
푑...
푑푠푌
=
1
푐
− 휂푠푌 휎
2
푌 −
푠푌 + 푠푍
푐
,
푑...
푑푠푍
=
1
푐
− 휂푠푍휎
2
푍,푛 −
푠푌 + 푠푍
푐
+ 휇푍,1.
It is straightforward that 푠푌 = 0 and 푠푍 > 0 cannot be optimal: then
푑.../푑푠푌 > 푑.../푑푠푍 , which is a contradiction when 푠푌 = 0 and 푠푍 > 0.
Moreover, 푠푌 = 0 and 푠푍 = 0 cannot be optimal: then 푑.../푑푠푌 is positive
for 푠푌 = 0 and 푠푍 = 0. Hence, 푠푌 > 0 and 푑.../푑푠푌 = 0. So
푠푌 =
1− 푠푍
1 + 푐휂휎2푌
.
Using this yields
푑...
푑푠푍
= 푐
(
1 + 푐휇푍,1 −
1
1 + 휂푐휎2푌
+ 푠푍
(
1
1 + 휂푐휎2푌
− 1− 휂푐휎2푍,푛
))
.
One directly sees that the RHS is decreasing in 푠푍 .
Hence, when 푑...
푑푠푍
∣∣∣
푠푍=0
≤ 0 the principal sets 푠푍 = 0. Otherwise he
sets 푠푍 > 0. So 푠푍 > 0 if and only if
휇푍,1 > −
휂휎2푌
1 + 휂푐휎2푌
.
□
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VII.4. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Suppose that signals are ordered according to their likelihood ratio, that
is, 푠 > 푠′ if and only if 훾퐻푠 /훾
퐿
푠 > 훾
퐻
푠′ /훾
퐿
푠′ . Consider a contract of the form
푢푠 =
{
푢 if 푠 < 푠ˆ
푢+ 푏 if 푠 ≥ 푠ˆ
,
where 푏 > 0 and 1 < 푠ˆ ≤ 푆. Under this contractual form and given that
the first-order approach is valid, (IC) can be rewritten as
푏
{[
푆∑
푠=푠ˆ
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
](
1− (휆− 1)
푠ˆ−1∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)
)
− (휆− 1)
(
푠ˆ−1∑
푠=1
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿)
)(
푆∑
푠=푠ˆ
훾푠(푎ˆ)
)}
= 푐′(푎ˆ).
Since signals are ordered according to their likelihood ratio, we have∑푆
푠=푠ˆ(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 ) > 0 and
∑푠ˆ−1
푠=1(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿) < 0 for all 1 < 푠ˆ ≤ 푆. This
implies that the term in curly brackets is strictly positive for 휆 ≤ 2.
Hence, with 푐′(푎ˆ) > 0, 푏 can alway be chosen such that (IC) is met.
Rearranging the participation constraint,
푢 ≥ 푢¯+ 푐(푎ˆ)− 푏
(
푆∑
푠=푠ˆ
훾푠(푎ˆ)
)[
1− (휆− 1)
(
푠ˆ−1∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)
)]
,
reveals that (IR) can be satisfied for any 푏 by choosing 푢 appropriately.
This concludes the proof. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 14
It is readily verified that Assumptions 1-3 from Grossman and Hart
(1983) are satisfied. Thus, the cost-minimization problem is well de-
fined, in the sense that for each action 푎 ∈ (0, 1) there exists a second-
best incentive scheme. Suppose the principal wants to implement action
푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1) at minimum cost. Since the agent’s action is not observable,
the principal’s problem is given by
min
{푢푠}푆푠=1
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ(푢푠) (MR)
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subject to
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)푢푠 − 푐(푎ˆ) ≥ 푢¯ , (IR푅)
푆∑
푠=1
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )푢푠 − 푐
′(푎ˆ) = 0 . (IC푅)
where the first constraint is the individual rationality constraint and the
second is the incentive compatibility constraint. Note that the first-order
approach is valid, since the agent’s expected utility is a strictly concave
function of his effort. The Lagrangian to the resulting problem is
ℒ =
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎)ℎ(푢푠)− 휇0
{
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎)푢푠 − 푐(푎)− 푢¯
}
− 휇1
{
푆∑
푠=1
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )푢푠 − 푐
′(푎)
}
,
where 휇0 and 휇1 denote the Lagrange multipliers of the individual ratio-
nality constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint, respectively.
Setting the partial derivative of ℒ with respect to 푢푠 equal to zero yields
∂ℒ
∂푢푠
= 0 ⇐⇒ ℎ′(푢푠) = 휇0 + 휇1
훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠
훾푠(푎ˆ)
, ∀푠 ∈ 풮. (VII.13)
Irrespective of the value of 휇0, if 휇1 > 0, convexity of ℎ(⋅) implies that
푢푠 > 푢푠′ if and only if (훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )/훾푠(푎ˆ) > (훾
퐻
푠′ − 훾
퐿
푠′)/훾푠′(푎ˆ), which in
turn is equivalent to 훾퐻푠 /훾
퐿
푠 > 훾
퐻
푠′ /훾
퐿
푠′ . Thus it remains to show that 휇1
is strictly positive. Suppose, in contradiction, that 휇1 ≤ 0. Consider the
case 휇1 = 0 first. From (A.1) it follows that 푢푠 = 푢
푓 for all 푠 ∈ 풮, where
푢푓 satisfies ℎ′(푢푓 ) = 휇0. This, however, violates (IC푅), a contradiction.
Next, consider 휇1 < 0. From (A.1) it follows that 푢푠 < 푢푠′ if and only
if (훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )/훾푠(푎ˆ) > (훾
퐻
푠′ − 훾
퐿
푠′)/훾푡(푎ˆ). Let 풮
+ ≡
{
푠∣훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 > 0
}
,
풮− ≡
{
푠∣훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 < 0
}
, and 푢ˆ ≡ min{푢푠∣푠 ∈ 풮
−}. Since 푢ˆ > 푢푠 for all
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푠 ∈ 풮+, we have
푆∑
푠=1
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )푢푠 =
∑
풮−
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )푢푠 +
∑
풮+
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )푢푠
<
∑
풮−
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )푢ˆ+
∑
풮+
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )푢ˆ
= 푢ˆ
푆∑
푠=1
(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
= 0,
again a contradiction to (IC푅). Hence, 휇1 > 0 and the desired result
follows. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 15
The problem of finding the optimal contract 풖∗ to implement action
푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1) is decomposed into two subproblems. First, for a given in-
centive feasible ordering of signals, we derive the optimal nondecreasing
incentive scheme that implements action 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then, in a second
step, we choose the ordering of signals for which the ordering specific cost
of implementation is lowest.
Step 1: Remember that the ordering of signals is incentive feasible if
훽푠(⋅) > 0 for at least one signal 푠. For a given incentive feasible ordering
of signals, in this first step we solve Program ML. First, note that it is
optimal to set 푏푠 = 0 if 훽푠(⋅) < 0. To see this, suppose, in contradiction,
that in the optimum (IC′) holds and 푏푠 > 0 for some signal 푠 with 훽푠(⋅) ≤
0. If 훽푠(⋅) = 0, then setting 푏푠 = 0 leaves (IC
′) unchanged, but leads to a
lower value of the objective function of Program ML, contradicting that
the original contract is optimal. If 훽푠(⋅) < 0, then setting 푏푠 = 0 not
only reduces the value of the objective function, but also relaxes (IC′),
which in turn allows to lower other bonus payments, thereby lowering the
value of the objective function even further. Again, a contradiction to
the original contract being optimal. Let 풮훽 ≡ {푠 ∈ 풮∣훽푠(⋅) > 0} denote
the set of signals for which 훽푠(⋅) is strictly positive under the considered
ordering of signals, and let 푆훽 denote the number of elements in this set.
Thus, Program (ML) can be rewritten as
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Program ML+:
min
{푏푠}푠∈풮훽
∑
푠∈풮훽
푏푠휌푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ)
subject to (푖)
∑
푠∈풮훽
푏푠훽푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) = 푐
′(푎ˆ) (IC+)
(푖푖) 푏푠 ≥ 0, ∀푠 ∈ 풮훽.
Program ML+ is a linear programming problem. It is well-known that
if a linear programming problem has a solution, it must have a solution
at an extreme point of the constraint set. Generically, there is a unique
solution and this solution is an extreme point. Since the constraint set
of Program ML+, ℳ ≡ {{푏푠}푠∈풮훽 ∈ ℝ
푆훽
+ ∣
∑
푠∈풮훽
푏푠훽푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) = 푐
′(푎ˆ)},
is closed and bounded, Program ML+ has a solution. Hence, generically∑
푠∈풮훽
푏푠휌푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) achieves its greatest lower bound at one of the extreme
points of ℳ. (We comment on genericity below.) With ℳ describing
a hyperplane in ℝ
푆훽
+ , all extreme points of ℳ are characterized by the
following property: 푏푠 > 0 for exactly one signal 푠 ∈ 푆훽 and 푏푡 = 0 for
all 푡 ∈ 푆훽, 푡 ∕= 푠. It remains to determine for which signal the bonus is
set strictly positive. The size of the bonus payment, which is set strictly
positive, is uniquely determined by (IC+):
푏푠훽푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) = 푐
′(푎ˆ) ⇐⇒ 푏푠 =
푐′(푎ˆ)
훽푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ)
. (VII.14)
Therefore, from the objective function of Program ML+ it follows that,
for the signal ordering under consideration, the optimal signal for which
the bonus is set strictly positive, 푠ˆ, is characterized by
푠ˆ = argmin
푠∈풮훽
푐′(푎ˆ)
훽푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ)
휌푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ).
Step 2: From all incentive feasible signal orders, the principal chooses
the one which minimizes her cost of implementation. With the number
of incentive feasible signal orders being finite, this problem clearly has a
solution. Let 푠∗ denote the resulting cutoff, i.e.,
푢∗푠 =
{
푢∗ if 푠 < 푠∗
푢∗ + 푏∗ if 푠 ≥ 푠∗
,
131
where
푏∗ = 푐′(푎ˆ)/훽푠∗(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) and
푢∗ = 푢¯+ 푐(푎ˆ)− 푏∗
[
푆∑
휏=푠∗
훾휏 (푎ˆ)− 휌푠∗(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ)
]
.
Letting 푢∗퐿 = 푢
∗, 푢∗퐻 = 푢
∗ + 푏∗, and ℬ∗ = {푠 ∈ 풮∣푠 ≥ 푠∗} establishes the
desired result.
On genericity: We claimed that, for any given feasible ordering of
signals, generically Program ML+ has a unique solution at one of the
extreme points of the constraint set. To see this, note that a neces-
sary condition for the existence of multiple solutions is 훽푠/훽푠′ = 휌푠/휌푠′
for some 푠, 푠′ ∈ 풮훽, 푠 ∕= 푠
′. This condition is characterized by the ac-
tion to be implemented, 푎ˆ, the structure of the performance measure,{
(훾퐻푠 , 훾
퐿
푠 )
}푆
푠=1
, and the agent’s degree of loss aversion, 휆. Now, fix 푎ˆ
and
{
(훾퐻푠 , 훾
퐿
푠 )
}푆
푠=1
. With both 훽푠 > 0 and 휌푠 > 0 for all 푠 ∈ 풮훽, it is
readily verified, that exactly one value of 휆 equates 훽푠/훽푠′ with 휌푠/휌푠′ .
Since 휆 is drawn from the interval (1, 2], and with the number of signals
being finite, this necessary condition for Program ML+ having multiple
solutions for a given feasible ordering of signals generically will not hold.
With the number of feasible orderings being finite, generic optimality of
a corner solution carries over to the overall problem. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 16
ℬ∗ maximizes 푋(ℬ) :=
[∑
푠∈ℬ(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]
× 푌 (푃ℬ), where
푌 (푃ℬ) :=
1
(휆− 1)푃ℬ(1− 푃ℬ)
−
1
푃ℬ
+
1
1− 푃ℬ
.
Suppose for the moment that 푃ℬ is a continuous decision variable. Ac-
cordingly,
푑푌 (푃ℬ)
푑푃ℬ
=
1
푃 2ℬ(1− 푃ℬ)
2
[
2푃 2ℬ +
2− 휆
휆− 1
(2푃ℬ − 1)
]
. (VII.15)
It is readily verified that 푑푌 (푃ℬ)/푑푃ℬ < 0 for 0 < 푃ℬ < 푃¯ (휆) and
푑푌 (푃ℬ)/푑푃ℬ > 0 for 푃¯ (휆) < 푃ℬ < 1, where
푃¯ (휆) ≡
휆− 2 +
√
휆(2− 휆)
2(휆− 1)
.
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Note that for 휆 ≤ 2 the critical value 푃¯ (휆) ∈ [0, 1/2). Hence, excluding
a signal of ℬ increases 푌 (푃ℬ) if 푃ℬ < 푃¯ (휆), whereas including a signal
to ℬ increases 푌 (푃ℬ) if 푃ℬ ≥ 푃¯ (휆). With these insights the next two
implications follow immediately.
(i) 푃ℬ∗ < 푃¯ (휆) =⇒ ℬ
∗ ⊆ 풮+
(ii) 푃ℬ∗ ≥ 푃¯ (휆) =⇒ 풮
+ ⊆ ℬ∗
We prove both statements in turn by contradiction. (i) Suppose 푃ℬ∗ <
푃¯ (휆) and that there exists a signal 푠ˆ ∈ 풮− which is also contained in ℬ∗,
i.e., 푠ˆ ∈ ℬ∗. Clearly,
∑
푠∈ℬ∗(훾
퐻
푠 −훾
퐿
푠 ) <
∑
푠∈ℬ∗∖{푠ˆ}(훾
퐻
푠 −훾
퐿
푠 ) because 푠ˆ is a
bad signal. Moreover, 푌 (ℬ∗) < 푌 (ℬ∗∖{푠ˆ}) because 푌 (⋅) increases when
signals are excluded of ℬ∗. Thus 푋(ℬ∗) < 푋(ℬ∗∖{푠ˆ}), a contradiction
to the assumption that ℬ∗ is the optimal partition. (ii) Suppose 푃ℬ∗ ≥
푃¯ (휆) and that there exists a signal 푠˜ ∈ 풮+ that is not contained in
ℬ∗, i.e., ℬ∗ ∩ {푠˜} = ∅. Since 푠ˆ is a good signal
∑
푠∈ℬ∗(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 ) <∑
푠∈ℬ∗∪{푠ˆ}(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 ). 푃ℬ∗ ≥ 푃¯ (휆) implies that 푌 (ℬ
∗ ∪ {푠˜}) > 푌 (ℬ∗).
Thus, 푋(ℬ∗) < 푋(ℬ∗ ∪ {푠˜}) a contradiction to the assumption that ℬ∗
maximizes 푋(ℬ∗). Finally, since for any ℬ∗ we are either in case (i) or
in case (ii), the desired result follows. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 17
Suppose, in contradiction, that in the optimum there are signals 푠, 푡 ∈ 풮
such that 푠 ∈ ℬ∗, 푡 /∈ ℬ∗ and 훾
퐻
푠 −훾
퐿
푠
훾푠(푎ˆ)
<
훾퐻푡 −훾
퐿
푡
훾푡(푎ˆ)
. We derive a contradiction
by showing that exchanging signal 푠 for signal 푡 reduces the principal’s
cost, which implies that the original contract cannot be optimal. Let
ℬ¯ ≡ (ℬ∗ ∖ {푠})∪{푡}.It suffices to show that 푋(ℬ¯) > 푋(ℬ∗), where 푋(ℬ)
is defined as in the proof of Proposition 16. 푋(ℬ¯) > 푋(ℬ∗) is equivalent
to(∑
푗∈ℬ∗
(훾퐻푗 − 훾
퐿
푗 ) + (훾
퐻
푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 )− (훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
)[
1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ¯)
(휆− 1)푃ℬ¯(1− 푃ℬ¯)
]
>
(∑
푗∈ℬ∗
(훾퐻푗 − 훾
퐿
푗 )
)[
1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ∗)
(휆− 1)푃ℬ∗(1− 푃ℬ∗)
]
.
133
Rearranging yields
[
(훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 )− (훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
] [1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ¯)
(휆− 1)푃ℬ¯(1− 푃ℬ¯)
]
>(∑
푗∈ℬ∗
(훾퐻푗 − 훾
퐿
푗 )
)[
1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ∗)
(휆− 1)푃ℬ∗(1− 푃ℬ∗)
−
1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ¯)
(휆− 1)푃ℬ¯(1− 푃ℬ¯)
]
.
(VII.16)
With 푌 (푃ℬ) being defined as in the proof of Proposition 16, we have to
consider two cases, (i) 푑푌 (푃ℬ∗)/푃ℬ ≥ 0, and (ii) 푑푌 (푃ℬ∗)/푃ℬ < 0.
Case (i): Since 훾푠(푎ˆ)−훾푡(푎ˆ) ≤ 휅, we have 푃ℬ∗ ≤ 푃ℬ¯+휅. With 푌 (푃ℬ)
being (weakly) increasing at 푃ℬ∗ , inequality (VII.16) is least likely to
hold for 푃ℬ∗ = 푃ℬ¯ + 휅. Inserting 푃ℬ∗ = 푃ℬ¯ + 휅 into (VII.16) yields
[
(훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 )− (훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
] [1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ¯)
(휆− 1)푃ℬ¯(1− 푃ℬ¯)
]
>(∑
푗∈ℬ∗
(훾퐻푗 − 훾
퐿
푗 )
)[
1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ¯ − 2휅)
(휆− 1)[푃ℬ¯(1− 푃ℬ¯) + 휅(1− 2푃ℬ¯)]− 휅2
−
1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ¯)
(휆− 1)푃ℬ¯(1− 푃ℬ¯)
]
. (VII.17)
The right-hand side of (VII.17) becomes arbitrarily close to zero for 휅→
0, thus it remains to show that[
(훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 )− (훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
] [1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ¯)
(휆− 1)푃ℬ¯(1− 푃ℬ¯)
]
> 0. (VII.18)
For (VII.18) to hold, we must have (훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 ) − (훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 ) > 0. From
the proof of Proposition 16 we know that 풮+ ⊆ ℬ∗ if 푌 (푃ℬ) is increasing
at ℬ∗. Since the principal will end up including all good signals in the
set ℬ∗ anyway, the question of interest is whether she can benefit from
swapping two bad signals. Therefore, we consider case 푠, 푡 ∈ 풮−, where
풮− ≡ {푠 ∈ 풮∣훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 < 0}. With 푠, 푡 ∈ 풮
−, we have[
(훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 )− (훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]
≥ 훾푡(푎ˆ)훾푠(푎ˆ)
⋅
[
1
훾푠(푎ˆ)
훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡
훾푡(푎ˆ)
−
1
훾푠(푎ˆ) + 휅
훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠
훾푠(푎ˆ)
]
, (VII.19)
where the inequality holds because 훾푡(푎ˆ) − 훾푠(푎ˆ) ≤ 휅. Note that for
휅 → 0 the right-hand side of (VII.19) becomes strictly positive, thus
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(훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 ) − (훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 ) > 0 for 휅 → 0. Hence, for 휅 sufficiently small,
푋(ℬ∗) < 푋(ℬ¯), a contradiction to ℬ∗ being optimal.
Case (ii): Since 훾푡(푎ˆ) − 훾푠(푎ˆ) ≤ 휅, we have 푃ℬ∗ ≥ 푃ℬ¯ − 휅. With
푌 (푃ℬ) being decreasing at 푃ℬ∗ , inequality (VII.16) is least likely to hold
for 푃ℬ∗ = 푃ℬ¯ − 휅. Inserting 푃ℬ∗ = 푃ℬ¯ − 휅 into (VII.16), and running
along the lines of case (i) allows us to establish that, for 휅 sufficiently
small, 푋(ℬ∗) < 푋(ℬ¯), a contradiction to ℬ∗ being optimal.
To sum up, for 휅 sufficiently small we have
max
푠∈풮∖ℬ∗
{(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )/훾푠(푎ˆ)} < min
푠∈ℬ∗
{(훾퐻푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )/훾푠(푎ˆ)} ,
or equivalently,
max
푠∈풮∖ℬ∗
{훾퐻푠 /훾
퐿
푠 } < min
푠∈ℬ∗
{훾퐻푠 /훾
퐿
푠 }.
Letting 퐾 ≡ min푠∈ℬ∗{훾
퐻
푠 /훾
퐿
푠 } establishes the desired result. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 18
We first prove part (ii). Suppose that a small change in 휆 leaves the
optimal partition ℬ∗ of the set of all signals unchanged. Rearranging
(IC′) yields
푏∗ =
푐′(푎ˆ)∑
푠∈ℬ∗(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )− (휆− 1)
[∑
푠∈ℬ∗(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]
[1− 2푃ℬ∗ ]
.
Straight-forward differentiation reveals that
푑푏∗
푑휆
=
푐′(푎ˆ)
[∑
푠∈ℬ∗(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]
[1− 2푃ℬ∗ ]{∑
푠∈ℬ∗(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )− (휆− 1)
[∑
푠∈ℬ∗(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]
[1− 2푃ℬ∗ ]
}2 .
Since under the second-best contract
∑
푠∈ℬ∗(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 ) > 0, the desired
result follows.
To prove part (i), let ℬ+ ≡
{
ℬ ⊂ 풮∣
∑
푠∈ℬ(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 ) > 0
}
. For any ℬ˜ ∈
ℬ+, let
푏ℬ˜ =
푐′(푎ˆ)∑
푠∈ℬ˜(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )− (휆− 1)
[∑
푠∈ℬ˜(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]
[1− 2푃ℬ˜]
and
푢ℬ˜ = 푢¯+ 푐(푎ˆ)− 푏ℬ˜푃ℬ˜ + (휆− 1)푃ℬ˜(1− 푃ℬ˜)푏ℬ˜.
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The cost of implementing action 푎ˆ when paying 푢ℬ˜ for signals in 풮 ∖ ℬ˜
and 푢ℬ˜ + 푏ℬ˜ for signals in ℬ˜ is given by
퐶ℬ˜ = 푢ℬ˜ + 푏ℬ˜푃ℬ˜ = 푢¯+ 푐(푎ˆ) +
푐′(푎ˆ)(휆− 1)푃ℬ˜(1− 푃ℬ˜)[∑
푠∈ℬ˜(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]
[1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ˜)]
.
Differentiation of 퐶ℬ˜ with respect to 휆 yields
푑퐶ℬ˜
푑휆
=
푐′(푎ˆ)푃ℬ˜(1− 푃ℬ˜)[∑
푠∈ℬ˜(훾
퐻
푠 − 훾
퐿
푠 )
]
[1− (휆− 1)(1− 2푃ℬ˜)]
2 .
Obviously, 푑퐶ℬ˜/푑휆 > 0 for all ℬ ∈ ℬ
+. Since the optimal partition of 풮
may change as 휆 changes, the minimum cost of implementing action 푎ˆ is
given by
퐶(푎ˆ) = min
ℬ∈ℬ+
퐶ℬ.
Put differently, 퐶(푎ˆ) is the lower envelope of all 퐶ℬ for ℬ ∈ ℬ
+. With
퐶ℬ being continuous and strictly increasing in 휆 for all ℬ ∈ ℬ
+, it follows
that also 퐶(푎ˆ) is continuous and strictly increasing in 휆. This completes
the proof. □
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
We show that program (MG) has a solution, that is,
∑푆
푠=1 훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ(푢푠)
achieves its greatest lower bound. First, from Lemma 6 we know that
the constraint set of program (MG) is not empty for action 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1).
Next, note that from (IR퐺) it follows that
∑푆
푠=1 훾푠(푎ˆ)푢푠 is bounded below.
Following the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1 of Grossman and
Hart (1983), we can artificially bound the constraint set – roughly spoken
because unbounded sequences in the constraint set make
∑푆
푠=1 훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ(푢푠)
tend to infinity by a result from Bertsekas (1974). Since the constraint set
is closed, the existence of a minimum follows from Weierstrass’ theorem.
□
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
Since (IR퐺) will always be satisfied with equality due to an appropriate
adjustment of the lowest intrinsic utility level offered, relaxing (IR퐺) will
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always lead to strictly lower costs for the principal. Therefore, the shadow
value of relaxing (IR퐺) is strictly positive, so 휇퐼푅 > 0.
Next, we show that relaxing (IC퐺) has a positive shadow value, 휇퐼퐶 >
0. We do this by showing that a decrease in 푐′(푎ˆ) leads to a reduction
in the principal’s minimum cost of implementation. Let {푢∗푠}푠∈풮 be the
optimal contract under (the original) Program MG, and suppose that
푐′(푎ˆ) decreases. Now the principal can offer a new contract {푢푁푠 }푠∈풮 of
the form
푢푁푠 = 훼푢
∗
푠 + (1− 훼)
푆∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)푢
∗
푡 , (VII.20)
where 훼 ∈ (0, 1), which also satisfies (IR퐺), the relaxed (IC퐺), and
(OC퐺), but yields strictly lower costs of implementation than the original
contract {푢∗푠}푠∈풮 .
Clearly, for 훼ˆ ∈ (0, 1), 푢푁푠 < 푢
푁
푠′ if and only if 푢
∗
푠 < 푢
∗
푠′ , so (OC퐺) is
also satisfied under contract {푢푁푠 }푠∈풮 .
Next, we check that the relaxed (IC퐺) holds under {푢
푁
푠 }푠∈풮 . To see
this, note that for 훼 = 1 we have {푢푁푠 }푠∈풮 ≡ {푢
∗
푠}푠∈풮 . Thus, for 훼 = 1,
the relaxed (IC퐺) is oversatisfied under {푢
푁
푠 }푠∈풮 . For 훼 = 0, on the
other hand, the left-hand side of (IC퐺) is equal to zero, and the relaxed
(IC퐺) in consequence is not satisfied. Since the left-hand side of (IC퐺)
is continuous in 훼 under contract {푢푁푠 }푠∈풮 , by the intermediate-value
theorem there exists 훼ˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that the relaxed (IC퐺) is satisfied
with equality.
Last, consider (IR퐺). The left-hand side of (IR퐺) under contract
{푢푁푠 }푠∈풮 with 훼 = 훼ˆ amounts to
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)푢
푁
푠 − (휆− 1)
푆−1∑
푠=1
푆∑
푡=푠+1
훾푠(푎ˆ)훾푡(푎ˆ)
[
푢푁푡 − 푢
푁
푠
]
=
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)푢
∗
푠 − 훼˜(휆− 1)
푆−1∑
푠=1
푆∑
푡=푠+1
훾푠(푎ˆ)훾푡(푎ˆ) [푢
∗
푡 − 푢
∗
푠]
>
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)푢
∗
푠 − (휆− 1)
푆−1∑
푠=1
푆∑
푡=푠+1
훾푠(푎ˆ)훾푡(푎ˆ) [푢
∗
푡 − 푢
∗
푠]
= 푢¯+ 푐(푎ˆ) , (VII.21)
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where the last equality follows from the fact that {푢∗푠}푠∈풮 fulfills the
(IR푔) with equality. Thus, contract {푢
푁
푠 }푠∈풮 is feasible in the sense that
all constraints of program (MG) are met. It remains to show that the
principal’s costs are reduced. Since ℎ(⋅) is strictly convex, the principal’s
objective function is strictly convex in 훼, with a minimum at 훼 = 0.
Hence, the principal’s objective function is strictly increasing in 훼 for
훼 ∈ (0, 1]. Since {푢푁푠 }푠∈풮 ≡ {푢
∗
푠}푠∈풮 for 훼 = 1, for 훼 = 훼ˆ we have
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ(푢
∗
푠) >
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ(푢
푁
푠 ),
which establishes the desired result. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 19
For the agent’s intrinsic utility function being sufficiently linear, the prin-
cipal’s costs are approximately given by a second-order Taylor polynomial
about 푟 = 1, thus
퐶(풖∣푟) ≈
∑
푠∈풮
훾푠(푎ˆ)푢푠 + Ω(풖∣푟) ,
where
Ω(풖∣푟) ≡
∑
푠∈풮
훾푠(푎ˆ)
[
(푢푠 ln 푢푠)(푟 − 1) + (1/2)푢푠(ln 푢푠)
2(푟 − 1)2
]
.
Relabeling signals such that the wage profile is increasing allows us to
express the incentive scheme in terms of increases in intrinsic utility. The
agent’s binding participation constraint implies that
푢1 = 푢¯+ 푐(푎ˆ)−
푆∑
푠=2
푏푠
{
푆∑
휏=푠
훾휏 (푎ˆ)− (휆− 1)
[ 푆∑
휏=푠
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
][ 푠−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
]}
≡ 푢1(풃)
and 푢푠 = 푢1(풃)+
∑푠
푡=2 푏푡 ≡ 푢푠(풃) for all 푠 = 2, . . . , 푆. Inserting the bind-
ing participation constraint into the above cost function and replacing
Ω(풖∣푟) equivalently by Ω˜(풃∣푟) ≡ Ω(푢1(풃), . . . , 푢푆(풃)∣푟) yields
퐶(풃∣푟) ≈ 푢¯+ 푐(푎ˆ) + (휆− 1)
푆∑
푠=2
푏푠
[
푆∑
휏=푠
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
][
푠−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
]
+ Ω˜(풃∣푟).
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Hence, for a given increasing wage profile the principal’s cost minimiza-
tion problem is:
Program ME:
min
풃∈ℝ푆−1
+
풃′흆(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) + Ω˜(풃∣푟)
subject to 풃′휷(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) = 푐′(푎ˆ) (IC′)
If 푟 is sufficiently close to 1, then the incentive scheme that solves pro-
gram ML also solves program ME. Note that generically program ME is
solved only by bonus schemes. Put differently, even if there are multi-
ple optimal contracts for program ML, all these contracts are generically
simple bonus contracts. Thus, from Proposition 15 it follows that gener-
ically for 푟 close to 1 the optimal incentive scheme entails a minimum of
wage differentiation. Note that for 휆 = 1 the principal’s problem is to
minimize Ω˜(풃∣푟) even for 푟 sufficiently close to 1. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 20
First consider 푏 ≥ 0. We divide the analysis for 푏 ≥ 0 into three subcases.
Case 1 (푎0 < 0): For the effort level 푎ˆ to be chosen by the agent, this
effort level has to satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint:
푎ˆ ∈ arg max
푎∈[0,1]
푢+ 훾(푎)푏− 훾(푎)(1− 훾(푎))푏(휆− 1)−
푘
2
푎2 (IC)
For 푎ˆ to be a zero of 푑퐸 [푈(푎)] /푑푎, the bonus has to be chosen according
to
푏∗(푎ˆ) =
푘푎ˆ
(훾퐻 − 훾퐿) [2− 휆+ 2훾(푎ˆ)(휆− 1)]
.
For 푎 > 푎0, 푏
∗(푎) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function with
푏∗(0) = 0. Hence, each 푎ˆ ∈ [0, 1] can be made a zero of 푑퐸 [푈(푎)] /푑푎 with
a non-negative bonus. By choosing the bonus according to 푏∗(푎ˆ), 푎ˆ sat-
isfies, by construction, the first-order condition. Inserting 푏∗(푎ˆ) into the
푑2퐸 [푈(푎)] /푑푎2 shows that expected utility is strictly concave function
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if 푎0 < 0. Hence, with the bonus set equal to 푏
∗(푎ˆ), effort level 푎ˆ satis-
fies the second-order condition for optimality and therefore is incentive
compatible.
Case 2 (푎0 = 0): Just like in the case where 푎0 < 0, each effort level
푎 ∈ [0, 1] turns out to be implementable with a non-negative bonus. To
see this, consider bonus
푏0 =
푘
2(훾퐻 − 훾퐿)2(휆− 1)
.
For 푏 ≤ 푏0, 푑퐸 [푈(푎)] /푑푎 < 0 for each 푎 > 0, that is, lowering effort
increases expected utility. Hence, the agent wants to choose an effort
level as low as possible and therefore exerts no effort at all. If, on the
other hand, 푏 > 푏0, then 푑퐸 [푈(푎)] /푑푎 > 0. Now, increasing effort
increases expected utility, and the agent wants to choose effort as high
as possible. For 푏 = 푏0, expected utility is constant over all 푎 ∈ [0, 1],
that is, as long as his participation constraint is satisfied, the agent is
indifferent which effort level to choose. As a tie-breaking rule we assume
that, if indifferent between several effort levels, the agent chooses the
effort level that the principal prefers.
Case 3 (푎0 > 0): If 푎0 > 0, the agent either chooses 푎 = 0 or 푎 = 1.
To see this, again consider bonus 푏0. For 푏 ≤ 푏0, 푑퐸 [푈(푎)] /푑푎 < 0 for
each 푎 > 0. Hence, the agent wants to exert as little effort as possible and
chooses 푎 = 0. If, on the other hand, 푏 > 푏0, then 푑
2퐸 [푈(푎)] /푑푎2 > 0,
that is, expected utility is a strictly convex function of effort. In order
to maximize expected utility, the agent will choose either 푎 = 0 or 푎 = 1
depending on whether 퐸 [푈(0)] exceeds 퐸 [푈(1)] or not.
Negative Bonus: 푏 < 0
Let 푏− < 0 denote the monetary punishment that the agent receives if
the good signal is observed. With a negative bonus, the agent’s expected
utility is
퐸 [푈(푎)] = 푢+ 훾(푎)푏− + 훾(푎)(1− 훾(푎))휆푏−
+ (1− 훾(푎))훾(푎)(−푏−)−
푘
2
푎2. (VII.22)
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The first derivative with respect to effort,
푑퐸 [푈(푎)]
푑푎
= (훾퐻 − 훾퐿)푏− [휆− 2훾(푎)(휆− 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
푀퐵−(푎)
− 푘푎︸︷︷︸
푀퐶(푎)
,
reveals that 푀퐵−(푎) is a positively sloped function, which is steeper the
harsher the punishment is, that is, the more negative 푏− is. It is worth-
while to point out that if bonus and punishment are equal in absolute
value, ∣푏−∣ = 푏, then also the slopes of푀퐵−(푎) and푀퐵(푎) are identical.
The intercept of푀퐵−(푎) with the horizontal axis, 푎−0 again is completely
determined by the model parameters:
푎−0 =
휆− 2훾퐿(휆− 1)
2(훾퐻 − 훾퐿)(휆− 1)
.
Note that 푎−0 > 0 for 훾
퐿 ≤ 1/2. For 훾퐿 > 1/2 we have 푎−0 < 0 if and only
if 휆 > 2훾퐿/(2훾퐿 − 1). Proceeding in exactly the same way as in the case
of a non-negative bonus yields a familiar results: effort level 푎ˆ ∈ [0, 1]
is implementable with a strictly negative bonus if and only if 푎−0 ≤ 0.
Finally, note that 푎0 < 푎
−
0 . Hence a negative bonus does not improve the
scope for implementation. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 21
Throughout the analysis we restricted attention to non-negative bonus
payment. It remains to be shown that the principal cannot benefit from
offering a negative bonus payment: implementing action 푎ˆ with a nega-
tive bonus is at least as costly as implementing action 푎ˆ with a positive
bonus. In what follows, we make use of notation introduced in the pa-
per as well as in the proof of Proposition 20. Let 푎0(푝), 푎
−
0 (푝), 푏
∗(푎ˆ; 푝),
and 푢∗(푎ˆ; 푝) denote the expressions obtained from 푎0, 푎
−
0 , 푏
∗(푎ˆ), and
푢∗(푎ˆ), respectively, by replacing 훾(푎ˆ), 훾퐿, and 훾퐻 with 훾(푎ˆ; 푝), 훾퐿(푝),
and 훾퐻(푝). From the proof of Proposition 19 we know that (i) action 푎ˆ
is implementable with a non-negative bonus (negative bonus) if and only
if 푎0(푝) ≤ 0 (푎
−
0 (푝) ≤ 0), (ii) 푎
−
0 (푝) ≤ 0 implies 푎0(푝) < 0. We will show
that, for a given value of 푝, if 푎ˆ is implementable with a negative bonus
then it is less costly to implement 푎ˆ with a non-negative bonus.
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Consider first the case where 푎−0 (푝) < 0. The negative bonus payment
satisfying incentive compatibility is given by
푏−(푎ˆ; 푝) =
푘푎ˆ
(훾퐻(푝)− 훾퐿(푝)) [휆− 2훾(푎ˆ; 푝)(휆− 1)]
.
It is easy to verify that the required punishment to implement 푎ˆ is larger
in absolute value than than the respective non-negative bonus which is
needed to implement 푎ˆ, that is, 푏∗(푎ˆ; 푝) < ∣푏−(푎ˆ; 푝)∣ for all 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1)
and all 푝 ∈ [0, 1). When punishing the agent with a negative bonus
푏−(푎ˆ; 푝), 푢−(푎ˆ; 푝) will be chosen to satisfy the corresponding participation
constraint with equality, that is,
푢−(푎ˆ; 푝) = 푢¯+
푘
2
푎ˆ2 − 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)푏−(푎ˆ; 푝) [휆− 훾(푎ˆ, 푝)(휆− 1)] .
Remember that, if 푎ˆ is implemented with a non-negative bonus, we have
푢∗(푎ˆ; 푝) = 푢¯+
푘
2
푎ˆ2 − 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)푏∗(푎ˆ; 푝) [2− 휆+ 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)(휆− 1)] .
It follows immediately that the minimum cost of implementing 푎ˆ with a
non-negative bonus is lower than the minimum implementation cost with
a strictly negative bonus:
퐶−(푎ˆ; 푝) = 푢−(푎ˆ; 푝) + 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)푏−(푎ˆ; 푝)
= 푢¯+
푘
2
푎ˆ2 − 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)푏−(푎ˆ; 푝) [휆− 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)(휆− 1)− 1]
> 푢¯+
푘
2
푎ˆ2 + 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)푏∗(푎ˆ; 푝) [휆− 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)(휆− 1)− 1]
= 푢¯+
푘
2
푎ˆ2 − 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)푏∗(푎ˆ; 푝) [1− 휆+ 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)(휆− 1)]
= 푢¯+
푘
2
푎ˆ2 − 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)푏∗(푎ˆ; 푝) [2− 휆+ 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)(휆− 1)]
+ 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)푏∗(푎ˆ; 푝)
= 푢∗(푎ˆ; 푝) + 훾(푎ˆ; 푝)푏∗(푎ˆ; 푝)
= 퐶(푎ˆ; 푝).
The same line of argument holds when 푎−0 = 0: the bonus which satisfies
the (IC) is
푏−0 (푎ˆ; 푝) = −
푘
2(훾퐻(푝)− 훾퐿(푝))2(휆− 1)
,
and so 푏∗(푎ˆ; 푝) < ∣푏−0 (푎ˆ; 푝)∣ for all 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1) and all 푝 ∈ [0, 1). □
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PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Let 푝 ∈ (0, 1). With 휻ˆ being a convex combination of 휸ˆ and 1 we have
(휁퐻 , 휁퐿) = 푝(1, 1)+(1−푝)(훾퐻 , 훾퐿) = (훾퐻+푝(1−훾퐻), 훾퐿+푝(1−훾퐿)). The
desired result follows immediately from Proposition 16: Consider 휆 > 2.
Implementation problems are less likely to be encountered under 휻ˆ than
under 휸ˆ. Moreover, if implementation problems are not an issue under
both performance measures, then implementation of a certain action is
less costly under 휻ˆ than under 휸ˆ. For 휆 = 2 implementation problems do
not arise and implementation costs are identical under both performance
measures. Last, if 휆 < 2, implementation problems are not an issue
under either performance measure, but the cost of implementation is
strictly lower under 휸ˆ than under 휻ˆ. □
VALIDITY OF THE FIRST-ORDER APPROACH
L e m m a 10: Suppose A3-A5 hold, then the incentive constraint in
the principal’s cost minimization problem can be represented as 퐸[푈 ′(푎ˆ)]
= 0.
Proof: Consider a contract (푢1, {푏푠}
푆
푠=2) with 푏푠 ≥ 0 for 푠 = 2, . . . , 푆.
In what follows, we write 훽푠 instead of 훽푠(휸ˆ, 휆, 푎ˆ) to cut back on notation.
The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that for a given contract
with the property 푏푠 > 0 only if 훽푠 > 0, all actions that satisfy the first-
order condition of the agent’s utility maximization problem characterize
a local maximum of his utility function. Since the utility function is
continuous and all extreme points are local maxima, if there exists some
action that fulfills the first-order condition, this action corresponds to the
unique maximum. In the second step we show that under the optimal
contract we cannot have 푏푠 > 0 if 훽푠 ≤ 0.
Step 1: The second derivative of the agent’s utility with respect to 푎
is
퐸[푈 ′′(푎)] = −2(휆− 1)
푆∑
푠=2
푏푠휎푠 − 푐
′′(푎) , (VII.23)
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where 휎푠 := (
∑푠−1
푖=1 훾
퐻
푖 − 훾
퐿
푖 )(
∑푆
푖=푠 훾
퐻
푖 − 훾
퐿
푖 ) < 0. Suppose action 푎ˆ
satisfies the first-order condition. Formally
푆∑
푠=2
푏푠훽푠 = 푐
′(푎ˆ) ⇐⇒
푆∑
푠=2
푏푠
훽푠
푎ˆ
=
푐′(푎ˆ)
푎ˆ
. (VII.24)
Action 푎ˆ locally maximizes the agent’s utility if
−2(휆− 1)
푆∑
푠=2
푏푠휎푠 < 푐
′′(푎ˆ). (VII.25)
Under Assumption A5, we have 푐′′(푎ˆ) > 푐(푎ˆ)/푎ˆ. Therefore, if
푆∑
푠=2
푏푠
[
−2(휆− 1)휎푠 − 훽푠/푎ˆ
]
< 0 , (VII.26)
then (VII.24) implies (VII.25), and each action 푎ˆ satisfying the first-order
condition of the agent’s maximization problem is a local maximum of his
expected utility. Inequality (VII.26) obviously is satisfied if each element
of the sum is negative. Summand 푠 is negative if and only if
− 2(휆− 1)
(
푠−1∑
푖=1
(훾퐻푖 − 훾
퐿
푖 )
)(
푆∑
푖=푠
(훾퐻푖 − 훾
퐿
푖 )
)
푎ˆ
−
(
푆∑
휏=푠
(훾퐻휏 − 훾
퐿
휏 )
)[
1− (휆− 1)
(
푠−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
)]
− (휆− 1)
[
푆∑
휏=푠
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
](
푠−1∑
푡=1
(훾퐻푡 − 훾
퐿
푡 )
)
< 0.
Rearranging the above inequality yields(
푆∑
푖=푠
(훾퐻푖 − 훾
퐿
푖 )
){
휆+ 2(휆− 1)
[
푎ˆ
푠−1∑
푖=1
(훾퐻푖 − 훾
퐿
푖 )−
푠−1∑
푖=1
훾푖(푎ˆ)
]}
> 0
⇐⇒
(
푆∑
푖=푠
(훾퐻푖 − 훾
퐿
푖 )
){
휆
(
1−
푠−1∑
푖=1
훾퐿푖
)
+ (2− 휆)
푠−1∑
푖=1
훾퐿푖
}
> 0
(VII.27)
The term in curly brackets is positive, since 휆 ≤ 2 and
∑푠−1
푖=1 훾
퐿
푖 < 1.
Furthermore, note that
∑푆
푖=푠(훾
퐻
푖 − 훾
퐿
푖 ) > 0 since 훽푠 > 0 for all 푏푠 > 0.
This completes the first step of the proof.
144
Step 2: Consider a contract with 푏푠 > 0 and 훽푠 ≤ 0 for at least
one signal 푠 ∈ {2, . . . , 푆} that implements 푎ˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then, under this
contract, (IC′) is satisfied and there exists at least one signal 푡 with 훽푡 > 0
and 푏푡 > 0. Obviously, the principal can reduce both 푏푠 and 푏푡 without
violating (IC′). This reasoning goes through up to the point where (IC′)
is satisfied and 푏푠 = 0 for all signals 푠 with 훽푠 ≤ 0. From the first step
of the proof we know that the resulting contract implements 푎ˆ incentive
compatibly. Next, we show that reducing any spread, say 푏푘, always
reduces the principal’s cost of implementation.
퐶(풃) =
푆∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ
(
푢1(풃) +
푠∑
푡=2
푏푠
)
,where
푢1(풃) = 푢¯+푐(푎ˆ)−
푆∑
푡=2
푏푠
[
푆∑
휏=푠
훾휏 (푎ˆ)− (휆− 1)
(
푆∑
휏=푠
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
)(
푠−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
)]
.
The partial derivative of the cost function with respect to an arbitrary
푏푘 is
∂퐶(풃)
∂푏푘
=
푘−1∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ
′
(
푢1(풃) +
푠∑
푡=2
푏푠
)[
∂푢1
∂푏푘
]
+
푆∑
푠=푘
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ
′
(
푢1(풃) +
푠∑
푡=2
푏푠
)[
∂푢1
∂푏푘
+ 1
]
.
Rearranging yields
∂퐶(풃)
∂푏푘
=
푘−1∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ
′(푢푠)
⋅
[
(휆− 1)
(
푆∑
휏=푘
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
)(
푘−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
)
−
푆∑
휏=푘
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
푆∑
푠=푘
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ
′(푢푠)
[
(휆− 1)
(
푆∑
휏=푘
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
)(
푘−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
)
−
푆∑
휏=푘
훾휏 (푎ˆ) + 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
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Note 푢푠 ≤ 푢푠+1 which implies that ℎ
′(푢푠) ≤ ℎ
′(푢푠+1). Thus, the following
inequality holds
∂퐶(풃)
∂푏푘
≥
푘−1∑
푠=1
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ
′(푢푘)
⋅
[
(휆− 1)
(
푆∑
휏=푘
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
)(
푘−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
)
−
푆∑
휏=푘
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
]
+
푆∑
푠=푘
훾푠(푎ˆ)ℎ
′(푢푘)
[
(휆− 1)
(
푆∑
휏=푘
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
)(
푘−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
)
−
푆∑
휏=푘
훾휏 (푎ˆ) + 1
]
.
The above inequality can be rewritten as follows
∂퐶(풃)
∂푏푘
≥ ℎ′(푢푘)
[
(휆− 1)
(
푆∑
휏=푘
훾휏 (푎ˆ)
)(
푘−1∑
푡=1
훾푡(푎ˆ)
)]
> 0.
Since reducing any bonus lowers the principal’s cost of implementation,
it cannot be optimal to set 푏푠 > 0 for 훽푠 ≤ 0. This completes the second
step of the proof. In combination with step 1, this establishes the desired
result. □
146
VII.5. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI
It is useful to know the following properties of a CES function, where we
take the specification of (VI.1):
(i) 푑퐼
푑퐼푡
is positive and homogenous of degree 0.
(ii) 푑
2퐼
푑퐼1푑퐼2
is positive for 휙 < 1 and zero for 휙 = 1.
(iii) 푑
2퐼
푑퐼2푡
is negative for 휙 < 1 and zero for 휙 = 1.
(iv) For 휙 < 1 and 퐼−푡 > 0, lim퐼푡→0
푑퐼
푑퐼푡
=∞.
PROOF OF LEMMA 9
The first-order conditions of (VI.5) are:
푑휋
푑퐼퐻2
= 푤
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼
[⋅]1/휙−1훼 (1− 훾)((1 + 훽) 퐼
퐻
2
∣∣
훼
)휙−1(1 + 훽)−
1
1 + 푟
= 0;
푑피훼[휋]
푑퐼ˆ1
=
1
2
푤
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=훽
[⋅]
1/휙−1
훼=훽 훾
(
(1 + 훽)퐼ˆ1 + (1− 훽)퐼ˇ1
)휙−1
(1 + 훽)
+
1
2
푤
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=−훽
[⋅]
1/휙−1
훼=−훽훾
(
(1− 훽)퐼ˆ1 + (1 + 훽)퐼ˇ1
)휙−1
(1− 훽)
− 1 = 0;
푑피훼[휋]
푑퐼ˇ1
=
1
2
푤
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=훽
[⋅]
1/휙−1
훼=훽 훾
(
(1 + 훽)퐼ˆ1 + (1− 훽)퐼ˇ1
)휙−1
(1− 훽)
+
1
2
푤
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=−훽
[⋅]
1/휙−1
훼=−훽훾
(
(1− 훽)퐼ˆ1 + (1 + 훽)퐼ˇ1
)휙−1
(1 + 훽)
− 1 = 0.
[⋅]훼 is the square bracket of (VI.4) evaluated at 훼. For the first-order
conditions of 퐼ˆ1 and 퐼ˇ1 we have used the Envelope theorem. Note, we
cannot be sure that in the optimum the first-order conditions must be
satisfied.
Due to the assumptions on 푚(⋅) it cannot be optimal not to invest at
all. Additionally, due to the concavity of 푚(⋅) an optimum exists.
Part 1: It holds that 퐼ˆ1 = 퐼ˇ1.
The case 휙 < 1. Property (iv) of the CES function implies that it is
optimal to invest a positive amount in both periods. Which proves the
last part of Lemma 9 and implies that the first-order condition of 퐼퐻2 must
be fulfilled in the optimum. Since 푑
2퐼
푑퐼2푡
< 0 for 휙 < 1 and 푑2푚(⋅)/푑퐼2 < 0
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the optimal 퐼퐻2 is unique. Moreover, since
푑퐼
푑퐼푡
is homogenous of degree 0
and 푑2푚(⋅)/푑퐼2 < 0 in the optimum
퐼퐻2
퐼effective1
is decreasing in 퐼effective1 .
Suppose that 퐼ˆ1 < 퐼ˇ1. Then
푑피훼[휋]
푑퐼ˆ1
≤ 푑피훼[휋]
푑퐼ˇ1
. Hence,
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=훽
[⋅]
1/휙−1
훼=훽
(
(1 + 훽)퐼ˆ1 + (1− 훽)퐼ˇ1
)휙−1
≤
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=−훽
[⋅]
1/휙−1
훼=−훽
(
(1− 훽)퐼ˆ1 + (1 + 훽)퐼ˇ1
)휙−1
.
From before we know that the first-order condition of 퐼퐻2 must be fulfilled
in the optimum. Inserting it into the previous inequality yields(
퐼퐻2
∣∣
훼=훽
퐼effective1
∣∣
훼=훽
)1−휙
≤
(
퐼퐻2
∣∣
훼=−훽
퐼effective1
∣∣
훼=−훽
)1−휙
. (VII.28)
Due to 퐼ˆ1 < 퐼ˇ1 we have 퐼
effective
1
∣∣
훼=훽
< 퐼effective1
∣∣
훼=−훽
. Since in the op-
timum
퐼퐻2
퐼effective1
is decreasing in 퐼effective1 , see before, (VII.28) cannot be
fulfilled. Also 퐼ˆ1 > 퐼ˇ1 yields a contradiction. Hence, 퐼ˆ1 = 퐼ˇ1.
The case 휙 = 1. With 휙 = 1 there are either corner solutions in which
it is optimal to invest in only one period, or there is an indifference. In
the latter case it is weakly optimal to choose 퐼ˆ1 = 퐼ˇ1. In the former case,
it is either optimal (i) not to invest in period 1, or (ii) it is optimal not
to invest in period 2. In case (i) 퐼ˆ1 = 퐼ˇ1 = 0. In case (ii) we must have
퐼ˆ1, 퐼ˇ1 > 0 which implies
푑피훼[휋]
푑퐼ˆ1
= 푑피훼[휋]
푑퐼ˇ1
. So
1
2
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=훽
(1 + 훽) +
1
2
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=−훽
(1− 훽)
=
1
2
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=훽
(1− 훽) +
1
2
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=−훽
(1 + 훽)
which simplifies to
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=훽
=
푑푚(⋅)
푑퐼
∣∣∣∣
훼=−훽
.
Since 퐼퐻2 = 0 this requires 퐼ˆ1 = 퐼ˇ1.
Part 2: It holds that 퐼퐻2
∣∣
훼=−훽
= 퐼퐻2
∣∣
훼=훽
.
The case 휙 < 1. From Part 1 we know that 퐼ˆ1 = 퐼ˇ1 > 0. This directly
implies, see the first-order condition of 퐼퐻2 , that in the optimum, although
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the type of the second period investment depends on 훼, the height of the
second period investments 퐼퐻2 is independent of 훼.
The case 휙 = 1. When it is optimal to invest only in the second
period the same arguments as with 휙 < 1 apply. When it is optimal only
to invest in the first period we have 퐼퐻2 = 0 for both, 훼 = 훽 and 훼 = −훽.
When there is a case of indifference it is weakly optimal to choose 퐼ˆ1 = 퐼ˇ1,
see Part 1. Then the the first-order condition of 퐼퐻2 implies that 퐼
퐻
2 is
independent of 훼. □
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